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Waiting for Mr. X

And a Strategy of Liberation for Post-Cold War Europe

Burton Yale Pines

The Cold War is melting. And the map of Europe is becoming more fluid than at any time in four decades. The changes in thinking in Bonn, Brussels, Paris, Rome, and, to an extent, London and Washington are cascading at a pace unimaginable only a year ago. Seriously questioned and even being discarded are some of the most firmly held assumptions about the nature of the military threat to Western Europe, the prospects for democracy in Eastern Europe, and the future of Leninism-Stalinism in the Soviet Union itself.

To be sure, much—perhaps too much—of the perception of what is happening is prompted by a fatigued West's wishful thinking or by an eagerness to accept Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's words as tantamount to deeds. Prudence surely argues that the jury on his perestroika and "new thinking" is still out and that almost all of what has happened so far (even in Poland) remains reversible. Indeed, even if Gorbachev is sincere and even if he succeeds, his Soviet Union will remain the globe's most serious military and geopolitical threat to the West and, above all, to America. Yet, prudence also argues that because so much is in flux and so many assumptions about East-West relations justifiably are being questioned (if not jettisoned), new thinking by the West is imperative.

Not since the four years after World War II have the pieces on the European board seemed so likely to be rearranged. This obviously poses many new challenges for Western Europe, Eastern Europe (or, as it again may be called, Central Europe), the Soviet Union, and the United States. Cliché though it may be, these challenges also offer enormous opportunities.

Kennan's Profound Insight

To meet these challenges and profit from these opportunities, the West, particularly Washington, needs a new conceptual structure positing goals, suggesting strategies, and outlining tactics for East-West relations. Needed, in essence, is another "X" article—that famous essay by George Kennan in the July 1947 *Foreign Affairs* that he anonymously signed "X."

Although Kennan subsequently lost his bite (and relevance) as a foreign policy analyst, the "X" article stands as a landmark in perceptive American geopolitical thinking. It correctly assessed Moscow's immediate post-World War II motives and intentions and called on the U.S. to gear up for what he rightly warned would be "a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." The article, which gave our political lexicon the word "containment" as a prescription for conducting foreign policy, helped shape U.S. views toward a Soviet Union that was tearing up the peaceful European order that had been negotiated for the postwar years. Though Kennan long ago distanced himself from his doctrine of "containment," history testifies to the profound insight of his article. The Soviet Union—at last, and at great financial and psychic cost to the U.S.—now may be contained, at least on the European front, apparently having concluded that the price of continued expansion, domination, and suppression of other countries may be too high to pay.

Should this be as true as it seems, it marks a grand victory for the West in general and for U.S. foreign policy in particular—as articulated and pursued over the postwar decades by James Byrnes, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Henry Kissinger. They drew the containment line, running first along divided Germany's inner border, then Europe's East-West boundary, through the Middle East and Southeast Asia and, finally, along the Sino-Soviet frontier.

The emerging situation is notably a victory for Ronald Reagan's policies. By rebuilding the U.S. arsenal and launching such advanced programs as the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan signaled strongly that America no longer would tolerate the shift of the global correlation of forces in Moscow's favor. By funding the National Endowment for Democracy and firing rhetorical salvos (from the lofty Westminster speech to the "evil empire" jab), he put Moscow on the unaccustomed public diplomacy defensive. And most important, by moving swiftly into Grenada and by determinedly supporting anti-Communist forces in Afghanistan, Angola, Cam-

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bodia, and Nicaragua (even, in some cases, with weapons as advanced as Stinger missiles), he ended Moscow's free ride in exploiting Third World instability.

Under Reagan, the U.S. raised the price of Soviet expansionism and adventurism to levels that the Kremlin's leaders apparently concluded are unacceptable. This reversed, of course, the trend in the middle and late 1970s when—through the Clark amendment, the Church committee's emasculation of the CIA, and the Carter foreign policy as conducted by Cyrus Vance and Andrew Young—Soviet adventurism went almost totally unopposed by the United States. Today, even most Soviets would blush at the naïveté of President Carter's Secretary of State Vance, who actually said that President Carter and Soviet leader Brezhnev "share similar dreams and aspirations." Indeed, Soviet officials and the press seem to be trying to outdo each other in denouncing and ridiculing Brezhnev.

Low Tension/Low Stability

For some policymakers and commentators in NATO capitals, the old East-West confrontation may be preferable to whatever is replacing it. At least the familiar terrain is well charted; rules have been learned (and generally observed) and methods of managing the tensions have been mastered. While few will dispute that Soviet troop reductions in Europe are a good thing, few also will deny that the new order may be plagued by problems as vexing as the old. Wistfully observed a seasoned foreign policy expert in London this April: "We are going from an East-West situation of high tension/high stability to a situation of low tension/low stability."

His view is widely shared and the anxiety level of West European policymakers is high, perhaps unreasonably so. After all, "high stability" has been brought to East-West relations only because the West, by and large, has stuck to containment as its strategy in dealing with Moscow. The new situation can become highly stable if the West devises and pursues a strategy as appropriate to the emerging order as containment has been to the fading order.

A new "X" essay could be the map by which the West, particularly Washington, navigates Europe's changed geopolitical terrain. This map would indicate how the West could: 1) ensure that Eastern Europe frees itself from Moscow's yoke; 2) offer Moscow incentives to respect East European freedom; 3) give Moscow guarantees that an Eastern Europe no longer in the Soviet sphere of influence would not become a military threat; 4) address West and East European fears that Germany (possibly reunited) could dominate the region from which Soviet troops and influence would withdraw; 5) design criteria for verifying that Gorbachev actually is carrying out his glasnost, democratization, economic restructuring, and other promised reforms; and 6) offer incentives for greater freedoms within the Soviet Union itself. In short, the essay could offer a strategy for conducting a genuine policy of liberation, fulfilling Dulles's promise long ago to "roll back" Moscow's post-World War II push into Central Europe.

An "X" essay would restate the principles of U.S. foreign policy—that the primary aims of such policy are protection and advancement of American national interests and that these are achieved by the United States remaining actively engaged in the world, by preserving and spreading freedom abroad, and by insisting that democracy and economic development require economic freedom. An "X" essay would explain the premises upon which a new policy toward Moscow rests and then would warn that although the Cold War may be thawing in Europe, elsewhere U.S.–Soviet tensions remain. Guidance must be offered, therefore, for dealing with U.S.–Soviet relations in non-NATO areas.

Only a boldly articulated vision of Europe's new order by Washington can prevent Bonn and other NATO capitals from prematurely letting down their defenses and making separate deals with Moscow.

The first premise of the new strategy would explain why Moscow is changing. There is no need to detail Marxism's now widely recognized failure worldwide as an ideal or a blueprint for building a new society. Nor is there need to detail the Soviet Union's dismal domestic plight—the imploding economy, falling living standards, shrinking life expectancy, paralysis of creativity, and official corruption. From the stories in the official Soviet press alone, it is clear that perestroika is not just a Kremlin option; it is a necessity if the Soviet Union is to march into the 21st century as a great power, to say nothing of a superpower.

The Soviet Burden in Eastern Europe

The second premise would argue that Soviet economic problems now make it reasonable to assume that Gorbachev may be curbing foreign adventurism to marshal his country's resources for internal reform. It also is reasonable to assume that Moscow may want to free itself from what have become the burdens of ruling Eastern Europe. For the quarter-century after World War II and longer, Eastern Europe was a Soviet economic boon. In the past decade Eastern Europe has probably become a costly economic liability for the USSR, and it definitely has become a political liability as Soviet suppression of the region continually puts Moscow on the public opinion defensive. Eastern Europe's main and incalculable value to Moscow is as a security buffer, ensuring that hostile (read: German) troops cannot mass on the Soviet border.

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
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
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If the Soviets truly curb their foreign adventurism, it will be a grand victory for the containment policies of James Byrnes, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, and Ronald Reagan.

A third premise, almost too obvious to be stated, is that American national interests are better served and advanced by the nation's continued active involvement in the world rather than by a gradual withdrawal of forces and interests. Whether it is a matter of access to natural resources, of securing trade routes and sea lanes, of protecting Americans abroad, of dousing brushfires before they burst into major wars, or of pursuing what we once unapologetically called manifest destiny, America must be engaged or have the ability of engaging militarily almost everywhere in the world—including, obviously, Europe.

A fourth premise is that Washington, with the right action at the right time, can nudge Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union toward democracy and freedom. This premise disputes those urging the U.S. either to remain passive and allow events in Eastern Europe to take their course or to stay a step behind Moscow. With events in Europe moving so rapidly, only a boldly articulated vision of Europe's new order by Washington can prevent Bonn and other NATO capitals from prematurely letting down their defenses and making separate deals with Moscow that will give the Soviets credits and other benefits without requiring concessions that advance freedom in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

A final premise is that, for a time, U.S. security policy and foreign policy need not operate in tandem. Changes or reductions in the U.S. military force structure require not simply the Kremlin's statements that it is changing military doctrine but proof that it actually has restructured and reduced Soviet forces. Here old advice remains sound advice: the U.S. arsenal should be determined not by an adversary's proclaimed policies, which could be reversed suddenly, but by its capabilities. By contrast, U.S. foreign policy proposals could be prompted by perceived or announced changes in Soviet policy. U.S. policy, after all, can be modified quickly if events require. Thus, while U.S. foreign policy can take risks to grab the initiative from Gorbachev, U.S. defense policy must lag behind, demanding Soviet force reductions before there are Pentagon reductions. A challenge to American policymakers, therefore, will be to prevent easily reversible gains on the diplomatic front from forcing concessions on the military front, while mustering public support for the expenditures still needed to defend against an adversary with which we are negotiating.

Kissinger: A Grand Settlement to Undo Yalta

A major portion of what could become an "X" article already is being discussed in a set of propositions and proposals offered by Henry Kissinger to President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker. These proposals have been criticized in the U.S. and abroad. Yet upon probing, the critics' reasons turn out to be based mainly on second- and third-hand erroneous reports of what Kissinger ostensibly told Bush and Baker. A problem here, of course, is that Kissinger has yet to detail his ideas in print. Nonetheless, when his assumptions and recommendations are stitched together and explained to the critics, most objections seem to fade. This was the case in talks with several dozen experts in NATO capitals this April.

Sweeping in scope, Kissinger's proposals call for taking the initiative away from Gorbachev by seeking a grand settlement for Europe. The proposals are based, in part, on the premise that if Gorbachev views Eastern Europe as a mounting burden, then he will consider a graceful, honorable way of relinquishing it if he receives something in return.

The Kissinger plan's main points:

1) The Soviets would yield their control over Eastern Europe and, in effect, abandon their claim that the region is in their sphere of influence. The result, says Kissinger, would be "the de-Yaltafying of Europe."

2) The East European nations would be guaranteed, by treaty and other means, nearly full sovereignty and self-determination. The model for this could be the 1955 treaty by which the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and France ended their occupation of Austria and gave that nation its freedom. To reread this treaty today is to be surprised at the seemingly extensive (even humiliating) limits imposed on Austria's sovereignty. Article 4, for example, bars "political or economic union between Austria and Germany" and requires Austria "to prevent within its territory any act likely, directly or indirectly, to promote such union." Article 12 bars non-Austrians from serving in the Austrian armed forces, while Article 13 lists whole classes of weapons that Austria "shall not possess, construct or experiment with"; these include "any self-propelled or guided missiles or torpedoes" and "guns with a range of more than 30 kilometers." The treaty then gives the four nations the right, which they still enjoy, "to add to this Article prohibitions of any weapons which may be evolved as a result of scientific development." The treaty also imposes political conditions, requiring in Article 6, for example, that Austria "secure to all persons under Austrian jurisdiction...the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting." And Article 8 declares flatly that "Austria shall have a democratic government based on elections by secret ballot and shall guarantee to all citizens free, equal, and universal suffrage."

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These limitations on sovereignty clearly have not stopped Austria from flourishing and becoming all but formally a member of the West. East European nations' sovereignties similarly could be limited somewhat to take into account Soviet security concerns. For example, these nations could be barred from joining any military alliance or from allowing Western troops to be based on their soil, in order to allay Moscow's fears that German troops once again might mass on the Soviet frontier.

3) A further incentive for Moscow to withdraw from Eastern Europe would be Western economic aid, credits, and other appropriate help. These would be delivered, however, only as Moscow fulfills specific conditions.

4) Moscow would agree, perhaps in a parallel accord with the U.S., to reduce tensions in such non-NATO areas as Central America, Africa, and the Pacific Basin.

Incentives for Both Sides

Kissinger's proposal offers incentives to both sides. For the U.S. and the West, a negotiated settlement would increase significantly the chances of a free Eastern Europe, allowing self-determination, multiparty democracy, and economic integration with the West. Were the U.S. simply to watch passively as events take their course, there probably would be at least an even chance that Moscow would intervene forcibly in an Eastern Europe that is moving away from the Soviet orbit. Red Army tanks rumbling into Warsaw or Budapest or Prague would set back East European liberalization for years. An agreement with Moscow, by contrast, reduces considerably the chances that the Soviets forcibly would repress East European democratization. An agreement, moreover, would ensure that economic aid from the West buys concessions from Moscow. Otherwise, Gorbachev is likely to get his Western aid anyway—albeit piecemeal—without having to yield anything substantial.

For Gorbachev, an agreement would allow him to pose as the co-author of East European liberalization and to bring to the Politburo a package of economic benefits from the West. This surely is vastly preferable for him to losing Eastern Europe by rebellion, which would do much more to humiliate Moscow and tarnish the Soviet superpower image than would withdrawing voluntarily. And an agreement (on the 1955 Austrian model) would make the West a guarantor that Eastern Europe would not threaten USSR security.

And, too, for Gorbachev, an agreement would enable him to escape a surely terrifying dilemma—that East European events could force him either to admit that he cannot control the region (and thus risk being toppled by the Politburo) or to dispatch troops to restore Soviet control (and by so doing destroy the image in the West of the new, benign Soviet Union, prompting renewed mistrust and vigilance by the West).

Revisiting the German Question

An "X" article, of course, must go beyond Kissinger's proposals. It must deal with what history has known as "The German Question." Here the premise is that if Moscow largely disengages from Central Europe, the region's most powerful state would be Germany, even West Germany alone. This enormously worries (indeed, frightens) many West and, presumably, East Europeans. A visitor to Paris, London, and Brussels is struck by how quickly a discussion of Europe's new fluidity turns to The German Question. Whatever else it has done, it now broadly is acknowledged that the Cold War's division of

An agreement with Moscow ensures that Western aid buys Soviet concessions.

Europe into East and West has dealt with Germany in a way that ironically allays its neighbors' fears. "What happens now?" is the question raised by many.

Such resurgent anxieties about Germany, meanwhile, are not calmed by Bonn's assertive economic, cultural, and even political initiatives in Eastern Europe or by ranking West German officials who blithely talk about the value of Germany's former "connections and networks" in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other points east. An "X" article thus must sketch a European order in which Germany—even united—will not be threatening. If Washington fails to address this, then Paris, London, and other capitals scarred by past German militarism surely will try to devise their own means of checking Germany, perhaps even cutting a deal with Moscow reminiscent of the pre-World War I Paris-St. Petersburg-London Triple Entente. A stable European order may require, among other things, indefinite basing of some U.S. troops in Europe to provide what Europeans delicately call stability. Such stability, they explain, requires checking not only Soviet ambitions but German ambitions as well. How many soldiers remain would be determined by East-West conventional arms talks.

Avoiding the Disintegration of 1914

An "X" article also must suggest ways to deal with other likely European instabilities. Many experts warn that the Soviet Empire seems to be unraveling in ways similar to those of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires at the start of this century. This could lead to confrontation between Romania and Hungary over contested territory, disintegration of Yugoslavia, security threats to the fledgling East European democracies, or other tensions. To manage these tensions and to prevent them from igniting the kind of continental conflict that flared in 1914, agreements and mechanisms may be needed.

An "X" article must propose criteria by which American policymakers, the press, and the public can verify whether perestroika and glasnost are taking hold and that the Soviet Union indeed is changing. The pace of these changes will determine, to a considerable extent, how Washington pursues its new policy. Some criteria for evaluating perestroika have been suggested by The Heritage Foundation's *Mandate for Leadership III;* these include release of all political prisoners, unrestricted travel and emigration, transfer of collective farm land to

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the peasants, creation of a truly independent judiciary, and legalization of independent publishing. More criteria are needed, as are suggestions for a mechanism to determine whether the criteria are being met. Cautions *Mandate:* "The U.S. must be able to distinguish between...1) Potemkin village-style artificial changes designed to deceive the West; 2) real changes that are either marginal or can be easily reversed; and 3) fundamental changes that alter the nature of the Soviet system."

Even if Gorbachev is sincere and even if he succeeds, his Soviet Union will remain the globe's most serious military and geopolitical threat to the West.

An "X" article must explain that resolution of the Cold War in Europe will not necessarily thaw U.S.-Soviet tensions elsewhere. The historical competition between America and the Soviet Union remains, and the USSR could be tempted to press the U.S. in Central America, Africa, and the Pacific. Because West European governments probably will remain as unconcerned as they typically have been about Soviet challenges to U.S. interests in the Third World, Washington must push for a separate understanding with Moscow on Soviet actions outside Europe. The incentives that the U.S. offers for Soviet good behavior in Europe, therefore, could be linked with good Soviet behavior elsewhere. More important, the Pentagon must begin restructuring U.S. forces, shifting resources from preparations for the classic massive air and land battle in Europe to a greater ability to project power to discourage Soviet adventurism in the Third World. This means reducing substantially the number of U.S. troops in Europe, particularly in Germany—perhaps from the current 325,000 to about 100,000 or even fewer. The U.S., too, will need a new strategy and more resources for public diplomacy and intelligence activities; these probably will be the arenas in which Moscow will be increasingly combative.

Finally, America must remember that if the old order of the Cold War seems to be ending in a Western victory it is because the U.S. (and its allies) created disincentives and imposed (in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Grenada, and Nicaragua) high penalties for Soviet adventurism. For the new order to be stable, therefore, appropriate disincentives and penalties on those who threaten the order must be designed. Making the case for such disincentives and suggesting what they may be would be a task of a new "X" article.

Washington as Spectator

The case for a new "X" article is compelling. Its appearance could ignite the essential foreign policy debate examining whether the venerable premises of U.S. policy toward Moscow remain valid. Through articles published on both sides of the Atlantic and by the East, through speculative analyses daringly offered for examination and refutation, and through official talks and many unofficial discussions with Soviets and other East Europeans, the feasibility and outlines of a new order for Europe could be probed and, perhaps, discovered. Gradually, the foreign policy elites in the East and West, and the press, would become comfortable with ideas that, at first blush, may seem inappropriate. It is in this way, after all, that consensus typically coalesces.

Without a new strategic consensus, Washington will find itself a spectator as Europe's old order dissolves. Without a new vision and renewed conceptual leadership from America, Gorbachev will retain the geopolitical initiative, enticing West European nations to cut their own limited deals with him for which he need make few key concessions in return. Without an attempt to devise a grand framework for dealing with what may be Moscow's defeat in the Cold War, new instabilities and dangers surely will replace the old. Without such a new strategy, it will be difficult to persuade the West's publics of the need for a reinvigorated, muscular containment policy should glasnost and perestroika fail or prove themselves a sham. ☎

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The Ever-Present Danger

Fred C. Iklé on Changing Threats to Our Freedom

An Interview by Adam Meyerson

Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1981 to 1987, provided much of the intellectual fire-power for both Strategic Defense and the Reagan Doctrine of supporting anti-Communist resistance movements, and consistently warned that the West's defense strategy is not keeping up with changing technologies. Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Nixon and Ford administrations, Mr. Iklé has also warned for many years that arms control policy must include measures to insure compliance if it is to serve our interests. Now affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., Mr. Iklé discussed with *Policy Review* both his years with Reagan and the security threats that will confront President Bush. The interview was conducted in early May by Adam Meyerson, editor of *Policy Review*.

Policy Review: **Writing for the Hoover Institution in early 1980, you saw three major threats to American security over the coming decade: the growing military power of the Soviet Union relative to the U.S., the vulnerability of the West to a disruption in oil supplies from the Middle East, and an obsolete nuclear strategy. How successful was the Reagan administration in reducing each of these threats?**

Iklé: The overall balance of military power between the Soviet Union and the United States improved during the Reagan years: the quality of our military personnel has been restored, and our tanks, ships, and aircraft have been modernized. However, the Soviet Union is still our strongest adversary, and its military power keeps growing while our own defense budget has been shrinking for several years. No Western experts, either inside or outside our government, know whether the Soviet military buildup will level off now. Mr. Gorbachev has been speaking a more benign language, but the shrinking of the Soviet military budget has so far been only talk. Should the Soviets continue to divert so many of their national resources to the military—then, without an American response, their military power would again grow relative to ours. That would be a serious threat.

I am much less concerned about the vulnerability of our oil supplies than I was in 1980, in the wake of the Khomeini takeover in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Soviet military buildup facing the Persian Gulf region. Afghanistan is no longer a military base for the Soviets, and, in fact, the whole experience in Afghanistan would make the Soviets extremely uneasy about intervening in Iran, something many Carter and Reagan advisors were worried about in 1980. Today, it's hard to imagine the military staff in Moscow being tempted by the thought of occupying Iran and having to cope with a hostile population larger and militarily more capable than the Afghans. In the last few years we also reduced our vulnerability with our daring but successful operation to protect the sea lanes in the Gulf. Together with our allies, who gave us more support here than ever before, we were able to stare down Khomeini. The operation was risky and we lost some lives, but we came out whole and healthy.

Our NATO strategy is still obsolete. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative speech in March 1983 changed much of the thinking about reliance on massive retaliation as the only response to possible attack. But the reality is that our NATO strategy hasn't changed much. Certainly the European conception of NATO strategy hasn't changed. In essence, the European community still postulates that it need not worry about war, because any major Soviet attack would escalate to all-out nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, with consequences so awful for the Soviets that a major attack will never occur.

This strategy of massive retaliation has been made obsolete by a less favorable nuclear balance between East and West, and by new technology that permits Soviet discriminating attacks with nuclear as well as conventional weapons against military targets. Such attacks could immensely damage our military forces but leave most of the civilian society in the West intact. It is no longer reasonable to assume that after a disabling, yet discriminate, attack on the NATO military structure, the NATO governments would then decide to unleash nuclear Armageddon. This strategy is likely to fail in time of crisis.

Our European allies are so attached to the old NATO

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

Iklé: "We're hearing a lot now about the importance of being pragmatic. But leadership and pragmatism are not the same."

strategy, however, that it is politically very difficult to make adjustments. I experienced this when the commission on long-term strategy that I co-chaired issued its report *Discriminate Deterrence* in early 1988. Our pointing out the weaknesses in current strategy created a lot of anxiety in Europe. The Europeans sense the inadequacy of the strategy, but prefer to leave things alone because they're not facing an imminent threat.

P.R.: **So two of the most serious security threats in the 1980s—growing Soviet military power and an obsolete NATO strategy—are still major causes for concern. What other important threats to American security do you see in the 1990s?**

Iklé: The biggest threat of a dangerous crisis is no longer in Central Europe, or even the Persian Gulf, but a potential confrontation between Israel and its neighbors. Israel is under assault. Its image is under attack. The reporting in the American media often shows Israeli forces in an unfavorable light. Congressional support for Israel may therefore diminish; but more importantly, the Israeli self-confidence may weaken. At the same time, adversaries of Israel are getting stronger; Syria, which is linked to the Soviet Union and armed with chemical weapons, in particular is acting with cruelty and aggressiveness in Lebanon. The perennial Arab-Israeli conflict on the West Bank and in Gaza seems to be getting worse. The Middle East could be the arena of an immense crisis in which the U.S. would be inextricably involved because of our long-standing commitment to Israel's security. But to make matters worse, Washington might be deeply divided as to the proper American role, and all the military options are likely to be unattractive.

Another smoldering crisis is in Central America, where Congress's abandonment of the Contras has demoralized the democracies and given heart to the Communist insurgents in El Salvador. The Communists in El Salvador have figured out a way to win: by influencing the U.S. Congress. I am worried that the Bush administration might be unable to continue economic and military assistance to El Salvador if the Left succeeds in mobilizing its forces in Congress to impose a cutoff of U.S. assistance to El Salvador, much as they imposed a cutoff of U.S. assistance to the Contras. Such a turn of events would probably permit the FMLN, the hard-line Communist insurgent force, to gain control over El Salvador. Honduras, thus squeezed between a Communist El Salvador and Ortega's Nicaragua, would be an easy next victim.

P.R.: **What strategic implications do you see in the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, the elections in Poland, and the partial political liberalization in the Soviet Union? Are we seeing the beginning of the retreat of the Soviet empire, and the decline of messianic, totalitarian Communism? Or is this just a temporary resting point in the decades-long expansion of Soviet power, what you have often described as "two steps forward, one step back"?**

Iklé: The importance of these developments is how they reveal the bankruptcy of Communism as an ideology. It is no longer a political belief that can inspire people. Ronald Reagan was attacked for saying clearly and explicitly that Communism was intellectually bankrupt. Now Gorbachev himself and other people in Moscow are saying it. Indeed, they are pointing out the evils that were committed under their predecessors.

But this is not to say that the power structures in the Soviet Union have been radically changed. They have not. The KGB is still there. The military remain in power. They might revert to a harsher control over the population, continue to extract large resources for the military from the rest of Soviet society, and return to a more aggressive foreign policy.

It is unlikely that the Soviet Union can recover its ideological strength. But it can become an expansionary military power again. If the Soviets succeed in expanding, their prestige might increase again as well.

The Bush administration is correct in its cautious approach to the START negotiations and its cautious assessment of long-term Soviet military policies. I would like to see the same caution applied in the economic sphere. We must not go overboard in sending the Soviets

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credits or new technology that could be used against us militarily. There's just too much uncertainty in the evolution of the Soviet empire. We can encourage favorable development; but, as Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has suggested, we have to be prepared for a possible reversal.

***P.R.:* The United States has many disputes these days with our European, Japanese, and South Korean allies, but realistically there are only so many things we can ask our allies to do. Which are the most important actions to demand of our allies?**

Iklé: We have to keep asking them to share with us the burden of the common defense, to take over certain tasks that they can handle better than we. And we have to keep leaning on them as well as on our own business community to maintain strict controls on technology transfer and prudent limits on credit flows to the Soviet Union.

But it's not just a matter of asking; we also have to lead. We are by far the largest power in the alliance. We are still the largest economic power in the world, and for historic reasons we are the leader of the West. That means we have to be able to inspire other nations and governments, as Ronald Reagan did with his 1982 Westminster speech about democracy. Reagan strengthened the West by expressing confidence in its values and ideology. While there was some carping initially, especially in Europe, today his ideological leadership is seen in a very favorable light. In 1981 some of our friends abroad complained about "cowboy policies," but in 1988 they said, "thank God that we can have confidence again in the United States."

***P.R.:* Should the United States be rethinking the fundamental structure of NATO?**

Iklé: No. NATO still serves the very important purpose of linking Western Europe with North America and confronts Soviet military planners with the prospect that any attack on a NATO ally would engage our alliance as a whole. However, for economic reasons we will have to reduce somewhat the size of our active forces worldwide, and unless we want a larger proportion of our active forces overseas, this will entail a reduction in Europe and in Asia. This shouldn't do any damage to our alliances, so long as we withdraw troops gradually and in consultation with our allies, and explain that we are doing so to save money for objectives more important for our common defense.

***P.R.:* You have long been a strong supporter of missile defenses—for both moral and strategic reasons. How do you evaluate the Reagan administration's record on SDI?**

Iklé: Clearly, a mistake was made in not proceeding with the broad interpretation of the ABM treaty. This would have put us in consonance with the Soviet view of the treaty, as they explained to us during initial negotiations, as well as with Soviet practices. The broad interpretation, by permitting certain kinds of ABM research not permitted under the narrow interpretation, also would have made it possible to base an eventual decision on deployment on much more convincing and conclusive research results. The Reagan administration took the wrong step early, almost inadvertently. Probably as a result of State Department nervousness, the administration announced it was going to abide by the narrow interpretation even though it considered the broad one correct. Once that was said, we were stuck in a groove from which we couldn't get out. Had we simply explained at the outset that the broad interpretation was correct and would guide our research, the whole controversy would have been over in a few weeks.

***P.R.:* Do you agree with those conservatives who fault President Reagan for failing to move to early deployment?**

Iklé: No. Early deployment was less important than the broadening of research. The administration probably should have expressed more firmly the desirability of early deployment, but I'm not sure a final decision would have been right before the end of '88. Maybe more appropriate would have been an expression of the view that the ABM treaty eventually ought to be revised, in concert with the Soviet Union. Instead of reaffirming the ABM treaty, whose objectives are in conflict with SDI, we should have expressed the desire to work with the Soviet Union in getting out of the ABM treaty, to our mutual advantage.

The Bush administration is correct in its cautious assessment of long-term Soviet military policies. We can encourage Soviet reforms, but, as Secretary Cheney has suggested, we have to be prepared for a possible reversal.

***P.R.:* What were the principal strengths and weaknesses of the Reagan administration's approach to arms control?**

Iklé: The weakness was the lack of a stronger compliance policy. To be fair, the Reagan administration did more than any previous administration to highlight Soviet violations and to try to stop them. Today, the Soviet

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Beirut, 1989: The biggest threat of a crisis is no longer in Central Europe, or even the Persian Gulf, but an Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East.

Union itself acknowledges that the Krasnoyarsk radar in Siberia is a violation of the ABM treaty. But in the end, we didn't have a clear strategy about how to respond. We had long, protracted debates within the administration about whether to declare the SALT II treaty null and void, even though we kept explaining to Congress that the treaty had never been ratified and had been violated to boot.

The great strength of the Reagan approach to arms control was to prove—I should hope once and for all—that sticking to a good position is much more likely to succeed than constantly showing "flexibility." Even if your position is far out, as long as it ultimately can be shown to be in the Soviet interest as well as ours, you can succeed. The elimination of all INF missiles is a stunning example. A number of people thought our demands for the elimination of all INF missiles were unreasonable and that only a compromise solution would save the negotiations. We stuck to our position and achieved what we were after.

***P.R.:* What recommendations would you make to President Bush in this area?**

Iklé: The Bush people don't need much advice here; they clearly understand the issues. I think the Bush administration ought to pick up the unfinished business of the Reagan administration on compliance. It also should avoid stumbling into unverifiable treaties such as the chemical-weapons ban. The overly complex provisions of the draft START treaty might also have to be trimmed to facilitate enforcement of compliance.

***P.R.:* The Reagan Doctrine of aid to anti-Communist resistance forces in the Third World seems to have been vindicated in the one country where it was most thoroughly applied: Afghanistan. Would the Soviets have withdrawn earlier if the administration had not waited until 1986 to send Stingers to the mujahideen?**

Iklé: A bit sooner, but probably not much sooner. The Pakistanis weren't ready until then to broaden their assistance to the mujahideen in a way that enabled them to carry out larger military operations against Soviet forces. Also, the change of leadership in Moscow was necessary to translate the Soviet misgivings with their policy into the decision to cut their losses.

***P.R.:* Was there much of a payoff from our relatively limited aid to Jonas Savimbi, and should we have sent more?**

Iklé: Our aid to Savimbi was very successful, assuming something good will come out of the negotiated arrangements for Angola and Namibia. It is quite clear that this agreement could not have been achieved without our aid to UNITA. Did we give enough to Savimbi, and are we doing enough now to maintain a counterforce to the Cuban-Angolan Communists? The critical issue is not the amount of aid we are now giving, but whether we can convince the Angolans on both sides that we will stand by UNITA as long as it takes to get an acceptable political settlement.

***P.R.:* You've been more skeptical about Renamo in Mozambique than about other anti-Communist resistance forces.**

Iklé: Though the Reagan administration never came close to a decision to help Renamo, I looked several times into whether we should. In fact, I remember talking about it with Franz-Josef Strauss, the conservative leader from Bavaria, who had contacts with many African anti-Communist movements including Renamo. Strauss confirmed what I feared: that Renamo lacks a political program and capable leadership, which are essential for a freedom fighter movement to succeed. An anti-Communist movement cannot just be a band of military fighters.

***P.R.:* Why do you think support for the Contras was so unpopular among the American people?**

Iklé: It was unpopular because the groups opposed to it were well organized and worked effectively through an extensive network of churches and other organizations. Undoubtedly, 99 percent of the people in these organizations were well-meaning. But the organizational weapon was so well managed that a constant flow of unfavorable information about the Contras and the Reagan administration's policy spread throughout the United States, and convinced people that we should not support the Contras.

There were other reasons for negative American opinion toward the Contras, as we discovered through opinion research. One had to do with political confusion: many Americans didn't know who was fighting whom in Nicaragua or even where Nicaragua is located. There was also, unfortunately, a generally negative attitude toward Central Americans: "Those little, not-so-clean people down there, why should we get in a war for them?" It's a shame; the Central Americans are wonder-

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ful people. There are many good people in that region trying very hard to build stable democracies.

But the Reagan administration, and maybe President Reagan himself, also made mistakes—and I'm not just thinking of Iran/Contra. I always thought that we should have taken things more to the brink in the dispute with Congress. Instead of accepting insufficient Contra aid, we should have said, Here's a program that can succeed, and if you don't vote for it, the situation in Nicaragua becomes your responsibility, you, the Democrats in the House of Representatives. Instead, there were all these negotiations on the several Boland amendments and on other compromises, which made it easier for the opponents of the president's policy to find political cover and to avoid responsibility.

***P.R.:* Did the Contras have much of a realistic hope of winning militarily?**

Iklé: The war in Nicaragua was lost by the Congress, not by the Contras. The last major installment of aid approved by Congress was extremely effective: The Sandinista regime was in deep, deep difficulty, and it probably would have been toppled had Congress approved another $200 million or so of aid. Continued support would have made the Contras more effective and, even more important, it would have convinced the people of Nicaragua that the United States was on the Contras' side. Expectations matter a great deal in such a conflict; people want to be on the winning side. Unfortunately, after the 1987 defeat of Contra aid in the Congress—at a time when the Ortega regime was getting half a billion or more in military assistance from the Soviet Union—people in Nicaragua began to see the Contras as losers.

***P.R.:* You have argued that in this period of belt-tightening for the Pentagon, new ICBM systems such as the Midgetman are a waste of resources better spent elsewhere. What should be the most important priorities for defense spending?**

Iklé: We should maintain the modernization of our major systems, but selectively. We need better capabilities to attack distant military targets, which will require systems with discrimination, accuracy, and powerful munitions. To a large extent, these systems should be conventional rather than nuclear. Then we have to work on our military capabilities for space, where the Soviets are far ahead of us now.

These are priorities because such complex systems take a long time to develop—usually 10 years or more from the initial research and development until the systems are fielded. It would be disastrous to stop these systems in mid-development, because we can't predict what U.S.-Soviet relations will be like 10 years hence. We don't control the succession in Moscow. On the other hand, we might cut back a bit on active forces and readiness because those things can be restored quickly.

I've also made clear my views that the budgets proposed for and the energy devoted to the question of the new ICBM are out of proportion with its importance. It's not the most important strategic system, and it's not



Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

Communist insurgents in El Salvador have been strengthened by Congress's abandonment of the Contras.

the most important defense decision for the Bush administration. The ICBM could divert a lot of defense dollars from SDI and other priorities if the preferences of some of the Democrats in Congress were followed by committing fully to the Midgetman.

But some conservatives, too, not only liberals, devote too much attention to questions of ICBM modernization. One reason may have to do with the simplicity of the calculations that can be made about a so-called missile exchange: the Soviets, it is assumed, seek to attack all our ICBMs, and those that survive we use to strike back. A high school student, given the basic functions, can make these calculations. So we are constantly hearing about the danger of MIRV missiles, the threat of the Soviet SS-18, which could hit 10 missiles on our side, or the virtues of single warhead missiles, and so on.

The fascination with these simplistic "exchange" calculations dominates strategic discussion because calcula-

Our NATO strategy is obsolete. But the NATO alliance still makes sense.

tions regarding the other strategic systems are far more complicated; most people can't do them. The penetration of bombers, for example, is very complex analytically, and the survival of submarines is a subject of immense technical uncertainty. These systems are as important as ICBMs, perhaps even more important.

***P.R.:* Do you favor any internal structural reforms within the Pentagon or armed services ?**

Iklé: Secretary Cheney and President Bush need to strengthen civilian control of the Pentagon. The inter-

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regnum between Carlucci and Cheney contributed to a further weakening of civilian control. While the military officers are superb, immensely dedicated people, the interaction of the services and the staffing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff tend to perpetuate an overly bureaucratic approach to strategy and to defense policy. Excessive weight is given to maintaining the current structures, current ways of thinking, current bureaucratic interests.

As a result of this bureaucratization, the doctrines, priorities, and systems in the Pentagon are lagging behind the rapidly changing technological and political reality of the world. Good civilian leadership, being less rooted in traditional interests, can help overcome this lag.

***P.R.:* What were Cap Weinberger's principal achievements and missed opportunities as Secretary of Defense?**

Iklé: Cap Weinberger was a whole-hearted and effective supporter of SDI. He tried to make the program work; he gave it a special place in the Pentagon organization. Together with President Reagan and over the resistance of the services, he prevailed upon Congress to give SDI strong funding. He also succeeded, together with the president, in taking advantage of the mood of the country, in increasing our defense budget in '81, '82, and '83, and restoring the confidence and capabilities of the armed forces.

Our military alliance with Japan is now a bulwark of the free world's defense. I hope we will not start destroying it with peevishness about trade issues.

Weinberger joined the president in accepting the risks of Grenada, and insisted that the forces sent to Grenada be larger than the Chiefs of Staff thought necessary—thus making sure the operation was successful. Through all his years at the Defense Department, he worked quietly and with great success in strengthening our most important new military alliance—the alliance with Japan, which is now a bulwark of the free world's defense. I hope we will not start destroying this alliance with peevishness about trade issues.

He was the leader in the administration in the American involvement in the Persian Gulf. Fully recognizing the potential dangers of the American flagging of the Kuwaiti tankers, he seized the opportunity to get the U.S. involved—and won allied support—for protecting freedom of navigation on this vital waterway. For 10 years, people had been talking about the need for the U.S. to exert the political will to do just that. Well, Weinberger finally did it, and established a precedent for doing it again if necessary. We are much better off today in averting a Persian Gulf crisis in the future.

With all these successes, it is unfortunate that we failed to win service support for SDI. The services, particularly the Air Force, see SDI as competing with their favorite programs. But it might have been possible to structure incentives to make the services more interested. With the benefit of hindsight it occurs to me now that when SDI was still strongly supported on the Hill, we should have set up a competition between the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and given the entire SDI budget to that service that would have committed itself most wholeheartedly to running with it.

***P.R.:* What are you proudest of in your years of government service?**

Iklé: I'm proud, of course, of the association with a successful administration and an almost uniquely successful president. And in that context, I'm proud of having helped to translate ideas into policies—ranging from pushing back Soviet expansion in the Third World, which became known as the Reagan Doctrine; to improving our capability to augment defense production; to getting rid of the Law of the Sea Treaty, which would have set up a gigantic UNESCO-type international organization that would have done a lot of damage; to supporting, with intellectual arguments and practical advice, President Reagan and Cap Weinberger on SDI. Changing the terms of the debate is really how you win, and that requires starting with an ideology. We're hearing a lot now about the importance of being pragmatic. But leadership and pragmatism are not the same. I was intrigued by a recent speech by Senator Ted Kennedy, who praised Ronald Reagan for his dedication to his ideas and for the way he persuaded the American people to think in terms of his ideas. I like to think that through my work in Ronald Reagan's primary campaign in 1980, in his presidential campaigns, and in the seven years I worked at the Pentagon, I made a useful contribution to the Reagan Revolution. ☎

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YESTERDAY'S WAR

Defense Acquisition Is Based on Obsolete Assumptions

DOV S. ZAKHEIM

The debate over defense "reform" never seems to end. Despite the completion in 1986 of yet another major analysis of defense management—the Packard Commission Report—as well as the passage that same year of the most important piece of defense management legislation in three decades, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, concerns about the size and effectiveness of defense spending abound. The Bush administration's preemptive reduction of the Reagan defense plan for fiscal year 1990 testifies to the strength of those making the case that the Pentagon cannot manage itself. The Bush plan accepts a 1 percent real decline in a defense budget that has already declined by an average of 3 percent in real terms in each of the last four years. It is hardly a prescription for a robust defense, but it reflects public concern about the usefulness of additional spending as well as public perceptions of Gorbachev's Soviet Union as an evaporating threat.

The argument that "something is rotten" in the Pentagon has generally taken two forms. Critics have long pointed to the need to reform the Defense Department's cumbersome and costly acquisition process. In addition, some have argued that the Pentagon has set for itself a strategy that is far too ambitious to be satisfied with the resources made available to it. Allegedly, the Defense Department is both incompetent and unrealistic. Even if its ability to field systems were perfect, its inability to meet its strategy efficiently, or indeed at all, would render its systems-management skills meaningless.

Some progress has been made in the acquisition sphere, despite continuing reports of poor performance by weapons systems such as the B-1 strategic bomber and the Apache attack helicopter, and the seemingly uncontrolled costs of development programs such as the B-2 strategic bomber and the SSN-21 submarine. Prosecutions in the "Ill Wind" procurement scandal should deter corruption. Long-needed organizational changes and greater Defense Department focus on program execution should lead to a more efficient acquisition process over the next five years.

The difficulty is that the process, even if it becomes efficient, will be so only on its own terms. The true test of efficiency is whether we are providing the optimal wherewithal to enhance our national security. Here, far less progress has been made.

The Strategy/Resources Mismatch

The strategy/resources mismatch, a phrase popularized by Senator Sam Nunn, was most graphically portrayed in a leaked report of a briefing given in 1983 to the Defense Resources Board (DRB), the budget review board for the Pentagon. Based on accounts of this briefing, and other similar analyses, critics charged that the Joint Chiefs of Staff set force requirements at levels that could never be met by the United States in peacetime. Moreover, the existence of this mismatch indicated that the strategy itself was flawed.

More than five years after the DRB briefing, and numerous commissions, panels, and studies later, there is no indication that U.S. strategy has fundamentally changed, that the mismatch has disappeared, or that it has even begun to diminish. Indeed, the persistent declines in the defense budget would lead to the opposite conclusion—given no palpable change in defense strategy, the mismatch must be worse relative to whatever it might have been when first identified.

Management Without Objective

Yet, it is not the strategy/resources mismatch that is at the root of the problem, but a mismatch, or even no match, between resources and policy—the framing of objectives. Policy seems to float off on its own, while the denizens of the Pentagon occupy themselves with the "real" business of planning, programming, budgeting, and acquiring weapons systems.

The acquisition process focuses almost entirely on weapons systems, not on whom they might be directed against. The ill-fated Army DIVAD program provides a case in point. The Army spent years and billions of dollars developing an air defense system that ultimately

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proved unable to meet the requirement of defeating hovering Soviet helicopters. The inevitable compromises in performance were not measured against the true nature of the Soviets' capabilities and of the evolving heliborne threat (which many analysts had predicted at the inception of DIVAD). By the time real-world performance finally was addressed, the Army had committed so many billions to the program that it argued that it had no recourse but to continue.

Even where there are efforts at "realistic" battlefield testing, the tests fail to take into account the locales where policy would lead the military to expect to fight. Thus, weapons judged effective in a realistic operational environment may be useless on the battlefield on which they are ultimately deployed. A tank designed to fight on the flat North German plain, for example, may not be as efficient for operations in the sand and marshes of the Persian Gulf.

Current programs incorrectly assume that little warning time would be available to the West in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe.

Finally, and most seriously, the acquisition process is frequently tampered with to satisfy internal management needs and time pressures. Schedules are altered, test plans adjusted and tests dropped, concurrent development tolerated, and faulty subsystems accepted. Suitability for the actual environment, the need to match schedules with the prospective threats to our policy interests—these factors are not even considered during the wranglings of senior acquisition management groups.

Bush vs. Bureaucracy

For the Defense Department to come to grips with the mismatch between policy and resources, it must carry out two distinct, but interrelated, tasks. First, it must clearly articulate its policy goals, and adjust them in light of fiscal restraints. At the same time, the department must revamp its bureaucratic structure to permit both ongoing policy review and policy leadership of the program and budgeting exercises that dominate defense activity. But, unless it carries out the former task, the latter effort will be meaningless.

The administration's recently conducted policy review—NSR-12—is supposed to lay the groundwork for major foreign policy and defense activities. However, as President Bush himself has recently recognized, it avoids questions involving fundamental policy *choices*, which would in turn prompt significant budgetary changes in favor of a more cautious approach that does not significantly alter current policy priorities. In an ideal, fiscally unconstrained world, there would be much merit to the course the bureaucracy appears to have taken. After all, free enterprise appears to be making strides worldwide, not least in the Communist world, while the forces of democracy have advanced further in the 1980s than at any time since World War II. The problem is that resources are constrained, and that an extension of current policy extends current dilemmas and threatens a further erosion of confidence in the efficiency and wisdom of defense spending. With spending already facing another real decline—proposed by the administration itself—such an erosion could be nothing short of disastrous.

Policy has long determined the direction of programs in the approximately 15 percent of the defense budget that is devoted to strategic arms. When programmers have challenged policy planners, the latter invariably have triumphed. For example, the Strategic Defense Initiative—and "Brilliant Pebbles"—has become a major defense program despite opposition from the services, and particularly service programmers. Similarly, the Midgetman system, viewed by the administration leadership as a major element in the subtle game of arms reduction with the Soviets, has been forced upon reluctant Defense Department programmers.

It is time for the Defense Department to take a closer, more radical look at the policy relevance of its current and projected programs for conventional forces, which account for 85 percent of the defense budget. In particular, it should reevaluate whether its long-standing assumption of a worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union, centered in Europe, consumes resources that could be more efficiently deployed in other regions. Emphasis on a NATO/Warsaw Pact war is fraught with costly assumptions that may be skewing the entire defense procurement process.

New Realities in Europe

Current programs assume that little warning time would be available to the West in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack in Europe. The shorter the warning available, the greater the demand for rapid deployment resources, primarily costly airlift capabilities. Yet the reductions in forces that Gorbachev has announced, and that have already begun, together with a growing emphasis on "defensive" posture, point to considerable flux in Soviet strategy. If NATO can expect more warning of Soviet troop movements, its requirement for additional rapid airlift (such as the Air Force's C-17 airlift program) becomes considerably less compelling. On the other hand, the case for dispatching reinforcements to Europe over a somewhat longer period, as warning of more drawn out Soviet preparations becomes available, would appear to be stronger. That the Soviets might not strike as quickly does not imply that they would not strike at all. Seen in those terms, the administration's decision to slow the development of already underfunded fast sealift programs appears especially incongruous.

The Pentagon has proposed the reduction of some forces from Europe—its new budget plans call for the withdrawal of 4,000 troops associated with the now cancelled INF program. But why stop at 4,000? Because of

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The Pentagon assumes its job in Iran is to protect these people from the Soviets.

threats elsewhere there is a case for further reduction of U.S. force levels in Europe—smaller increments unilaterally, larger ones as part of an East-West agreement as suggested by President Bush. In addition, conversion of some active units to reserves (a proposal recently reiterated by former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman), and the acquisition of fast sealift ships, whose cost per ton of lift is immensely lower than that of huge aircraft, would afford the United States a realistic and viable hedge against Soviet attack, while also creating significant savings that could be directed to defense priorities elsewhere in the world.

Old Thinking On Iran

Threats to U.S. interests, and the need to respond to them militarily, are likely to emerge over the next decade outside the European arena. Budget priorities should reflect uncertainties over the future of our basing posture in East Asia, and the stability of the Gulf region, where a final peace has yet to be negotiated between Iran and Iraq. Such a policy would not denigrate our commitment to NATO's defense. Rather, it would fashion a somewhat different force posture from that which is being structured today, in almost haphazard fashion, in response to the pressures imposed by the budget deficit. Our maritime forces, critical for flexibility of response in both major Asian theaters, would not be cut by as much as the current budget plan would envisage. It is ironic that the Department of Defense is preparing to reduce its force posture in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region so quickly after it played such a major role in the Gulf war and won back many doubting partners in the Arab world.

Our posture in Southwest Asia requires much more careful scrutiny. As its FY 1990 annual report clearly indicates, the Department of Defense has not moved from the scenario promulgated in the late 1970s, which envisaged American assistance to Iran in the face of a Soviet drive to the Gulf across the Zagros mountains. This relic of the shah's rule has remained a staple for those programmers seeking to justify large numbers of "light" land forces—to fight in Iran's interior—as well as the airlift to get them to their destination. That the Ayatollah's henchmen and successors would be more inclined to request Soviet assistance to defend against an American attack does not seem to have entered the consciousness of these programmers.

The far more worrisome contingency, the spread of conflict to the southern Gulf arising from another outburst of Iranian fundamentalism, possibly even with

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U.S. Army

The DIVAD Sergeant York air defense system was so flawed it never made it to the battlefield.

Soviet connivance, receives little attention from Pentagon programmers. Such a scenario is less malleable in terms of its potential linkage to a worldwide war with the Soviets, and therefore would not generate the same level of resource requirements. More to the point, perhaps, it also appears too "maritime," thereby upsetting the fragile budgetary equilibrium among the armed services, which receive approximately the same level of resources each year.

This southern Gulf scenario would militate against a large reduction of Indian Ocean forces. It would justify the retention of the V-22 Osprey ship-to-shore lifter. It would call for more sealift. It would challenge the programmers' calls for sizable light and mountain divisions, and instead argue for a redirection of heavier units currently fielded in the ever less plausible context of a European conflict.

Uncertainty in East Asia

If our posture in Southwest Asia seems detached from current reality, that in East Asia appears blind to potential realities that could confront the United States in the years ahead. We cannot bury our heads in the sand and trust that we will retain all our Asian bases. History has proved that base rights are far from permanent, and more easily lost than obtained. Moreover, the Defense Department must ask itself, as did the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, whether a changing U.S.-Japanese or U.S.-PRC relationship would place different requirements upon U.S. military capabilities, calling for still greater flexibility, and allowing even fewer land-basing options than exist today. The resultant U.S. force posture again would emphasize the need for a new look at force deployments and perhaps a different set of weapons programs.

A final question arises with respect to what is termed "low intensity conflict." Here, too, the Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy identified a series of programs that have not won the full support of the Department of Defense. Airships, specially designed sea-based support platforms, and special communications and intelligence equipment for less demanding missions are all low Defense Department priorities. So, too, are smaller platforms that could carry out missions as capably as, and at lower cost than, the heavy armored vehicles and large warships designed for combat with the Soviets. Yet the exigencies of Western Hemisphere crises and the uncertain demands that the drug war might place upon the armed forces would appear to call for the transfer of greater resources to these specialized low intensity conflict systems.

New Defense Priorities

These adjustments would reflect a very different American view of its overseas roles and commitments. NATO would be seen as the primary commitment, but the onus of worrying about extreme, and increasingly less likely contingencies (the short warning attack) would fall more squarely upon our allies. Southwest Asia would remain a major American concern, but U.S. defense efforts would be on behalf of its close friends, and in no way to support Iran, a country whose hostility to America has lasted a decade and is unrelenting. East Asia would be recognized as a region in which uncertainty about American prospects is probably greater than previously acknowledged, and for which special efforts and planning will have to be undertaken to protect the United States' currently robust political and military posture. And more direct activity would be undertaken in response to potential developments in America's backyard, the Western hemisphere, which could well become the source of new crises and conflicts for the United States.

This changing American view would not necessarily result in a change of commitments per se, only in a change in the way commitments are carried out. It would represent a policy that reflects constraints on American resources: ideally, were there no constraints, the United States should hedge against any contingency anywhere. In turn, it would constrain the nature of the resource planning process, which would have to conform more closely to clear policy direction. Additional force reductions in Europe, and the transfer of some units to the reserves, would allow savings in administrative overhead—reducing the proliferation of headquarters at far too many levels—as well as weapons systems specifically acquired to support a larger land-based overseas posture. Larger force reductions based on a more realistic Southwest Asian requirement—the elimination of several light

We cannot bury our heads in the sand and trust that we will retain all our Asian bases.

divisions—would add to savings. Elimination of costly systems designed primarily with the European contingency in mind would permit a combination of both savings and available resources for less costly but critical programs designed for other contingencies. The net result would be a shrinkage of the gap between policy

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

U.S. Army/Jane E. Rackley

Annual Reforger maneuvers in West Germany: The assumption of a central front war in Europe siphons off resources that could be better used elsewhere.

and resources, and an impetus to plan programs with an eye to realistic assumptions about the international environment and America's role within it.

Changing Policy's Role in the Bureaucracy

No policy review, however revolutionary in scope and detailed in nature, can be expected to have much impact on the current acquisition process. That process simply does not provide the offices that formulate and interpret policy sufficient authority to ensure that macro-level policy decisions seep into the micro-level world of acquisition and programs. A reordering of the bureaucracy is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for rectifying the policy/resources mismatch.

The focus for institutional reform must be the office of the Under Secretary for Policy. This office should be afforded not merely a seat on the Defense Acquisition Board and the Defense Resources Board, but an effective veto over programs and systems to ensure their linkage to Defense Department policy priorities. To strengthen the Under Secretary's hand, he or she should be permitted to organize a powerful policy planning organization with partial veto power over the progression of a weapons system through its various stages of development and production. Thus, if a weapons system initially appeared to be relevant within the framework of the nation's policy goals, but events over the multiyear course of its development changed that relevance (for example, more political change in Europe), the policy planning office could demand that further expenditures not be authorized until the system's proponents offered new, policy-relevant justifications for its continuance.

Moreover, the program planning guidance that emanates from the Under Secretary for Policy, which theoretically sets weapons program priorities, should be restructured so as to set limits that go no higher than projected five-year plans deriving from budgetary decisions already made by Congress. The practice of allowing planners to incorporate guidance for programs that in aggregate could exceed budget ceilings would be terminated. Programmers would no longer have the flexibility to choose their favorite programs and discard others in the face of vague guidance. The choices instead would be made early in the process, consistent with policy goals that would be adjusted to reflect resource constraints. Programming would be relegated to the secondary activity that it should always have been, namely, the structuring of systems acquisition within the bounds set by policy choices. The acquisition system will likewise become more attuned to the demands of policy. Systems with little relevance to the realistic missions of U.S. forces, as defined by policymakers, would have little chance of surviving Defense Department cuts, whatever the inherent merits of their technologies.

The mismatch between policy and resources would thus be diminished, as policy would reflect the limitations of resource availability, while resources would be assigned priority to correspond with a fiscally relevant policy. On the other hand, should policy continue to remain an orphan within the Defense Department, the United States will continue to be hit with a double whammy: its resources will be poorly spent, while its security is dangerously compromised. Surely, America's taxpayers deserve better.

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Western Reunion

Our Coming Alliance with Russia?

William S. Lind

Since the late 1940s, the guiding concept of American foreign policy has been a healthy fear of Communism as an ideology and of the Soviet Union as an imperialistic, aggrandizing Great Power with the goal of world hegemony. This understanding of our national interest has been—and still remains—entirely correct. But if, as now looks possible, the Soviet Union genuinely de-Communizes over the next few decades, our most important conflict may no longer be with Moscow. Instead, 10, 20, 30 years from now, Russia may be a potential ally against emerging new threats to the West as the axis of world conflict shifts from East-West to North-South.

The official press of the Soviet Union is today substantiating all the historic reasons for our anti-Communist foreign policy. *Pravda* and *Izvestia,* as well as more daring journals such as *Moscow News* and *Ogonyok,* write openly about the kulaks murdered in the campaign to collectivize Soviet agriculture, the bloody horror of the Stalin purges, the sacrifice of the Baltic nations in the Stalin-Hitler pact, the wholly unwarranted and, under Soviet law, illegal persecution of religious believers, and all the other crimes that can rightly be laid to the Soviet leadership and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The invasion of Afghanistan, the Brezhnev Doctrine calling for armed intervention in Eastern Europe, and the use of poison gas against Georgian protesters this year are now openly criticized in the Soviet press and by senior Soviet officials. The conservative view that under Communism Russia was transformed into one vast prison camp is now confirmed by the Soviets themselves.

Applauding Bishops

Changes unthinkable since 1917 are now occurring. A partially open press is emerging. Popular Front political groupings—parties in fact if not in name—are being established in the Baltic states. The recent elections were real, if still limited; some senior Party officials were defeated, and a number of reformers were elected. Some private economic initiative is being encouraged. The Soviet leadership seems to be repealing the Brezhnev Doctrine. The chief of ideology for the Politburo, Vadim Medvedev, has said publicly that the laws of the market apply to everyone and that foreign policy should not be conducted on a class—that is, ideological—basis. Some churches and monasteries that had been confiscated by the state are being returned, and churchmen are now published in the popular press. Elie Wiesel helped open a Jewish study center in Moscow, and persecution of many Protestant churches has declined sharply.

The Russian Synodal Orthodox Church recently held a celebration in Washington, D.C., to mark the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Russia. The Synodal Church, which has beatified Czar Nicholas II, his wife Alexandra, and their children, is very strongly anti-Communist. Yet this recent church assembly heard speaker after speaker, even one who had been allowed to come from the Soviet Union to address the group, talk of the significant changes—especially in what the state would permit in relation to Christianity—now taking place in the Soviet Union. Through it all, the bishops applauded. Their sources are telling them the same thing: something new is being seen in Russia.

Is it all a trick? Possibly; we can never really know what is happening in the Soviet Union. There have been sudden, brutal reversals of earlier Soviet reforms before. We must never let down our guard in ways that would make us fatally vulnerable if the changes prove illusory. But there is a genuine possibility that the changes are real; that they have gone as far as they have and cut as deep as they have makes deception less likely.

Defense of Christendom

What should be the American response to these developments? To present a conservative answer to that question, we need first to put the United States into a larger context, the context of the West. America's national interests cannot be divorced from the fate and future of the West, or what used to be called Christendom—the culture that developed out of Judaism and Christianity and the philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome.

Russia, it is important to remember, is part of this

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A Communist Soviet Union is and must be our enemy.
But a Russia reunited with Western culture can be our partner.

culture. Russia under the czars was not a Jeffersonian democracy; it was, however, a Christian country with a strong emphasis on freedom of the soul and the moral responsibility of the individual. Only since the Cold War has the term "the West" come to comprise solely the United States, Western Europe, and the outposts of freedom in Asia, and to exclude Russia. Under Communist domination Russia made war on traditional Western culture. But, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn has argued, the departure was never total. Communism was an overlay on Russia, and beneath it, Russia still existed, the Russia of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky and Pushkin that was part of the West. Now, as Russia reemerges, we need to redefine the West in its older, broader sense.

This need is not merely philosophical, but strategic. At the beginning of this century, the West dominated the world by a margin now almost unimaginable. Most of the non-Western world consisted of colonies of Western countries. Any country outside Europe and North America that wanted to be a major power had to Westernize. As late as World War II, only one had really succeeded: Japan. In everything—education, the military, medicine, even religion—the West was the model, and everything non-Western was seen as hopelessly inferior.

The West's Civil Wars

Today, the West has lost this dominance. It is one among equals, with other power centers rising rapidly. Non-Western challenges to the West are growing—in the Islamic revival, in phenomena such as narco-terrorism, and possibly in the awakening nationalisms of East Asia (although Western ideas of free will and individual moral responsibility are beginning to coexist in Asia with Oriental emphasis of duty to family and country).

How did the West lose its dominance? It lost it largely as a result of three Western civil wars: World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. Japan played a small part in the first and a larger role in the second, but the main players in both cases were European countries—Germany, Austria, Italy, England, France, Russia—and the United States.

These civil wars bled the West white. Tens of millions of people died, whole nations saw their leading classes eradicated, tremendous amounts of capital were diverted or destroyed, and much of the West's confidence in itself was shattered. Russia suffered the most severe damage, not only in casualties and physical destruction, but also because Bolshevism's victory there was a consequence of the civil war. Indeed, Lenin was sent to Petrograd by the Imperial German government as a weapon of war.

What does the West's self-inflicted decline mean to conservatives as we seek to devise a foreign policy for the United States? As conservatives, we are the defenders of Western culture. Our goal in American domestic policy is to conserve and restore that culture here at home. The goal should be the same overseas. We should look not only to the interests of the United States, but to the well-being of the West as a whole. Our oceans can no longer give us security through isolation. In this century

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



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

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If the Gorbachev reforms continue and are institutionalized, the Russia of Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Solzhenitsyn, and Shcharansky could resume her rightful place in the West.

our transoceanic interests led us into two world wars and the Cold War.

We have valiantly and correctly fought the Cold War to save the West from Soviet expansionism. Communism, however, is but one threat to Western civilization. We must now recognize that there are other threats—growing threats.

Threat from Militant Islam

The resurgence of militant Islam is one such threat. There are varieties of Islam that are relatively tolerant of other religions and cultures and that can coexist with a Westernized state; certainly the United States has had friendly relations with Moslem countries ranging from Indonesia to Pakistan to Turkey to Egypt to Morocco. As we see, however, in the efforts to destroy Israel, in the Rushdie death threats, in hostage-taking and terrorism, there is also a fanatical, violent strain in Islam that is implacably hostile to the West. Both democratic and traditionalist Islamic countries are under increasing pressure from fundamentalists who share Khomeini's and Qadhafi's hatred of the United States as leader of the West. Further "Islamic revolutions" are likely, and, if the fundamentalists can overcome internal differences (Sunni vs. Shiite, Arab vs. Persian), a unified, militant, and aggressive Islam could be one of the power centers of the next century.

Russia's role as part of the West takes on special importance in the light of a potential Islamic revival. As the strategist Dimitri Cyril Ramesses has noted, the Soviet Union holds the West's vital right flank, stretching from the Black Sea to Vladivostok. The implication of a Soviet collapse, of the disintegration of the traditional Russian empire, might be that Moslem armies would again be besieging the gates of Vienna.

Similarly, the Islamic revival may present dangers in Afghanistan. It was necessary for the democratic West to oppose Soviet expansion in Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union's defeat there is clearly contributing to the loosening of Communism's grip on Central Europe and the Soviet Union itself. At the same time, the West as a whole may be ill served if an Islamic fundamentalist, anti-Western government succeeds the Soviet puppet regime. We may find we have won the war and lost the peace, or that we won one of the last East-West conflicts but lost one of the opening rounds of the succeeding North-South struggle. Just as in the war against Hitler we allowed Stalin to take too much of Europe, so in the war against Stalin's successors we must be sure not to let potential new enemies fill a power vacuum left by a receding Soviet empire.

Nativist Fascism

The United States may see a similar anti-Western threat develop in Latin America. Latin America is, of course, strongly influenced by Western culture; the region is Christian, Hispanic, and increasingly democratic. But in some Latin countries, economic and social tensions are creating new, "alternative" cultures that draw on and appeal to pre-Western elements. The narcotics culture is one such example, although it is a corruption of Western culture rather than a true alternative. The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla movement in Peru is closer to an alternative, combining extreme Maoism with Inca revivalism. The Sendero may be heralding a new wave of anti-Western movements that are not really Marxist but nativist-fascist in character.

The emerging nativist-fascisms will include "class warfare" elements, but with less reference to Marx than to the Western character of the national and international "ruling class" and the non-Western character of the "oppressed." If nations such as Mexico dissolve in chaos, the result may not be a Moscow-oriented socialist state on the Cuban model, but a new form of radicalism based on pre-Columbian romanticism. It is perhaps no accident that the left-wing candidate for president in Mexico last year boasts the name of an Aztec emperor. If the Sendero Luminoso is any indication, the new fascisms are likely to be totalitarian to an extreme degree, following the Pol Pot model.

Metternich's Welcome

As the leading defenders of the West and its culture, conservatives must be prepared to recognize these new threats. Further, we must recognize that the West's chances of defeating and indeed of surviving them may depend heavily on our ability to reunite, to reconstitute a West that includes Russia.

A Communist Soviet Union is and must be our enemy. But Russia should be our friend. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia made major contributions to the West in literature, in culture, and in science. Even under the

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weight of Soviet oppression, Russia has sometimes shone through, especially in literature. If the Gorbachev reforms continue and are institutionalized, there is at least a chance Russia will triumph over Communism and resume her rightful place as part of the West, an ally in the defense of Western culture and civilization. At that point, the East-West struggle as we have known it will be over. The Cold War will have no reason to go on. We, the West, and especially we conservatives, will have won—not over Russia, which was never our enemy, but over Communism and Sovietism.

This, then, should be the goal of conservatives in the Gorbachev era: to seek an opportunity to reunite the West—a West that includes Russia—so that united we may face the anti-Western challenges the next century is sure to bring.

To move toward that goal, we must be prepared to do what we can to assist and shape the transformation now underway in the Soviet Union. Our power to do so is limited; as in most countries, internal events will be the dominant force. But there are some things we can do—and not do—to assist. We can make it clear that we, as conservatives, are ready to welcome a changed Russia back into the Western family of nations, just as European conservatives, led by Metternich, welcomed France back into the concert of Europe in 1815. We should give credit to the current Soviet government for the real changes it has made. We should work for the "Finlandization" of Eastern Europe.

Dangers of 1918

Perhaps most important, we should avoid actions that might bring about the dissolution of the Russian empire. While many conservatives will quite properly seek greater cultural autonomy for components of the empire, such as the Baltic states and the Ukraine, we must recognize that an actual breakup of the empire into mutually hostile mini-states could be catastrophic for the West as a whole. It could duplicate, on a larger scale, the error made in 1918 of facilitating the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Without a Danubian federation, the nations of south-central Europe inevitably became pawns in the struggle between Germany and Russia. Similarly, a multitude of successor states to the Russian empire might become pawns in the battle between the West and the non-West.

As Jack Wheeler of the Freedom Research Foundation has suggested, a farsighted conservative vision for Russia might be of a commonwealth, where individual nations have great autonomy in their internal policies but are voluntarily united in foreign and defense policy. That would be a tall order for Russia, and again, internal forces, not actions by American conservatives, will be the primary causes of whatever changes do emerge. But conservatives do need a concept and a goal for their policy toward Russia, and this might be a sensible one.

At the same time, we need to work to expand the horizons of all Americans to see the new threats the West is likely to face. Which will be the most serious, and exactly how they will manifest themselves, we cannot yet know. The challenge from East Asia, while real, is peaceful and economic; we should not view it as a threat. But others will not be peaceful and may be very threatening indeed. America must not be unforewarned and unprepared when they arrive in full force. Conservatives should be preparing to take the leading role in making this adjustment, with the changes in national strategy it must bring.

Can Gorbachev Survive?

One thing we should not do is count on the Gorbachev era continuing. We can hope it will, but it may not. If Gorbachev cannot put food in the stores, if he cannot get Soviet industry operating efficiently, if he cannot raise living standards, he will not last. We will pick up the paper some morning and find he has gone the way of Mr. Dubcek in Czechoslovakia. That would be deeply regrettable from a conservative standpoint. It would probably mean the end of the chance to reunite the West. Gorbachev's replacement would probably restore Soviet foreign policy to a "class" basis, as Yegor Ligachev has called for. In other words, the Soviet Union would re-declare the Cold War. In turn, we would have to do the same.

Russia under the czars was not a Jeffersonian democracy; it was, however, a Christian country with a strong emphasis on freedom of the soul and the moral responsibility of the individual.

Because the permanence of the Gorbachev era is in doubt, we must not weaken our defenses. Our security must continue to depend only on our own strength, not on anyone else's good will. This does not mean we should threaten the Soviet Union as it attempts to reform. Both we and the Soviets have an interest in reducing threats to each other. But we must carefully distinguish reducing threats from creating weakness. Our answer to any proposal that would leave us open and vulnerable to attack must be, Never!

At the same time, what is happening in the Soviet Union today is an opportunity for victory in the struggle we have waged since 1917—the struggle against Communism. It offers a chance—not a certainty, but a chance—of rescuing Russia from Communism. We owe it to the Russian people to help them in that rescue effort. We owe it to the American people to explore the possibility of reuniting the West as we move to face the anti-Western challenges the 21st century will bring. ☎

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A Billion Here, A Billion There

Social Spending Under Ronald Reagan

Ron Haskins and Representative Hank Brown

Every liberal knows that federal spending on social programs was slashed during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Every conservative knows that Reagan's biggest domestic failure was his inability to do anything about spending. Both are wrong.

Instead, the Reagan presidency's budget performance can be summarized in four statements:

- After decades of spending growth in both absolute terms and as a percentage of the nation's total economic output, the rate of federal spending growth declined;
- Federal spending on social programs increased greatly in current dollars, increased slightly in constant dollars, and decreased slightly as a percentage of gross national product;
- Most programs for children and families escaped unscathed or with small cuts; overall, constant dollar spending on programs that most directly affect children and families increased during the Reagan administration; and
- Spending cuts in selected programs were guided by five principles: reduce interference in the market; focus social spending on the poor and near-poor; make social spending contingent on efforts by beneficiaries to achieve independence; return as much decision-making authority as possible to states and localities; and cut back or eliminate programs that don't work.

30 Years of Rapid Growth

The federal budget is broadly divided into categories called "functions." The budget functions in turn are grouped together to form five superfunctions: defense, human resources (social spending), physical resources, net interest, and other. **Table 1** shows constant dollar changes in spending by superfunction and function between 1950 and 1988.

The table shows that government spending grew steadily in all five superfunctions in the 30 years between 1950 and 1980. Total federal spending grew 3.8 percent per year in constant (inflation-adjusted) dollars, a rate that would double expenditures every 18.4 years. Even more impressive, the 5.4 percent growth rate for human resources programs would double expenditures every 13 years.

From 1970 to 1980, federal growth declined somewhat relative to the entire 1950-1980 period, largely as a result of constant-dollar reductions in defense outlays. Even so, the overall growth rate was still 3.2 percent. Overall social spending rose by more than $210 billion during the period. In fact, all the superfunctions except defense grew faster between 1970 and 1980 than during the entire 1950-1980 period.

GNP data shown in **Table 2** strengthen the conclusions drawn from the constant-dollar data in Table 1. From 1950 to 1980, the federal government was claiming a steadily increasing percentage of the nation's gross national product. The heftiest increase was for human resources, which consumed 6.4 percent more of GNP in 1980 than in 1950—an increase bigger in relation to GNP than the entire defense budget in 1988. Further, in GNP terms, the decline in defense spending started before 1970. By 1980 the nation devoted a smaller proportion of its income to national defense than it had in 1950.

Where Reagan Cut

Ronald Reagan promised to halt the growth of government, and to do so while increasing federal expenditures on defense. As Tables 1 and 2 show, Reagan delivered on his promise, but not to the degree or in the manner claimed by his critics. We see in **Table 1** that the increase in federal spending declined from 3.2 to 2.7 percent annually. Reagan reduced the rate of increase but not the overall level of federal spending.

Table 2 shows that during the Reagan years spending as a proportion of GNP declined from 22.7 percent to 22.3 percent. Three superfunctions (including human resources) and 11 functions also declined as a percentage of GNP. These data reflect Reagan's success in holding the growth in federal spending below the rate of economic expansion for the first time in decades. Reagan administration officials and their supporters in

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the academic community held that these two trends were causally related—GNP growth was up precisely because Reagan had moderated government growth and interference in the economy.

Constant-dollar spending in eight of the budget functions declined between 1981 and 1988. The decline in spending on energy of more than 30 percent per year is nothing less than spectacular, but the nearly 14 percent annual decline in community and regional development is also remarkable. Two other functions sustained major reductions: education, training, employment, and social services (ETESS), which declined by over 5 percent per year, and international affairs, which declined by nearly 7 percent. (**Table 1**)

The slashing of outlays for energy was achieved by nearly halting production of uranium and other fuels, by substantially reducing research and development on fission, fusion, and fossil fuels, by requiring the five regional power marketing authorities to pay higher prices for their use of electricity, and by halting storage of oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The president argued that market forces would do better than government in providing energy at reasonable cost.

Cuts in training and employment programs accounted for over half of the 12 billion constant-dollar decline in ETESS spending during Reagan's tenure. The president justified these cuts on the ground that private industry would undertake training where it was necessary and do so far more efficiently than would the federal government. Equally important, training and employment programs such as CETA had a dismal record that included few measurable impacts on employment and high levels of corruption at the local level. Public service employment, which seemed to produce minimal benefits at high expense, was actually zeroed out by Reagan.

An especially controversial cut in education and training was made in loans and grants to post-secondary students. In this case, there was no attack on the underlying purpose of the program; the administration did not claim that students from poor and low-income families should lose their assistance. Rather, the claim was that too many students from middle-class families received benefits. The administration also argued that profit margins for participating banks were too high. Thus, the major cuts were achieved by eliminating relatively wealthy students from the programs and by reduc-

Table 1

Federal Expenditures by Superfunction and Function in Billions of 1988 Dollars, 1950-1988

Function or Superfunction	Year						Average Annual Rate of Growth		
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1981	1988	1950-80	1970-80	1981-88
By Superfunction									
Human Resources	$89.0	$117.1	$237.2	$448.2	$470.6	$533.4	5.4%	6.3%	1.8%
Defense	85.9	215.0	257.4	191.6	204.8	290.4	2.7	-2.9	5.0
Net Interest	30.1	30.8	45.4	75.1	89.3	151.7	3.1	5.0	7.5
Physical Resources	23.2	35.8	49.1	94.4	92.2	68.3	4.7	6.6	-4.3
Other	50.2	34.9	54.5	64.4	61.2	57.2	0.8	1.7	-0.9
By Function									
Social Security	5.0	51.9	95.4	169.6	181.5	219.3	11.7	5.7	2.7
Income Security	25.7	33.1	49.1	123.7	129.6	129.3	5.2	9.3	-0.03
Medicare	*	*	19.5	45.9	50.8	78.9	*	8.6	6.3
Health	1.9	3.6	18.6	33.2	35.0	44.5	9.5	5.8	3.5
ETESS	1.3	4.5	27.1	45.5	43.8	31.9	11.9	5.2	-5.1
Veterans	55.2	24.1	27.4	30.3	29.9	29.4	-2.0	1.0	-0.2
Transportation	6.3	18.3	22.0	30.5	30.4	27.3	5.3	3.3	-1.4
Commerce & Housing	6.3	7.2	6.6	13.4	10.7	18.8	2.5	7.1	8.0
Agriculture	12.5	11.6	16.4	12.6	14.7	17.2	0.03	-2.7	2.1
Natural Resources	8.2	7.2	9.8	19.9	17.7	14.6	3.0	7.1	-2.7
General Science	0.6	2.7	14.2	8.3	8.4	10.8	8.8	-5.3	3.6
International Affairs	29.5	13.4	13.5	18.2	17.0	10.5	-1.6	3.0	-6.9
General Government	6.3	5.4	7.2	18.6	14.8	9.5	3.7	9.5	6.3
Justice	1.3	1.8	3.2	6.6	6.2	9.2	5.4	7.3	5.7
Comm. & Reg. Dev.	**	0.9	7.6	16.2	13.8	5.3	17.0	7.6	-13.6
Energy	1.9	2.2	3.2	14.6	19.8	2.3	6.8	15.2	-30.8
Totals									
Outlays	267.1	412.1	616.1	845.0	881.7	1,064.0	3.8	3.2	2.7
Revenues	247.0	413.5	607.3	739.5	779.1	909.0	3.7	2.0	2.2
GNP	$1,673.0	$2,264.9	$3,119.1	$3,819.0	$3,882.3	$4,780.0	2.8%	2.0%	3.0%

Source. *Executive Office of the President. Annual figures adjusted using Consumer Price Index. GNP figures from Council of Economic Advisers.*

Note. *ETESS=Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services; Comm. & Reg. Dev.=Community and Regional Development.*

**Medicare was enacted in 1965.*

***Less than $.1 billion.*

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ing the amount of money flowing to lenders.

Community and regional development saw an $8.5 billion reduction. Grant programs to the regions and states—such as Urban Development Action Grants, Community Development Block Grants, and Revenue Sharing—had proven ineffective in achieving their major purpose of stimulating economic growth. In the Reagan view of economic development, government decisions on investments are inherently less efficient than those made by the private market. Community and regional development are best achieved by an expanding economy; an expanding economy is best achieved by low taxes and minimal federal interference. In short, it makes little sense to tax activities known to be productive (otherwise they would not generate tax revenues) and then to use the money on activities—some of which might compete with productive ventures—that have not stood the test of market survival.

Social Security and Medicare

The nation's two largest social programs are Social Security and Medicare. In the 16 years before Reagan came into office, the average annual increase in Social Security benefits was nearly 8 percent. Since the comparable figure for the growth of both wages and consumer prices was around 6.5 percent, it is understandable that changes in Social Security were near the top of Reagan's list of budget objectives. During his presidency, Social Security rose in constant dollars by 2.7 percent a year, the same as the increase in GNP.

Assisted by what everyone agreed was a rapidly approaching crisis, Reagan and Congress engaged in two rounds of legislative changes designed to restore health to the Social Security trust funds. A series of improvements in 1981 resulted in savings of about $10.5 billion over the next three years. Reagan also made some proposals, such as an immediate increase in the deduction for early retirement, that caused a firestorm of protest and gained no serious consideration. The fervor of these reactions has probably made federal politicians all the more eager to turn their backs on Social Security financing problems.

The second and more important round of Reagan changes in Social Security took place in 1983. Following the Greenspan Commission's report on the crisis in Social Security trust funds, Reagan and the Congress

Table 2

Federal Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP by Superfunction and Function, 1950-1988

Function or Superfunction	Year						Change in GNP Percentage		
	1950	1960	1970	1980	1981	1988	1950-80	1970-80	1981-88
By Superfunction									
Human Resources	5.32%	5.17%	7.60%	11.74%	12.12%	11.16%	6.42%	4.14%	-0.96%
Defense	5.13	9.49	8.25	5.02	5.27	6.08	-0.11	-3.23	0.80
Net Interest	1.80	1.36	1.46	1.97	2.30	3.17	0.17	0.51	0.87
Physical Resources	1.39	1.58	1.57	2.47	2.37	1.43	1.08	0.90	-0.94
Other	3.00	1.54	1.75	1.69	1.58	1.20	-1.31	-0.06	-0.38
By Function									
Social Security	0.30	2.29	3.06	4.44	4.67	4.59	4.14	1.38	-0.08
Income Security	1.54	1.46	1.57	3.24	3.34	2.71	1.70	1.66	-0.63
Medicare	*	*	0.63	1.20	1.31	1.65	1.20	0.57	0.34
Health	0.11	0.16	0.60	0.87	0.90	0.93	0.76	0.27	0.03
ETESS	0.08	0.20	0.87	1.19	1.13	0.67	1.11	0.32	-0.46
Veterans	3.30	1.07	0.88	0.79	0.77	0.62	-2.51	-0.09	-0.15
Transportation	0.38	0.81	0.71	0.80	0.78	0.57	0.42	0.09	-0.21
Commerce & Housing	0.38	0.32	0.21	0.35	0.28	0.39	-0.03	0.14	0.12
Agriculture	0.75	0.51	0.53	0.33	0.38	0.36	-0.42	-0.20	-0.02
Natural Resources	0.49	0.32	0.31	0.52	0.46	0.31	0.03	0.21	-0.15
General Science	0.04	0.12	0.46	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.18	-0.23	0.01
International Affairs	1.76	0.59	0.43	0.48	0.44	0.22	-1.28	0.05	-0.22
General Government	0.38	0.24	0.23	0.49	0.38	0.20	0.11	0.26	-0.18
Justice	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.17	0.16	0.19	0.09	0.07	0.03
Comm. & Reg. Dev.	**	0.04	0.24	0.42	0.35	0.11	0.42	0.18	-0.24
Energy	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.38	0.51	0.05	0.27	0.28	-0.46
Totals									
Outlays	15.97	18.20	19.75	22.13	22.71	22.26	6.16	2.38	-0.45
Revenues	14.77%	18.26%	19.47%	19.36%	20.07%	19.02%	4.59%	-0.11%	-1.05%

Source. *Executive Office of the President. Figures inflated using Consumer Price Index. GNP figures from Council of Economic Advisers.*

Note. *ETESS=Education, Training, Employment, and Social Services; Comm. & Reg. Dev.=Community and Regional Development.*

**Medicare was enacted in 1965.*

***Less than $50 million.*

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Table 3

Changes in Constant Dollar Outlays for Safety Net Programs, 1970-1988

Program	Year				Change 1970-1980		Change 1981-1988	
	1970	1980	1981	1988	Total	Annual %	Total	Annual %
AFDC(a)	$7.9	$10.3	$10.2	$10.3	$2.4	2.7%	$0.1	0.01%
Social Security for Children(b)	7.5*	9.2	9.4	7.1	1.7	2.0	-2.3	-4.0
Child Nutrition(c)	1.6	5.3	5.5	6.1	3.7	12.0	0.6	1.5
Food Stamps(d)	1.7	12.3	13.9	13.3	10.6	19.8	-0.6	-0.6
Housing(e)	1.4	8.0	8.9	13.9	6.6	17.4	5.0	6.4
Medicaid(f)	10.0	25.4	26.8	30.5	15.4	9.3	3.7	1.9
Totals	**$30.1**	**$70.5**	**$74.7**	**$81.2**	**$40.4**	**8.5%**	**$6.5**	**1.2%**

Note. *Outlays in billions of 1988 dollars.*
**Data for 1973.*
Sources. **a***Committee on Ways and Means.* **b***Committee on the Budget/Minority* **c***Committee on Education and Labor.* **d***Congressional Research Service.* **e***Executive Office of the President.* **f***Committee on Energy and Commerce; Committee on Ways and Means; years before 1988 adjusted using CPI for medical care.*

raised Social Security taxes, brought new groups of workers into the system, and modified benefits. The combined impact of these changes between 1983 and 1989 was to increase the trust fund balance by about $166 billion.

In fact, Social Security taxes will far exceed benefit payments for at least the next 30 years. By about the year 2020, projections indicate that the combined Social Security and Hospital Insurance (Medicare) trust fund will have a $12 trillion surplus. Unfortunately, this surplus will be invested only in nonmarketable federal paper (IOUs from one government program to another); it will not be held in anything like actual assets, bonds, or other tangible resources. Meanwhile, if the government's overall financial health continues to deteriorate, these Social Security "surpluses" will enjoy the same status as the Emperor's new clothes. It will likely prove difficult to pay future benefits from what, in the end, is nothing more than a bookkeeping entry.

Reagan and the Congress also made serious efforts to reduce the growth in Medicare spending; in this case they managed to reduce growth from 8.6 to 6.3 percent annually (**Table 1**). This moderated growth was achieved through a host of changes in Medicare law, which, taken together, resulted in deficit reductions of around $70 billion between 1982 and 1990. Despite these "cuts," the Medicare function still grew more rapidly under Reagan than did defense. According to the Congressional Budget Office, between 1989 and 1994 Medicare expenditures are expected to grow over 10 percent per year while Medicare income will grow only about 7 percent per year. As with Social Security, the day of reckoning on Medicare lies ahead.

Safety Net Programs

One charge frequently brought against the Reagan administration is that it allowed the safety net to fall into disrepair. Although there is no widely accepted definition of the safety net, most observers would agree that a reasonable definition should include the major programs for providing the needy with cash, food, housing, and health care.

Table 3 shows the major cash, food, housing, and medical programs that affect children and families (as well as unrelated individuals). Spending on all six safety net programs grew more slowly from 1981-1988 than in the previous decade, and spending on Social Security for children and Food Stamps actually declined. Averaged across all six programs, annual growth declined from over 8 percent during the 1970s to about 1 percent during the Reagan years.

Nonetheless, under Reagan total spending across the six programs increased from approximately $75 billion to approximately $81 billion in constant dollars. Led by an annual increase averaging over 6 percent in housing programs and by an increase of $3.7 billion in Medicaid, total spending on the basic safety net programs more than kept pace with inflation.

The widespread claims of deep cuts in safety net programs are incorrect. Even in the two cases where spending did decline, the reductions were not necessarily the result of policy changes. In Food Stamps, for example, the administration persuaded Congress to make some 40 changes in 1981 and 1982 that were expected to reduce benefit levels and eligibility. These changes were greeted by predictions of doom in many quarters. It was not long before articles appeared in serious journals about increasing rates of hunger in America. Nonetheless, a large-scale empirical study by the Urban Institute in 1985 found that: "the purchasing power of the benefit was largely maintained," there was no "effect of the legislative changes on the number of Food Stamp participants once changing economic conditions and demographic characteristics are controlled," and there had been no fundamental change in "the basic structure of the Food Stamp program."

Declines in Social Security outlays for children were more substantial than those for Food Stamps. The immediate cause of this decline was that there were fewer children eligible for Social Security payments. There were about 3.2 million surviving children and 1.3 million children in families with a disabled worker drawing Social Security in 1981; by 1987 these numbers had declined to about 2.3 million and 1.0 million respective-

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ly, a decline of more than 25 percent. Decreases in the death rate accounted for about 75 percent of reduced spending on surviving children. There were, however, a number of changes in the disability program intended to restrict eligibility only to those who were truly disabled; some families and children were removed from the rolls by these changes.

Federal AFDC expenditures held virtually constant under Reagan. Nonetheless, several 1981 policy changes were designed to remove some families from the welfare rolls and thereby reduce federal expenditures. The most notable among these were limiting family income to 150 percent of the state's need standard, counting the Earned Income Tax Credit as income even if families did not claim the credit, counting stepparent income, reporting income on a monthly basis, and reducing the amount of income that families could earn by working and still remain eligible for AFDC. That these provisions had their intended effect was demonstrated by a U.S. General Accounting Office study in 1985 showing that the national AFDC caseload had declined by about 440,000 and monthly outlays by somewhat less than $100 million between 1981 and 1984.

The budget impact of Reagan's 1981 AFDC reforms is minimal in comparison to the long-term decline in average AFDC benefits. In 1988 dollars, the median AFDC benefit per family fell from $510 to $394 between 1970 and 1980—a decline caused by the states' unwillingness to ensure that benefits kept up with inflation. After Reagan took office, monthly benefit payments per family decreased only an additional $24. Moreover, because of decreasing family size, monthly benefit payments per person declined only $8 under Reagan.

Spending on Successful Programs

A second way to judge social spending under Reagan is to focus on children's programs deemed successful. A list of such programs that has recently been published by the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families in the House of Representatives includes: the Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children; Medicaid; immunizations; Head Start; Chapter I subsidies for school districts based on the number of poor children enrolled; education and services for handicapped children; and youth employment programs such as the Job Corps. **Table 4** provides an overview of funding for these programs.

The data in Table 4 are strikingly similar to trends in federal social spending on other programs discussed above. Nearly all the programs were growing rapidly between 1970 and 1980; on average, they grew at the rate of 8.3 percent per year. Under Reagan, however, the average annual rate of growth was reduced to a little under 1 percent. Moreover, spending on four of the seven programs actually declined in constant dollars. (In three of these four the rate of decline was very small—around 1 percent per year or less.)

The cuts for youth employment were more substantial. Expenditures declined by about $1.2 billion or 27 percent between 1981 and 1988. However, most scholars would be unlikely to agree with the Select Committee's judgment that there is extensive benefit-cost data showing youth employment programs to be effective. A few studies show that the Job Corps produces benefits that exceed costs, but the nearly undisputed conclusion among scholars is that youth employment programs in general have cost more than they saved.

In addition to the seven programs listed in Table 4, the Select Committee also included prenatal care as a cost-beneficial program. Although funding for Medicaid, the major source of federal support for prenatal care, grew under Reagan, it is not known how much Medicaid money was spent on prenatal care. Nonetheless, it is clear that Medicaid coverage for prenatal care expanded dramatically during the Reagan years. Since the inception of Medicaid in 1965, liberals have argued that the greatest shortcoming of federal health policy for the poor is that access to Medicaid is tied to participation in

Table 4

Changes in Constant Dollar Spending on "Successful" Children's Programs, 1970-1988

Program	Year				Change			
					1970-1980		1981-1989	
	1970	1980	1981	1988	Total	Annual %	Total	Annual %
WIC(a)	$30	$1,042	$1,141	$1,800	$1,012	35.5%	$659	6.5%
Medicaid(b)	10,013	25,273	26,789	30,462	15,260	9.3	3,673	1.9
Immunizations(c)	65	45	40	86	-20	-3.7	46	10.9
Head Start(d)	1,132	1,209	1,224	1,206	77	0.5	-18	-0.2
Chapter I(e)	4,659	5,280	4,668	4,328	621	1.0	-340	-1.1
Handicapped(f)	275	1,350	1,556	1,466	1,075	15.9	-90	-0.9
Youth Employment(g)	905	4,923	4,532	3,297	4,018	16.9	-1,235	-4.5
Total	**$17,079**	**$39,122**	**$39,950**	**$42,645**	**$22,043**	**8.3%**	**$2,695**	**0.9%**

Note. *Data in millions of 1988 dollars.*

Sources.

a WIC=Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children. Committee on Education and Labor.

bCommittee on Energy and Commerce; Committee on Ways and Means. Years before 1988 adjusted using CPI for medical care.

cCongressional Research Service; U.S. General Accounting Office. Years before 1988 adjusted using CPI for medical care.

dCongressional Research Service.

eCongressional Research Service. Years before 1988 adjusted using CPI for state and local government purchases of services.

fCongressional Research Service.

gCongressional Research Service. Includes spending on Job Corps, Title IIA of JTPA, the Summer Youth program from JTPA, and the predecessors of these programs.

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AFDC or the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. As a result, millions of needy families that do not qualify for welfare are shut out of medical care, even though they have incomes below the federal poverty level. Beginning in 1984, Congress, with at least the acquiescence of the Reagan administration, began to break the welfare-Medicaid link. After several incremental pieces of legislation, in 1988 the Congress required all states, by July 1, 1990, to use their Medicaid program to pay for prenatal care for all pregnant women and health care for all infants under age one in households with incomes below the federal poverty level—regardless of whether they qualify for AFDC or SSI. Also, states were given the option of offering prenatal care to mothers with incomes of up to 185 percent of the poverty level.

Child Nutrition Programs

Over the years Congress has developed a broad array of programs to insure that children get proper nutrition. As shown in **Table 5**, changes in funding for child food programs mirror the changes in most other programs examined above. During the decade before the Reagan presidency, all except the Special Milk program were growing rapidly. Across the six programs expenditures were growing at the average annual rate of nearly 13 percent per year. Under Reagan, the annual rate of growth was reduced to 1.6 percent, although growth continued in three of the six individual programs and expenditures in constant dollars grew by over $640 million.

To achieve this spending restraint, the administration proposed several changes in the various nutrition programs. Perhaps the most important and far reaching was the proposal to eliminate subsidies for non-poor children, especially in the school lunch program. Congress reacted by reducing the reimbursement rates of lunches served to non-poor children and by making several additional but minor changes in school lunch and other child nutrition programs. The Congress flatly refused, however, to go along with Reagan's proposal to focus nutrition subsidies exclusively on the poor. Thus, the concept of federal support for all children eating meals in public schools remained intact, and indeed has been strengthened by Congress on a number of occasions since 1981.

Reagan's Cutting Principles

Ronald Reagan slowed the rapid growth of federal spending. If the federal government had continued to grow at the rate it had been growing during the three decades before Reagan, federal outlays in 1988 would have been about $86 billion higher than the actual outlays of $1.064 trillion.

The Reagan reductions were by no means haphazard. Five principles guided the cuts. The first and most important is virtually the defining characteristic of Reaganism: the federal government interfered too extensively in American life with disastrous consequences for economic growth. Its growth should therefore be curbed. The steep cuts in spending on energy demonstration programs were justified by this principle. Similarly, the dictum "let the market function" can be seen in reductions in job training, public service employment, housing, and economic development grants aimed at helping the poor.

The second principle guiding Reagan budget cuts was that federal benefits in means-tested programs should be focused primarily on the poor. Then as now, this principle clashed with several popular assumptions about social programs, including the notion that spending on poor people will be miserly and vulnerable to budget cutting unless middle-class citizens benefit from the expenditures. It also clashes with the economists' concern for maintaining work incentives in welfare programs. In this view, wise social policy aims to avoid sudden reductions in welfare benefits as earnings increase because such reductions are thought to decrease a person's motivation to earn money. Reagan seemed willing to violate these widely accepted ideas in order to draw a clear line between welfare and non-welfare.

Increased welfare spending is not a barometer of the nation's social conscience. It is a direct measure of the failure of social policy.

The cuts in AFDC, for example, were achieved in major part by reducing the amount of earnings a family could have and still remain eligible for welfare. This approach directly violated the notion that phase-outs of welfare benefits should be gradual—or in the economist's jargon, that marginal tax rates should be kept to a minimum—in order to maintain work incentive. Even so, several evaluations found that the rate of families leaving welfare doubled and most were still off the rolls one year later.

Similarly, Reagan policy was often designed to reduce spending on middle-class children and families. This principle applied with special force to cuts in both the school lunch program and student aid. Schools could and did claim reimbursement equal to about 50 percent for meals served to even the wealthiest students. Although Congress rejected Reagan's attempt to eliminate this middle-class subsidy, the administration's willingness to incur the pointed and harsh criticism of Congress and numerous social pundits on this issue shows the seriousness of its commitment to the underlying principle. Virtually the same comments can be made about Reagan's more successful attempts to remove middle-class students from the student grant and aid programs.

A third principle pursued by Reagan budget cuts was that means-tested benefits should be contingent on an individual's effort to leave welfare. Thus, Reagan strengthened work requirements in both AFDC and Food Stamps, redirected training money to focus on welfare clients so they could acquire the skills needed to

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Table 5

Changes in Constant Dollar Outlays for Children's Food Programs, 1970-1988

Program	Year				Change 1970-1980		Change 1981-1988	
	1970	1980	1981	1988	Total	Annual %	Total	Annual %
School Lunch	$999	$3,107	$3,201	$3,068	$2,108	11.3%	$-133	-0.6%
Special Milk	346	232	160	22	114	-4.0	-138	-28.3
School Breakfast	36	365	433	480	329	23.2	47	1.5
Child Care Food	19	318	391	600	299	28.2	209	6.1
Summer Food	6	167	142	138	161	33.3	-4	-0.4
WIC*	30	1,042	1,141	1,800	1,012	35.5	659	6.5
Totals	**$1,436**	**$5,231**	**$5,468**	**$6,108**	**$3,795**	**12.9%**	**$640**	**1.6%**

Note. *Data in millions of 1988 dollars.*
Source. *Committee on Education and Labor.*
**WIC=Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children. WIC began in 1974 so the outlays in this column and the change data in the 1970-80 column are based on 1974 rather than 1970.*

escape welfare, and attempted—with indifferent success—to revive the moribund job requirements in the Unemployment Compensation program.

Fourth, Reagan budget policy was often designed to return decision-making authority on social programs to the states and localities. In Reagan's view of American history since the Depression, power had been sucked away from county seats and state capitols by the voracious giant of rigid control on the Potomac. The most effective solution Reagan found to reverse this trend was to combine several programs with similar purposes into a single program, to reduce the funding of the new "block grant" in anticipation of savings from more efficient administration, and to give the states and localities great flexibility in spending the federal money.

The fifth and, in the abstract, the least controversial principle guiding Reagan budget cuts was that programs that don't work should be eliminated. Business as usual in Washington often means that members of Congress heap praise upon and then increase the funding of programs they and every informed observer know are failures. Reagan himself was not incapable of showing this tendency. And yet, Reagan cuts often fell most heavily on politically popular but empirically questionable programs. The training and employment programs are good examples, as are the various community development programs.

The Welfare Trap

Perched on the cusp of the huge and gently rising curve of federal spending, we can now see the importance of the controls on social spending achieved by Reagan. Though Congress, as usual, is anxious to spend more money, its habits are somewhat cramped by the deficit and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law. But the deficit is weakening as an effective curb on federal spending. The 100th Congress spent $3.3 billion over five years on welfare reform, $1.5 billion over three years on a food bill, and at least $2 billion on a drug bill. In addition, Congress dramatically increased outlays on catastrophic health insurance under the Medicare program, spending an estimated $31 billion over the first five years. Evidently, more than a budget deficit will be required to prevent increased spending and taxing by the Congress.

Those interested in securing the historic gains of the Reagan budget revolution need to advance a more defensible and positive reason for holding the line on social spending. The heart of such a position should be that the nation now spends enough on social programs and that the idea of "entitlements" should be supplemented, and in some cases replaced, as the underlying principle of American social policy, by the idea of benefits contingent on responsible behavior. Children, the infirm, and the aged are often incapable of providing for themselves; for these groups public generosity is not accompanied by the specter of dependency, especially where the programs are based on insurance principles. However, for non-elderly and able-bodied adults, welfare is a potential trap. For this reason, public programs should be based on the idea that support is temporary and conditional. People should be encouraged to use their talents and become productive, self-supporting citizens. Those who do receive public support should work toward independence at the earliest possible moment. It is in both the nation's and their own best interest to do so.

Increased welfare spending is not a barometer of the nation's social conscience. It is a direct measure of the failure of social policy. We now spend enough to insure a decent provision for all citizens; our new objective should be to help citizens make every effort to provide for themselves and their children. Changes in social spending under Reagan moved the nation in this new and more humane direction. If we can now build national consensus on the need for personal responsibility and initiative in the nation's social programs, we can continue to move both policy and public spending away from the expansive, wasteful, and self-defeating social expenditures of the past.

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

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McJobs

Inside America's Largest Youth Training Program

Ben Wildavsky

When Eddie Murphy arrives in New York as a spoiled young African prince in the 1988 hit movie *Coming To America,* he is determined to live the life of a typical American. Shunning the vanities of Manhattan, he orders the cab driver to take him to Queens. After renting a cheap, run-down apartment, Murphy decides to get a typical American job. Soon, he is installed—where else?—in a fast food restaurant, working on the clean-up crew of a McDonald's look-alike called McDowell's.

Nobody seems to have told the prince—who displays a gleeful enthusiasm for his menial work and soon romances the boss's daughter in true Horatio Alger form—that he is supposed to feel alienated, exploited, and doomed to a lifetime of drudgery in a classic dead-end job. According to the standard lament, the 18 million jobs created in America since the 1982 recession are an illusory measure of economic expansion; a nation of hamburger-flippers, goes the argument, is a nation in decline.

Billions Served, Millions Trained

As the archetypal fast food establishment, serving close to 7 percent of the U.S. population every day and employing a remarkable 1 out of 15 first-time job seekers, McDonald's has been a frequent target for those expounding the "dead-end jobs" thesis. As early as 1974, Senator Lloyd Bentsen, aghast that McDonald's total stock market value had surpassed that of U.S. Steel, declared: "There is something very wrong with a nation that is long on hamburgers and short on steel." A 1988 Children's Defense Fund publication cited favorably a report proclaiming that "Voters live...with the specter of 'McDonald's'—the fear that kids might end up in dead-end, low-paying service jobs."

Concern about the value of these jobs is understandable. The 8,000 McDonald's restaurants in the United States—75 percent owned by franchisees, 25 percent by the Oak Brook, Illinois-based corporation—currently employ around 480,000 people, with eight million alumni now in other jobs. It might fairly be said that the influence of McDonald's corporate culture extends beyond the walls of the restaurant to American culture at large. If McDonald's is a creativity-crushing, exploitative organization, what does its pervasiveness say about American society? And if the training it provides is worthless, the skills its employees acquire negligible, whither the nation's work force?

While the typical complaints critics voice about McDonald's certainly have some basis in reality—annual turnover often surpasses 100 percent, and it is not difficult to find crew members who complain of high pressure and low wages—the overall picture is more positive. A closer look at the people who work at McDonald's shows that a surprising number of burger flippers advance through the ranks and enjoy the benefits that go with managerial responsibility in a demanding business. More important, most employees who pass through McDonald's gain the kinds of skills that help them get better jobs. Far from sticking its workers in an inescapable rut, McDonald's functions as a de facto job training program by teaching the basics of *how* to work.

Movers and Shake Makers

It's easy to see why upward mobility is taken seriously at McDonald's. The company's legendary founder, Ray Kroc, was a high school dropout; chairman Fred Turner was a door-to-door salesman before starting work as a grillman at age 23; Michael Quinlan, president and CEO, began with the company as a part-time mailroom clerk when he was 18; and Ed Rensi, president of McDonald's U.S.A., started at 85 cents an hour in 1956 after dropping out of Ohio State. Nor are senior executives detached from their roots; Rensi's business card reads: CHIEF Burger Griller, French Fryer, Shake Maker, Cheer Leader.

Any large corporation could point to a few such spectacular rises, but success stories like these are common at McDonald's and do not stop at the top. Fewer than half of the corporate officers graduated from college, and almost 40 percent started as hourly store employees. More telling, over 50 percent of store managers began behind the counter, reflecting the company's emphasis on hiring from within to ensure that its managers have hands-on experience with the

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strict operating procedures that have made McDonald's a success. The individual stories of those who have come up through the ranks suggest that for some, at least, flipping burgers can be far from a dead end.

The Fast (Food) Track

Marion Foran started working at McDonald's in July 1973, a month after graduating from high school in Helena, Montana. She planned to attend the University of Arizona at Flagstaff, and her mother told her to go out and get a job. "In my family," says Foran, "there were five kids, and it was assumed that if you wanted to go to college you'd have to pay your own way." She was hired at $1.60 an hour, intending only to stay until she had financed her first year of college. On her first day, after watching training films, 17-year-old Foran was assigned a "buddy" who showed her how to prepare milk shakes. She found the dinner rush overwhelming at first—"it was way too much for me," she laughs—and came home splattered with ice cream. But Foran's early misgivings quickly vanished. She had once been "horribly shy"—she'd never been a cheerleader, joined any clubs, or played in the band—but that didn't last long: "You've got no choice," she says, "when you're talking to 100 customers during lunch."

Ben Wildavsky

Kay-Andrea Robinson serves a customer. Fast food workers learn to work with others, deal with the public, follow directions, and take responsibility for mistakes.

Soon, Foran was awarded the first in a series of promotions. She became a second assistant manager, working six days a week supervising employees, hiring and training new crew members, taking inventory, and helping with the financial reports, all for the grand sum of $350 a month.

By the time she was 18, Foran was first assistant manager, had purchased a new Volkswagen bug with her own money, and had trained two new second assistants. As for the University of Arizona, she never thought of it again—"I was having too much fun," she says. The job wasn't easy, though. "It's a lot harder work than it looks like to the customer," Foran explains. "It's not that it's difficult, it's the pace you have to keep up."

At age 20, Foran thought she should be a manager. The owner of her store had no other stores, so she moved to Las Vegas and started work as a manager trainee at a McDonald's in a poor section of town, a far cry from small-town Montana. By 1978, Foran was promoted to restaurant manager and was asked to open a brand new outlet on the Las Vegas Strip, no easy task in such a transient environment. "It was wild, real wild," she says, with strung-out gamblers and a 2 A.M. armed robbery among the challenges she confronted.

After managing another Las Vegas store for one and a half years, Foran was promoted to area supervisor in 1982 at age 26; she oversaw operations at five or six stores and earned $24,000 a year, with the added benefits of a company car and weekends off. After two more years, she became a field consultant, then a training assistant, running the Basic Operations Course that all would-be McDonald's managers must take. Eighteen months later, Foran took the two-month sabbatical that McDonald's managers earn every 10 years, and traveled to Hong Kong, Mexico, and Canada. In April 1988 she started her current job as a professor at Hamburger University, the McDonald's manager-training center at company headquarters in Illinois, famous for issuing each graduate of its one- and two-week intensive courses a degree in Hamburgerology with a minor in Fries. Foran teaches classes in employee retention; she also instructs managers, who do almost all their own equipment maintenance, in how to tame her old nemesis, the Taylor milk shake machine.

Foran is well aware that not everybody wants to make McDonald's a career. "The ones who leave, leave for better jobs," she says, "There's nothing wrong with that." She often runs into old employees who are now hairdressers, computer programmers, air flight attendants, and in one case, a Dairy Queen owner/operator. Another former crew person, Mike Ware, came from a tough Las Vegas neighborhood, worked for her when he was 18, and was eventually hired as the food and beverage manager for one of the big hotels on the Strip. Asked what she thinks people learn from working at McDonald's, Foran cites her efforts to instill responsibility in her employees; if a crew member didn't show

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Roger M. Matteucci/McDonald's Corporation

Marion Foran rose through the ranks to become a professor at Hamburger University.

up for his shift, "I was not above going to his house and knocking on his door to say he should be at work." She says she never had to go to the same house twice.

"No One's Going To Hand It To You"

A less spectacular but perhaps more typical example of someone who has progressed through the ranks is David Fisher. Fisher was recently promoted to second assistant at a McDonald's in a suburb of Washington. The average salary nationally for those in his position is $19,500, with full medical benefits. The 20-year-old Fisher started working at a different outlet two years ago, after graduating from high school with no firm plans for college. Although his prior part-time jobs in a hotel and a department store put him on the management fast track at first, he decided to move into a lower-pressure hourly position when he changed stores. "It's rough running a store," declares Fisher. "People tend to put us down, but it's hard work."

Fisher explains that those who perform well on the meticulous work station evaluations called SOCs (station observation checklists) are chosen to move beyond the entry-level position of crew person to become crew trainers and, in stores that have the post, crew chiefs. Raises and promotions are based on ability and ambition, says Fisher, not age and seniority; performance reviews are scheduled every four months, with small raises, ranging from 10 cents to 25 cents an hour, awarded according to performance, and further increases given if an employee is promoted. Fisher's store pays new employees between $4 and $5 an hour, depending on the shift they work (the nationwide McDonald's average is $4.55). He was making $6.75 an hour by the time he became a swing manager, a part-time management position that is the last hourly job in the restaurant hierarchy before employees enter junior salaried management.

Fisher disagrees with people who think McDonald's jobs lead nowhere. He is exasperated by the high turnover that plagues the tight D.C.-area labor market—"some kids just hop from job to job"—and thinks that too many employees expect something for nothing: "There's an amazing amount of opportunity available, but no one's going to hand it to you." He cites three successful second assistants, all in their early 20s, who started at the bottom—one from Korea, one from Nigeria, and one from Jamaica. Apparently, recent immigrants, who may find few other jobs as easily available, can achieve considerable mobility at McDonald's.

Burgers or Crack

Not far from Fisher's store, inside the District line, Kay-Andrea Robinson, an 18-year-old senior at Roosevelt High School, works as a swing manager at a McDonald's near Howard University. She came to the United States from Jamaica when she was 16, and when she was told that she'd have to wait until her mother's next paycheck to buy the new slacks she wanted, Robinson decided it was time to become independent. Working as a $3.85-an-hour crewperson, she was nervous at first: "I thought, I was a foreigner, Oh Lord, how are they going to accept me?" Robinson moved very quickly, going from crew trainer to crew chief to swing manager within six months. She often supervises workers older than she is, since most of the crew at her store are students at Howard or the University of the District of Columbia. She wishes people who make fun of her for working at McDonald's understood the range of responsibilities she has—"They think all you do is flip hamburgers."

In a city notorious for drug-related crime, Robinson says she is proud of what she does. "I see kids in my class selling drugs, making $500 a day. I can say I'm working. Some kids want things the fast way, some kids want things the honest way—and they'll wait for it. It all depends on what they want."

McDonald's hires 1 out of 15 first-time job seekers in America.

The area supervisor in charge of Robinson's store, Blanca Vivas, came to the United States from Ecuador in 1976 speaking no English. She started at McDonald's in 1978, making french fries for a little over minimum wage. She progressed to dressing hamburgers, and after four months started working behind the counter. She moved through various positions, was voted crew person of the month three times, and became a first assistant in 1983. After working as a store manager, Vivas was promoted to her current position supervising four stores in 1985. She believes that accountability is the most important thing McDonald's teaches its employees: "You

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start with a clean station, you leave with a clean station; you drop something, you pick it up; you're given a clean uniform, you come in with a clean uniform."

Some Poor Treatment

Not everyone paints as rosy a picture of McDonald's as those who have made it. In addition to low wages and a hot, high-speed work environment, some employees complain of poor treatment by managers. Mark Kershaw, a 33-year-old manager from Ogden, Utah, who started at McDonald's in high school and came back as a manager when a back injury caused him to lose his railroad job, agrees that "there are some managers who treat them like slaves." He tries to avoid this, and has gotten to know his employees well, to the point of advising them about problems outside the workplace: "In this job," he says, "you can be a marriage counselor, you can be an abortion counselor. You're not managing a time card, you're managing a person."

Lou DeRosa, the 29-year-old manager of a Connecticut McDonald's, grew up in a tough New Haven neighborhood. He offers a blunt assessment of McDonald's jobs that seems realistic for many of those who take them: "This is a survival job. A lot of people can't handle it. This is something that shows you if you can work or not. It's not like a department store where you can lay back." DeRosa stresses the time constraints and high standards crew members must work to: "It separates the men from the boys."

Both Kershaw and DeRosa have received job offers from other companies. Another manager, a 24-year-old woman from Salt Lake City who began with McDonald's when she was 16, left for a year to work for a leading hotel company as a catering manager. She took a $2,000 per year pay cut to return to McDonald's. At her hotel company, she says, "The managers shouted at each other, and they treated their employees like dirt. I never heard the word 'communicate' once." For women, who make up 57 percent of McDonald's crews and half of all store managers (whose average national salary is nearly $28,000), working at McDonald's can offer unexpected satisfactions. "My input matters," emphasizes a young female manager from the Baltimore area. "I have friends who work as secretaries—no one cares what they think."

Careers Without Ladders

While the number of success stories to be found within McDonald's belies the notion that jobs there are irredeemably worthless, these examples are not intended to suggest that such career paths are typical, only that they are possible. The vast majority of those who work at McDonald's come and go with great frequency, and not everyone sees anything wrong with this. "*All* jobs are dead-end," says Walter Williams, professor of economics at George Mason University. "We as a nation suffer from the Horatio Alger myth, where a guy comes in as a porter and becomes president of the company." The typical person, according to Williams, achieves upward mobility *across* jobs, not within a job. This process involves working at a particular job, gaining experience, finding out about other jobs, and moving on.

A labor economist at the American Enterprise Institute, Marvin Kosters, concurs: "The notion that good jobs are those with a good career ladder is a view oriented towards an older world, in which young people got trained for a particular kind of work, such as dressmaking or bricklaying, which they would do their whole lives. In the modern economy, people don't continue using specialized skills; occupational charts aren't hierarchical—they're more like a matrix." Kosters says that people in McDonald's-style jobs acquire transferable skills that are useful to any employer. The relatively low pay, he suggests, can be seen as a form of indirect payment by the employee for the broadly applicable skills he or she learns.

General Employability Skills

What exactly do fast food jobs teach? A 1984 study by Ivan Charner and Bryna Fraser of the National Institute for Work and Learning, an independent research organization that works both with unions such as the AFL/CIO, and major corporations, attempted to answer that question. For *Fast Food Jobs,* 4,660 hourly workers for seven large fast food companies—Arby's, Del Taco, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Krystal, McDonald's, Roy Rogers, and White Castle—responded to a detailed questionnaire asking what they had learned on the job. As might be expected, high percentages of employees reported learning such directly job-related skills as operating a cash register (80 percent) and operating food preparation machines (85 percent). Seventy percent of employees believed they had learned "some" or "a great deal" about training other workers, 50 percent learned supervisory skills, and 40 percent learned inventory control, while fewer than 20 percent developed bookkeeping or accounting skills.

People in fast food jobs acquire transferable skills that are useful to any employer.

More important than the specific skills learned are what Charner and Fraser call "general employability skills," the kinds of qualities an employee—particularly a young person with limited work experience—must possess to be successful in any job. Ninety-four percent of employees said their jobs helped them learn teamwork, 89 percent learned how to deal with customers, and 69 percent developed an awareness of how a business runs. Respondents learned such crucial work skills as taking directions (73 percent), getting along with coworkers (75 percent), being on time (57 percent), finishing an assigned task (64 percent), taking responsibility for mistakes (65 percent), coming to work regularly (59 percent), and being well groomed (44 percent).

The greatest gains in such skills were reported by blacks and Hispanics, employees from lower-income backgrounds, and high school drop-outs. In a recent interview, Fraser stressed the socializing functions of fast

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food jobs for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. "These skills may get picked up as a matter of course by middle-class kids, but the places people learn all-important behavior—how you look, how you dress, how you talk—are not functioning effectively for many kids. You might learn them in church...who goes? In families? There are so many broken homes, many kids lack role models of working adults. The job site is perhaps the only place to get these basic skills—rudimentary, door-opening skills."

Straighten Your Hat

Robert M. Beavers Jr., a senior vice president at McDonald's who sits on the corporation's board of directors, agrees with Fraser. "We fill a void. We provide invaluable training and help to kids who in some cases would not otherwise get help and training at a very critical stage in life—ages 15, 16, 17, 18." Named one of the top 25 black managers in America by *Black Enterprise* magazine in February 1988, Beavers points out that McDonald's is the largest employer of black youth in the nation, and through its franchise system has more successful black entrepreneurs than any other organization (31 percent of potential owners currently in training are black). Since it is often argued that ghetto youth cannot be expected to look to easily available fast food jobs as a realistic alternative to the lucrative drug trade, or as a way to improve their otherwise poor life chances, it should be noted that *Black Enterprise* recently featured McDonald's as one of the 50 best places for blacks to work, citing the high proportion of black employees (26 percent) and managers (17 percent).

Blanca Vivas started making french fries in 1978 at a little over minimum wage. Today she supervises four stores.

Starting as a part-timer in 1963 while studying electrical engineering at George Washington University, Beavers continued with McDonald's after graduation out of an enthusiasm for the business that outsiders may have trouble understanding, but which many inside the company share. He cites a number of instances in which working at McDonald's helped turn around young people with few apparent prospects for success. One of his former employees, James Scott, was a high school dropout who worked for McDonald's full time, was persuaded to go back and get his diploma, and became a model worker who eventually took the civil service exam and got a job with the Department of the Interior.

Another crew person came from the projects in Southeast Washington, D.C. "He would strike fear into the heart of anyone," laughs Beavers, "but he was one hell of an employee. I remember watching him get off the bus outside the store on his way into work one day, the way he walked, the way he wore his hat, the way he wore his clothes. I sat him down and said, 'I want you to project a certain appearance coming into the store. I don't want your hat cocked. I don't want your pants rolled up.' A few days later, I saw him get off the bus. He straightened his hat, let down his pants leg. I knew I'd made an impression on that guy." Though the young man eventually was killed in a fight, he worked for Beavers for over a year, got his high school equivalency, and became a foreman at a bottling plant.

Bathing Daily

Not only does the Charner-Fraser study give some quantitative credibility to such anecdotes, it decisively refutes the common notion that most fast food employees hate their jobs. Thus, while books such as *The 100 Best Companies to Work for in America* exclude McDonald's, claiming that its workers find it "dehumanizing, similar to the experiences Chaplin encountered in *Modern Times,*" the majority of fast food workers Charner and Fraser surveyed—67 percent—said they enjoyed their jobs.

Since the results of the Charner-Fraser study are at least broadly applicable to McDonald's (the samples from the seven chains surveyed were weighted to reflect their respective market shares), it is worth asking how McDonald's teaches the basic job skills that help its employees get ahead.

The not-so-hidden secret of McDonald's success lies in the meticulous operating procedures for food preparation and service that all its stores follow. Before being shown the ropes by a crew trainer, new employees watch an orientation video that stresses neatness and hygiene. Employees are told they must bathe daily, have clean hair and teeth, keep moustaches and sideburns trimmed, wear only neutral nail polish, and wash their hands with soap before and after using any work station.

Don't Sound Like a Robot

Another video, "Counter 1: The Six Steps," teaches the fundamentals of customer service. Crew members are told to be at the counter before the customer arrives, to look him or her in the eye, and to smile. A beaming teen-ager is shown greeting a customer with an upbeat "Good afternoon! May I take your order please?" The narrator instructs crew people, "Vary the greeting and the tone of your voice from customer to customer—you don't want to sound like a robot."

The next step involves not only taking the customer's order, but also selling up—asking if a customer wants a large order of fries if he doesn't specify a size, for example—and suggestive selling, which requires employees to suggest one additional item to customers who do not order all four elements of a McDonald's meal: sandwich, fries, drink, and dessert. Employees are taught a precise routine for assembling the order, after which counter clerks receive payment, make change, and must thank the customer and ask for repeat business—the classic "Thank you, please come again." Once more, employees are told to vary their words and tone, though the desperate smile of the shiny-eyed blonde in the training tape makes her an unlikely model of sincerity.

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Saccharin-sweet as the squeaky clean actors may be, the videos seem an effective way of breaking basic courtesy into steps that can be learned. Such routines are found throughout the 658-page Operations and Training manual that contains the minutiae needed to run a McDonald's. And however much fun people make of formulaic service, anyone who has ever been made to feel like an imposition in a store or restaurant can only be grateful to an organization whose "Customer Relations Ten Commandments" instructs employees: "Our customers do us an honor when they call—we are not doing them a favor."

Training tapes with titles like "Fries," "Opening the Store," and "A Study in Breakfast" are used to teach various stations and responsibilities, with detailed station observation checklists used both as a reference point for crew people and a performance assessment tool for managers. No point is too small to be left out—making french fries involves 15 separate steps, with seven more to be followed for bagging—though a number of tasks require more human initiative than a checklist can spell out. If counter people are not busy, for example, they should help their coworkers, clean the counter, and replenish supplies. Those working the grill are guided by a timer, but must rely on visual inspection to decide exactly when to turn the patties. And counter people have standing instructions to replace any items dropped by customers at no cost, informing the manager afterwards so the product can be accounted for in the store's inventory.

As for managers, they are repeatedly taught the importance of good employee relations, with a basic supervision video emphasizing such fundamentals as greeting employees by name; looking them in the eye; asking, not telling; saying please and thank you; and being sensitive to what other people are thinking and feeling. At Hamburger University, McDonald's uses an adapted version of transactional analysis called McPac to teach managers good communication skills; the video relayed to students' hotel room television sets features forgettable New Age music and advice about making competent adult agreements and avoiding parent-like bossiness or child-like whining.

Accountability and due process are reinforced by regular performance evaluations. These evaluations are bolstered by a counseling procedure in which employees are told of shortcomings in their work and are given a chance to correct mistakes. If a series of oral corrections followed by written reprimands yields no improvement, employees can be dismissed, though the system seems more geared towards patience than punishment. Most managers can remember firing crew people only for stealing or for swearing at coworkers or customers, not for getting a procedure wrong.

Smelling Like Grease

The training given by McDonald's has clearly left its mark on those who once worked there. Many can still recite the different steps for customer service, and have vivid memories of the speed, precision, and industriousness required of them.

Dale Newell, 31, now living on a Paiute-Shoshone

McDonald's board member and senior vice president Bob Beavers: "We fill a void. We provide invaluable training to kids who would not otherwise get it."

Indian reservation in California, worked at a McDonald's for a year in the early 1980s. Newell remembers the emphasis placed on cordiality, punctuality, and appearance. "It taught me a bunch," he says, "It made you take pride in what you did." Newell says people he knows in businesses such as department stores and hardware stores regard McDonald's-trained workers highly, knowing they will be hard workers: "It was ingrained in their head, whenever you're at work you do things."

Currently an assistant store manager at Marshall's department store in Beacon Hill, Virginia, Marilyn Milner says the main thing her McDonald's job taught her was that she wanted something better: "You went home smelling like grease every night—it was disgusting." But she was satisfied enough with her job to return to the neighborhood franchise in her native Philadelphia during all her college vacations. "Who else would take me for three weeks?" asks Milner. "It was more like a social thing...me and this other woman used to always fight to be the best." With electronic cash registers keeping a precise account of sales, such in-store competitions are frequent; employees are given small gifts or cash incentives for taking in the most money or serving the most customers in a given period. Today, Milner wishes she could find employees for her store who worked as hard as she and her coworkers did.

"Don't Look Down On Me"

When Josh Malkin started working for $3.35 an hour at a McDonald's in Sebastopol, California, while he was in high school, he had no other work experience. "Realis-

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tically, I couldn't get a job at a place that paid better," he says. Now working a drill press at a computer furniture manufacturer after spending two years at his local community college, Malkin, 21, says he enjoyed his job. He was annoyed when he later applied for part-time work at a gas station and was asked if his McDonald's experience was "as bad as everyone says." "To me that was a really narrow-minded question," Malkin says. "I felt like asking them 'Did you ever work there? Don't look down on me.'" Malkin got along well with the senior citizens in his store, and says working with mentally handicapped employees made him less afraid of them (McDonald's hires these workers through a special program). He thinks his job taught him self-confidence, and that many of his coworkers who complained about the heat and the uniforms had bad attitudes: "They thought they could be lazy and still get paid for it; they'd get mad if the supervisor told them to work a little harder."

McDonald's is the largest employer of black youth in the nation.

Presently enrolled at a Brooklyn, New York, community college, Masha Kotlyar, a 19-year-old Soviet émigré, got a job at McDonald's shortly after arriving in the United States when she was 17. At first, she says, she was afraid of the people, of speaking the new language, and of being embarrassed. "When they spoke to me, I didn't always understand what they were saying," she recalls. The training cassette was only the second videotape she had ever seen, and the very idea of cheerful service was a novelty: "In Russia, usually people who serve you are angry for the very fact that you're coming to disturb them." The most important thing Kotlyar thinks her McDonald's job provided for her was the opportunity to find out what Americans were like, and to conquer her initial fear and confusion about starting a new life here. She worked with other immigrants who moved on to a variety of jobs, including a 22-year-old friend from Taiwan who arrived six months before she did, held a series of jobs after McDonald's, and now works for United Airlines.

The varied exploits of McDonald's alumni were celebrated in a 1985 ad campaign featuring a barber, an airline pilot, a doctor, a power lineman, a policeman, an optometrist, and Manu Tuiasosopo, a former defensive tackle for the Seattle Seahawks and the San Francisco 49ers. Former employees who didn't make it into the ad, according to the *Wall Street Journal*, included the then-mayor of Tulsa, Oklahoma, a New York City radio reporter, and a female Alaskan bush pilot.

Attitude and Energy

No longitudinal studies of fast food employees have been conducted to methodically track their progress through the work force, so it is difficult to test the model of gradual job-by-job mobility that many labor economists say characterizes the kinds of workers who get their start at McDonald's. But by looking at the qualities that large employers of entry-level personnel say they are looking for, it becomes clear that these closely coincide with the employability skills taught in fast food jobs.

Alan Wurtzel, chairman of Circuit City, a chain of electronics stores based in Richmond, Virginia, says that when his stores hire new cashiers and stock clerks, specific skills are unimportant. "The most important thing we're looking for is attitude and energy. We want people who are reliable, presentable, clean shaven, honest, can get along with coworkers, and can follow directions." When a new store opens, Wurtzel says, 10 applicants have to be screened for every one hired; people with these basic work skills are apparently not easy to find.

Ninety percent of Mike O'Shea's new employees have fast food experience, mostly at McDonald's. While the 20-year-old assistant manager of a downtown Chicago shoe store says he is unimpressed by applicants with a string of short-term hitches at fast food restaurants, he understands people who rise to a certain level and decide it's not worthwhile to continue. That, after all, is how he got his $19,000-a-year job. O'Shea started at 16 in a fast food restaurant, then moved to a department store, where he went from stock clerk to security officer. He left for another stock clerk job and eventually a sales position at Courtesy Home Centers. Finally, O'Shea moved to the shoe store, where he started once again as a part-time stock clerk. When he qualifies as a full manager next year, O'Shea expects to earn $32,000 annually. "McDonald's breaks people in," says O'Shea.

Marilyn Milner says the main thing her fast food job taught her was that she wanted something better.

"If you're in a factory, you have no contact with the outside world. Someone who's been at McDonald's has constantly been meeting different kinds of people."

As senior human resources coordinator at the Washington-area Capital Centre entertainment complex, Kim Whittington considers fast food experience a plus in a candidate for entry-level positions: "For me it shows the motivation, the initiative, especially if they've been there over a year. They learn people skills, cash handling, getting people in and out quickly; they could even learn some management skills if they're training other people." Whittington stresses the importance of "basic, basic work skills," adding, "we have problems with dependability, especially among young people."

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Yvonne Willis, manager of employment for Washington Gas, says that in addition to passing a basic skills test, the most important qualities for an entry-level worker are dependability, being able to take the initiative ("If you see something that needs to be done, just go ahead and do it before someone tells you, even if it's not one of your assigned tasks"), pitching in with the crew to accomplish what the unit needs to do, and following directions. Interpersonal skills are also important, says Willis, especially for dealing with customers. Willis believes working at McDonald's can help people learn "those skills we take for granted. You learn what it means to work, to get up in the morning, to be on time, to plan your day and plan your activities."

Bernard Tenenbaum

For Soviet émigré Masha Kotlyar, the very idea of cheerful service was a novelty. "In the Soviet Union people who serve you are usually angry that you're disturbing them."

A personnel manager for a large Northern Virginia bank says he hires quite a few tellers who have worked in fast food restaurants. "If it was one of their first jobs and they kept it for six months to a year, we'd look at it positively," he states, citing the cash-handling experience and practice dealing with the public that fast food employees gain.

No Dead End

Evidently, the kinds of skills learned at McDonald's are the kinds of skills employers are looking for. This does not mean that the jobs are a panacea whose abundance offers a magic solution to the nation's problems. Although McDonald's jobs undeniably fulfill various people's need for part-time and seasonal employment, they are just as undeniably plain hard work. Like all jobs that are easily available to many different people, what they can do and are doing, in the small, incremental ways in which much economic and social mobility takes place in this country, is to give people a chance to work hard and get ahead, even—perhaps especially—those whose lack of skills and advantages might seem to limit their prospects enormously.

With almost 50 percent of McDonald's employees under 20, and many of the rest students and nontraditional workers such as senior citizens and women with young children, it seems unlikely that the oft-cited case of a primary wage earner with a family to support being reduced to flipping burgers at minimum wage is a common occurrence. Most who stay with McDonald's can make some headway through the hierarchy, and the huge numbers who come and go through its doors every year do not leave empty-handed as they advance to new jobs.

Critics to the contrary, McDonald's can help people succeed, especially those for whom other social institutions have failed. As Herbert R. Northrup of the Wharton School of Business has written: "It is perhaps ironic that many of the most insistent advocates of job training programs in this country are the same academics, journalists, and government administrators who condemn the fast food job as, at best, a meaningless dead end and thus fail to see that the object of their contempt has in effect become one of the most massive, cost-efficient, and racially equitable job training programs in our nation's history."

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Robespierre and the Rights of Man

The Terror of 1793 Sprang from the Theories of 1789

Ralph C. Hancock

Two hundred years ago, President George Washington and the First Congress assumed the powers and responsibilities that the people of the United States had confided to them under a new Constitution. With the forming of a new government the Americans effectively resolved a crisis that had threatened to dash the hopes and discredit the principles of their revolution, principles expressed in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. They held up their new constitution to the world as proof that freedom need not be an enemy to order, that men were truly capable of self-government. Recalling these happy events of 1789, we conclude a 13-year celebration of a truly rare occurrence: a constructive rebellion, a revolution that became a founding.

The French are now beginning their own bicentennial commemoration. As America's elected representatives were drafting a Bill of Rights intended in part to reconcile many moderate anti-federalists to the Constitution, a decrepit Bourbon dynasty was collapsing before a gathering insurrection. The meeting of the Estates-General that Louis XVI had called in an attempt to fend off the crisis declared itself a Constituent Assembly, in effect claiming an authority more fundamental than that of the monarchy. The world was convinced of the seriousness of these claims when, on July 14, 1789, a mob stormed a Paris prison and armory called the Bastille, symbol of royal power. Thus, just as the world learned of the successful outcome of the American Revolution, another rebellion had erupted—but this was not an uprising of a few million colonials on the periphery of civilization, but a cataclysm in the heart of Europe. Both friends and enemies of the new revolution sensed almost immediately that the very course of Western civilization was implicated in the events in Paris.

Eighty Years of Upheaval

The French celebration will be shorter than ours—precisely, one might say, because their revolution was longer. It is hard to assign a date to the end of the French Revolution. The fall of Robespierre in July 1794 marked the end of the most violent and radical phase of the revolution. The "Thermidoreans" who then assumed power pledged loyalty to the revolution but did what they could to recover stability. In 1795 a new constitution replaced that of 1793 (which really had not been used anyway). This constitution of the "Directory" established in effect the rule of five executives called directors, who managed to retain power until General Bonaparte's *coup d'état* in 1799. Some would end the revolution here, but Napoleon himself claimed, not entirely without warrant, to be the savior of the new republic. He ruled until 1814, first as consul, then (after 1804) as emperor. The fall of Napoleon, followed by the restoration of a limited monarchy, did not so much conclude the revolution as give birth to a second revolutionary cycle of regimes from monarchy (Bourbon, then Orleanist), to republic (1848-1852), to a new dictatorship with a new Napoleon (1852-1870). Only with the establishment of the Third French Republic was it clear that the turmoil unleashed by the revolution, including the succession of 15 distinct regimes, had come to a halt. Thus, *La Revolution,* by the leading contemporary historian of the revolution, François Furet of the École des Hautes Études, covers the period up to the Third Republic. But surely we cannot expect the French to carry their celebration into the year 2070.

A deeper problem for the French is the image that haunts their bicentennial: the guillotine. We find this tall, stark, and efficient implement on the center stage of the revolution in January 1793, above the crouched figure of Louis Capet, formerly Louis XVI. It became the most visible instrument of the "Terror" of 1793-1794, the label used by Robespierre and his Jacobin associates to describe their systematic liquidation of perceived enemies. Terror was not confined to the guillotine or to Paris; revolutionary commanders such as Carrier in the Vendée (a western region including the city of Nantes) resorted to mass shootings and drownings of men, women, and children. This harvest of "heretics" went on with ever-increasing ferocity and efficiency from the spring of 1793 until the blood of Robespierre himself seemed to quench the most violent thirst of the revolu-

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

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The French Revolution appealed to the authority of "the People" to justify violence against the population.

tionary guillotine in July of 1794.

Clearly, a cheerful celebration of the French Revolution requires more than the usual measure of forgetfulness. Of course, there is no full-scale attempt to repress the record of the Terror, to rewrite history Soviet-style. French schoolchildren still find mention of the Terror in the history books, but it appears as an aberration, largely explained, if not excused, by real threats posed by foreign and domestic enemies of the revolution. In this the schoolbooks are following the lead of a venerable leftist historiographical tradition, most recently Marxist. The difficulty with this line of argument, as Furet has pointed out, is that the most ferocious stages of the Terror, including the decimation of the inhabitants of the Vendée, coincided with periods of greatest security from both internal and external military threats. The Terror was perfectly capable of providing its own enemies.

Elastic Vocabulary

Just what, then, is to be celebrated? The French have settled on what appears to be a satisfactory answer to this question. The dominant, indeed practically the only theme of their bicentennial has been the revolutionary idea of "human rights," and especially the first and most famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, adopted by the Assembly on August 26, 1789. This recommends itself as a nonpartisan, consensual approach, fitting for a national celebration—for who today could be offended by the evocation of the principle of human rights? The core vocabulary of the revolution is now the common heritage not only of all French parties but of all Western democracies—indeed, in a way, the common heritage of practically the whole world, since Eastern bloc "people's republics" are as ready as Third World insurgents to appropriate the vocabulary of 18th-century European rationalism.

Of course, one might want to distinguish between genuine and deceitful uses of this vocabulary, but there can be no denying that the language of rights is peculiarly elastic. Everyone is for human rights, because everyone reads into them what he wants—from the protection of private property, to the government's responsibility to the needy, to rights of national self-determination, to the dream of collectively transforming the human condition. But to recognize this is to see that the inoffensive, ecumenical quality of the French bicentennial masks a problem that, to say the least, calls for reflection as much as celebration. This is not to blame the French nation for simple insipidity—any celebration, particularly a national one, is entitled to a fair amount of uncritical good cheer. The problem is that what appears to make human rights inoffensive—their elasticity—is precisely what links them with the great offenses of the Terror. There is a troubling kinship between what we find easiest to remember and what we are most eager to forget.

Much to their credit, the French have themselves taken the lead in recent years in exploring this kinship.

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

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Virtue for George Washington meant traditional ideals of individual character. Robespierre's virtue, by contrast, meant total commitment to social transformation.

While the public celebrates, French scholars such as Furet and Mona Ozouf have been busily excavating the meaning of the revolution from beneath the layers of two centuries of ideologically charged interpretations of the revolutionaries' stated intentions.

A first step in coming to terms with the revolution as a whole is to see that the systematic terrorization and sometimes decimation of whole populations was the natural outcome of a certain mode of thought. Robespierre and his soul mates certainly craved power, but their characters and conduct cannot be grasped by viewing them simply as the kind of ruthless egoists who have always plagued human society. These were rogues of a new kind, true believers who sometimes seem almost as ready to sacrifice themselves as their countrymen to the bloodthirsty gods of the revolution. It seems clear that the "incorruptible" Robespierre (to take the clearest and most representative case) toiled and killed not for personal gain in any ordinary sense, but for the sake of an ideal that dominated his own self-understanding, for the cause that he called "La Justice."

Alexis de Tocqueville provides a key to the meaning of this peculiar sense of justice when he observes that "the French Revolution was a political revolution that proceeded in the manner of religious revolutions." It promised by political means to accomplish an end formerly thought to be beyond politics: the regeneration of mankind. New institutions and new policies were mere instruments in the creation of new human beings, beings who would escape all the limitations, troubles, and perplexities that earlier ages had assumed to inhere necessarily in the human condition. Such a creation clearly requires a radical repudiation of the beliefs, habits, and institutions of the past; these must be destroyed in order to allow the emergence of regenerate humanity. The attempt to effect such a rupture is nicely summarized in the introduction of a new, rationalized calendar: the new age would not accept the burden of 1,792 years from the Christian calendar, but would start afresh in the year 1.

Vanguard of the People

The logic of the Terror follows from this radical project of destroying the past and creating a new humanity. In the first place, the past is a hard thing to kill. The "people," who are supposed to be eager to be reborn as free and equal, find it hard to break old habits; they require more and more aggressive midwives to bring them forth. Second, "regeneration" is by its nature a difficult thing to define, and thus to limit. It can have no public and settled meaning until a new public is created; the aims of the revolution must thus be entrusted to a visionary vanguard that refuses all accountability to allegedly higher authorities, whether religious, moral, or political.

There is, then, a certain consistency in the revolution's appeal to the authority of "the People" to justify violence against the population. For the people evoked as sovereign are not the actual, concrete human beings who supply grist for the mills of the Terror, but the regenerate people, which does not yet exist, except germinally in the revolutionary vanguard.

This is of course not to say that the French people (in the ordinary, concrete sense) played no role in the revolution. The necessity of winning the support of a critical mass of the population, and particularly the Parisian mob, was essential to the calculations of all revolutionary factions. It is precisely the ambiguity of the "people" in the revolutionary vocabulary that enables the vanguard to appeal to real popular interests and prejudices in creating the institutional machinery necessary for social regeneration. The masses are the engine of the revolution, but only an elite revolutionary corps can provide engineers and drivers. The people must be fed and flattered to provide the power to create the People.

With all traditional institutional and moral restraints reduced to dust and ashes, there is nothing to check the dynamics of demagoguery. Whatever party, faction, or individual can best manipulate the people can claim to speak for the People. Whoever rides the tiger of popular favor at a given moment possesses not only the keys to power but the only recognized touchstone of Truth. The support of the mob becomes the foundation of power, and power the only available criterion of truth. Thus, Robespierre's "justice" is not contaminated by any residue of traditional morality. Any act that advances the revolution (as defined by those empowered to define it) is by that very fact a just act: "To punish the oppressors of humanity is mercy; to pardon them is barbarism."

It follows that "evil" is embodied in the enemies of

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the revolution, a category indistinguishable not only in practice but in principle from the perceived enemies of the revolution—the enemies designated by whoever is empowered to define the revolutionary categories. Repudiating the very possibility of a moral horizon common to regenerate and unregenerate alike, the revolutionary mentality produces a Manichaean vision of the social world: we embody the Good, and everyone who is not with us is Evil. The vision of a new humanity erases all moral distinctions except one between those who have the power to define themselves as friends of humanity and those who find themselves defined as its enemies. "Between the People and their enemies, there is nothing left in common but the sword," declared Saint-Just, Robespierre's most loyal disciple. The winners of each struggle for power are entitled, indeed called upon, to treat the losers as devils to be vanquished or insects to be crushed.

Elusive Promise

This Manichaean struggle for power over language and thought as well as institutional machinery is a pervasive theme of the revolution. The elusiveness of the promise of regeneration, the absolute and therefore ever-receding character of the end that justifies the pains of the revolution, produces successive phases of radicalization. To acknowledge the impossibility of humanity's autosalvation would be to forsake the revolution altogether; the only possible response to the inevitable failure to regenerate is thus to concentrate the power of the revolution by designating more enemies to be blamed and punished. Since the purity of the revolution itself cannot be questioned, there is no choice but to enlarge the search for devils, for counterrevolutionary conspirators hidden among the people or disguised among the elite. Without new enemies to feed upon, the revolution cannot sustain itself; precisely because the dream is indefinite, almost spiritual, it can assert its reality only in consuming flesh and blood. Purges and pogroms are essential to the dynamics of social salvation.

Thus, the distinctive features of the Terror—concentration of power "of the People" in the hands of a few, merciless liquidation of enemies real or perceived, construction of a new moral vocabulary, irresistible radicalization—issue from a fundamental commitment to the regeneration of humanity by human means. But was this commitment distinctive of the period dominated by the Jacobins, or was it characteristic of the revolution from the beginning? The answer provided by Furet and others contributes little to the celebratory mood of the bicentennial: the faction dominant during the Terror of 1793-94 did not differ essentially in its objectives and self-understanding from its predecessors. The practice of terror may have reached new extremes in that period, but its logic was present much earlier. Furet says the revolutionary "mechanism of interpretation, of action, and of power...is in place already in 1789." In particular, the core idea of regeneration figures prominently in revolutionary rhetoric from the very beginning. Indeed, 10 years before the fall of the Bastille, a French ideologue, Garat, gave voice to the all-too-common dream: "Let us institute laws for wisdom and for happiness, and surely we will see on earth only wise and happy men...then all will be accomplished: mankind will have but to rejoice in life." It is only by forgetting and by looking away from the dark side of this hope that the terror of the revolution can be confined within the Terror.

Lockean Kinship: 1776 and 1789

Once the spirit of '89 is implicated in the most notorious events of the revolution, the possibilities of celebration are narrowed indeed. The only remaining hope for joining the French bicentennial festival with good historical conscience would appear to lie in the possibility of severing the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen from the extravagant dreams of its authors. To celebrate the Declaration without condoning the Terror, one must distinguish the principle of human rights from the radical aspiration to human regeneration.

The germ of the Terror, the dream of the regeneration of humanity by political means, is already present in the radically modern idea of sovereignty that informs the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.

Clearly Americans have an interest in such a distinction that goes beyond well-wishing toward the French. Our own revolution appealed to rights inherent in all human beings; the Declaration of 1789 indeed appears in many respects a close relation if not a twin to our Declaration of 1776. The attempt to save the Rights of Man from association with the unlimited politics of regeneration, to prove such rights compatible with a moderate, decent, and stable form of government, suggests a comparative reflection on our own "inalienable rights" in relation to our constitutional tradition.

The most well-known passages of the 1776 document, proclaiming the "self-evident" truths that all men are created equal, that they possess inalienable rights, including rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that popular consent is the source of political authority organized to secure these rights, find clear echoes in 1789. The first article of the French declaration proclaims that human beings are born free and equal in rights; the second makes the goal of political association the preservation of these rights, including liberty and property. Both the French and American statements speak the basic political vocabulary of the Enlightenment

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of the 18th century, which in turn may be traced to the central ideas of John Locke's political treatises of 1690. The two declarations appear to derive from a common and distinctly modern philosophic program: ecclesial and aristocratic prejudices are to be stripped away to reveal and to liberate human nature.

Sovereignty of the General Will

The differences are, however, important—indeed, decisive. The framers of the French declaration, although ready to acknowledge the value of American precedents, including the declarations of rights published by various states, were eager to surpass them, to produce what they believed to be a more purely rational and universal statement. In particular, they found that the Americans did not break radically enough with their English past. Despite the ringing statements of abstract principles of equality and freedom in the Declaration of Independence, the former colonists revealed a willingness to appeal as well to traditional norms and guarantees; their lapses included references to King George's imposition of "a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution" as well as his "abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring province." More generally, the Declaration of 1776 and the state declarations that followed seemed to the French to betray a tendency to focus on concrete, procedural guarantees; they confused abstract rights and particular, institutional protections and remedies. From the French point of view, the Americans tended to lose sight of the grandeur and purity of the new political philosophy as they focused on certain legal forms that had proved useful in their particular experience. In some respects, one could almost accuse the Americans of claiming to be more English than the empire from which they were separating.

If politics is all there is, then politics must be everything, it must hold the key to fulfilling not only the ordinary needs but even the deepest longings of humanity.

The French were persuaded that, whereas the Americans were preoccupied with specific legal forms and limitations, they owed it to themselves and to the world to address with full clarity the question of the essence of law. Their answer is best represented in Articles 3 through 6 of the 1789 Declaration. These articles appear in certain respects consonant with the American statements; they seem to bespeak a commitment to a liberal-individualist social order and to a rather restrictive notion of the scope of legitimate government: "Freedom consists in being able to do anything that is not harmful to others. Thus, the exercise of natural rights...has no other limits than those that guarantee to other members of Society the enjoyment of these same rights...(Article 4)." "Law has the right to forbid only those actions harmful to society...(Article 5)." But these individualistic themes are embedded in a framework quite foreign to our Declaration of Independence and to the American political tradition as a whole: "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation...(Article 3)." The limits of rights "can only be determined by law (Article 4)." "Law is the expression of the general will...(Article 6)." In the last analysis, the People or Nation, a collective entity, must be regarded as absolutely superior to the individual, for the rights of individuals are in fact determined by Law, the voice of the General Will. The individual can appeal to no authority higher than that of actual statutes legislated by "all the citizens or by their representatives (Article 6)." In the French formulation, the effectual truth of the sovereignty of the people is the sovereignty of the legislative power.

No Separation of Powers

This commitment to absolute legislative sovereignty lies behind French impatience with the American doctrine of separation of powers. The economist Turgot blamed the Americans for what he deemed a thoughtless imitation of English institutions; he could not see the point of checks and balances in a system where privilege had been abolished in favor of the equal rights of all citizens. Likewise, the philosopher Condorcet found that in the American constitutions the luster of the new political science was tainted by "prejudices that those who drafted them had imbibed in their youth"; thus, "their simplicity was impaired by a determination to preserve a balance of power within the state." All this inelegant limiting and balancing made no sense to the French; it only served unnecessarily to obstruct the simple truth that philosophy had discovered: the will of the people as expressed in legislation is sovereign.

To the French, the American disinclination to deduce legislative sovereignty from natural rights thus represented a simple failure of rational consistency. The French had learned from Rousseau what Rousseau had learned from Hobbes: the denial of any transcendent ground of political authority entails the necessity of an absolute human sovereign. The Americans seemed not to have come to terms with the fact that we human beings must create for and by ourselves the ground of authority that God and Nature have failed to provide.

It may be, however, that the difference between American and French principles is greater than that between theoretical consistency and hesitation. For the Declaration of Independence represents not a timid and partial statement of the Hobbesian and Rousseauistic theory of natural rights, but an alternative to that theory. Thus, whereas a certain "Supreme Being" is present in the French declaration only as a passive witness mentioned in the preamble, the American declaration holds the Creator to be the very source of man's natural equality and liberty. Moreover, the American claim to inalienable rights is set within a framework defined by "the laws of nature and of nature's God." Human rights

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are not, at the deepest level, simply human assertions to be sanctioned by human power alone, but claims of moral beings within an ordered universe.

If Americans have succeeded in doing without a theory of a unitary sovereign, it is not primarily due to a lack of theoretical acumen but because they believe in an authority higher than any created by human beings. The rule of law in America is not reducible to the rule of the legislative (or judicial) power for the simple reason that human laws are presumed to be subordinate to the laws of nature and of nature's God. More precisely, ordinary legislation (as well as execution and judgment) is measured against a Constitution that is in turn understood to embody the permanent principles announced in the Declaration of Independence. The sovereignty of the people can be effectively focused in a written Constitution without being uniquely represented by any political body because the people constitute themselves as a whole by reference to an authority beyond human power. The most fundamental difference between the American Declaration of 1776 and the French Declaration of 1789 is the appeal of the former, absent in the latter, to the ground of human rights in the laws of nature and of nature's God.

Marat tel qu'il était au moment de sa mort.

Ne pouvant me corrompre, ils m'ont assassiné.

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Two Conceptions of Nature

Insofar as both declarations and both revolutions appeal to "nature," to a ground of understanding presumed to be accessible to all rational human beings, rather than to some particular revelation or ancient custom, both may be said to owe much to the philosophy of the Enlightenment. But the Americans' understanding of "nature," particularly human nature, was considerably richer, more subtle, and more informed by experience than that which guided the French. It gave place, notably, to largely traditional conceptions of honor, both political and "sacred." An appeal to nature was held to be compatible with "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind"—to the moral standards of a humanity that already existed and did not have to be created. If American ideals of liberty and equality have been relatively effective in practice, if they have proved compatible with a decent and stable social and political order, this is because they rest on a moderate theory.

This difference in the interpretation of "nature" provides a key for sorting out other comparisons between the French and American traditions. The idea of liberty associated with the American Founding may appear more "materialistic" than the French version precisely, in a sense, because it is less so. American liberty generates a way of life that is more prosaic, more "bourgeois," more respectful of the ordinary interests and ambitions of ordinary people, because it makes no claim to realizing the full and final meaning of human existence. The individual's right to pursue his own happiness can only be safe when founded upon a common recognition of ends beyond human mastery and thus beyond the limits of political and social authority.

On the other hand, the theory underlying the collectivist or statist tendencies of French ideals was, paradoxically, more radically individualistic than its American counterpart. The revolutionary enthusiasm for the general will, the assertion of unchecked legislative sovereignty, was dictated by a Rousseauistic reduction of the individual to a completely pre-social and pre-moral state of nature. The human nature upon which the French founded their political theories was a nature stripped of all inherently social and transcendent dimensions. Their theories founded respect for no humanity except that which they proposed to create. In order to liberate mankind from tradition, the revolutionaries were ready to make him altogether the creature of a new society, to reconstruct his very humanity to meet the demands of the General Will.

This is not at all to say, of course, that because their principles were shaped by reductionist theories the French revolutionaries showed no concern for honor and virtue. On the contrary, they showed an extreme concern for the duties of the individual to the Republic and to Humanity; they relished a high-minded rhetoric imitative of classical antiquity, and seemed to speak of nothing but noble ideals and self-sacrifice. But they transformed the meaning of this moral vocabulary by subordinating all to the demands of radical revolution, to the ever-receding dream of political regeneration. The morality of the revolution abolishes the distinction between the public and the private, between political utility and individual character.

The meaning of this new virtue may be illustrated by contrasting the characters of the two men most representative of their respective revolutions, Robespierre and Washington. The virtue claimed by Robespierre was an altogether public virtue; it was exhausted in his revolutionary zeal, his total commitment to social transformation. His devotion to a new deity called the People completely eclipsed all concern for conventional restraints or standards of character. Washington, on the other hand, was not only governed by traditional ideals of individual character but also quite aware that his usefulness to the new republic depended upon his embodiment of a kind of greatness that the people considered collectively could be expected to admire but not to possess; his political virtue was completed and

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adorned by a transpolitical dimension. French revolutionary virtue proved harsh toward the people in practice because it was identified with the People in theory. Thus, whereas Washington's virtue may be said to represent the best of the standards of character that already informed American society, Robespierre's virtue was identical with his consuming passion to impose universally his own abstract purity, to reduce the individual to the service of some future Humanity.

Human Autonomy vs. Divine Moral Order

A similar point may be made with respect to religion: it is not enough to say that the American Revolution was friendly to religion and the French Revolution hostile. Rather, in America religion was in a sense both more closely associated with revolutionary politics and more distinct from it than was the case in France. The American people's understanding of the revolution and of its motivating principles was embedded in a broadly Protestant worldview; their enthusiasm for liberty was not cordoned off in their minds from their understanding of man's spiritual destiny. Providence was believed to be friendly to the revolutionary cause, and many indeed were given to associating the rise of America with the millennium prophesied in scripture. The evocation of a new dawn of history was not a rhetorical form employed only by evangelicals; the more philosophically minded had their own version of a New Order of the Ages. Still, the relative moderation of the American Revolution is represented in the fact that, however religious and political ends may have been allied, they were not simply fused; a core of transcendent meaning remained outside the realm subject to human mastery.

Unlike the French Declaration of 1789, the American Declaration of 1776 based human rights in the laws of nature and of nature's God.

But the French dream of political regeneration dictated the elimination of all loyalties not reducible to human autonomy. For them, only a God whose very being was defined by revolutionary categories could meet the requirements of the revolution: thus Robespierre's attempt to invent a new religion calculated to shape public opinion to conform with the new order, culminating in the Fête of the Supreme Being in June 1794. Whereas American religion graced the revolutionary cause precisely because it was not identified with it, revolutionary devotion in France finally could not tolerate the coexistence of any truly religious authority.

The disconcerting conclusion of this reflection on the theoretical core of the French Revolution is that the idea of human rights informing the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 cannot be *altogether* severed from the logic of the Terror. The potential for unlimited radicalization exists from the moment the rights of man are extracted from a framework defined by the laws of nature and nature's God and made to stand on their own as assertions of human autonomy. The germ of the Terror, the dream of the regeneration of humanity by political means, is already present in the radically modern idea of sovereignty that informs the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. The political denial of an authoritative realm of meaning beyond politics is barely separable from the absorption of all meaning into the political realm. Hobbes's radical materialism, which accompanies his rejection of the priority of natural law to human rights, invites Rousseau's idealism, or his craving for a comprehensive moral order not grounded in nature but created by human beings. If politics is all there is, then politics must be everything; it must hold the key to fulfilling not only the ordinary needs but even the deepest longings of humanity.

Those who propose to liberate human beings by reducing them to their naked individuality and destroying the bonds that connect them with principles beyond human power arrogate to themselves the right to forge new and tighter chains. If there is no Truth above the People, then the People must create their own truth—in effect, of course, some revolutionary elite must create it in the name of the People, at whatever cost in violence and death. The violence of the Terror springs from a theoretical violence to human nature.

Which Legacy?

French and American patriots have been trying to understand the relationship between their two revolutions since the early days of the French uprising. From the very beginning, friends of democracy on both sides of the Atlantic have sensed the practical importance of this puzzling comparison: how can these sisters who justify their conduct with reference to the same vocabulary of the Enlightenment behave so differently? The problem of the relationship between the two revolutions was deeply implicated in the first great party conflict of the American regime; Federalists tried to depict Republicans as wild, atheistic Jacobin demagogues, and Republicans portrayed Federalists as closet monarchists.

The coincidence of the bicentennials of the end of the American Revolution and the beginning of the French Revolution provides an occasion to compare these two experiments in democracy. Although the passions surrounding such a comparison have subsided since Americans were divided into a pro-French and an anti-French party, we may still have a practical stake in the question of whether the similarities or differences between the two movements are finally more fundamental. If I am right that the largely similar vocabularies of 1776 and 1789 concealed fundamentally different self-understandings, then we may not understand ourselves until we understand this difference. If we cannot distinguish human rights that are divinely endowed from those that are merely asserted and defined by human beings, then we will not know which legacy to claim.

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Special Delivery

Overcoming the Barriers to Adoption

Charlotte Low Allen

Say adoption to most people these days, and they won't think of President Gerald Ford or of Greg Louganis, the class-act diver who won four gold medals in the 1984 and 1988 Olympics. They will think: Lisa Steinberg.

Never mind that Lisa was never legally adopted by Joel Steinberg, the disbarred, cocaine-soaked New York lawyer who beat her to death in 1987. The farthest Steinberg got in the direction of adoption court was to take $500 from Lisa's mother, Michelle Launders, a 19-year-old unwed Roman Catholic determined not to have an abortion. Steinberg assured her that the baby girl would go to a loving Catholic couple. Lisa went instead to live in the filthy one-bedroom apartment in Greenwich Village that Steinberg shared with his girlfriend and, later, a baby boy whose adoption was likewise never formalized. (The boy has since been returned to his mother.) Many opined that Lisa would have been better off had she been aborted.

Adoption has a bad rap these days. "You shouldn't have to bear a child and give it up to strangers," the actress playing lawyer Sarah Weddington told Norma McCorvey, or "Jane Roe," in the television docudrama "Roe vs. Wade." The "strangers" are the infertile couples who spend years on agency waiting lists hoping for a child to raise and love.

Least Chosen Option

Adoption is the least chosen option today when a woman, typically young and unmarried, faces an unexpected "crisis" pregnancy. Negative societal attitudes are only part of the problem.

Others are: high costs that put adoption out of reach for working-class couples; nearly universal agency restrictions on who can adopt (typically excluded are singles, the handicapped, couples without a stay-at-home spouse, couples who already have children, couples over age 40, and sometimes even couples whose home size does not meet upper-middle-class expectations); a taboo, the result of 20 years of lobbying by black social workers, against white couples adopting black babies; lackadaisical efforts to promote adoption of minority, handicapped, or older children; a relaxation of confidentiality laws that once guaranteed the finality of adoptions, coupled with new legal rights for natural fathers to challenge adoptions, sometimes years later; nonexistent to inadequate explanation of adoption's benefits to young women with crisis pregnancies; and a dwindling number of facilities for unwed mothers. Hardest hit may be the pregnant but unmarried middle-class woman, the college student, secretary, or lawyer who is too rich or too proud for charity or public assistance. There is virtually no moral or social support for her if she chooses any other course but abortion.

Two Million Waiting Couples

Every year, there are 1.5 million abortions and 50,000 adoptions by persons unrelated to the child—30 abortions for every adoption. But there are also 2 million childless couples on agency waiting lists or at fertility clinics who would like to adopt—40 couples for every adoption, the National Committee on Adoption estimates, using waiting-list numbers and infertility statistics. "This is a conservative estimate," says William Pierce, the organization's president; the number of infertile couples alone is about 2.5 million and rising because of the current tendency to delay marriage and childbearing. Bethany Christian Services, the nation's largest adoption agency, estimates a four-year wait for couples who want a healthy Caucasian infant, and waits of up to 10 years are not unusual.

Adoptions have numbered about 50,000 a year since 1974, after peaking at 89,200 in 1970. The availability of legal abortion has reduced the number of babies available for adoption. So has the new social acceptability—"illegitimacy chic," my colleague Charlotte Hays calls it—of conceiving children outside the marriage bond and raising them without fathers. Only about 3 percent of women who give birth out of wedlock relinquish their babies for adoption these days, the National Committee for Adoption estimates conservatively, although some estimates are as high as 7 percent.

The 50,000 figure includes about 10,000 children adopted from abroad, some 60 percent of them from

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South Korea. It does not include the 90,000 American children adopted every year by relatives or stepparents, or the thousands never formally adopted, who have found permanent homes with grandparents, aunts, or friends of their mother. Many of these children are black; blacks are far less likely than whites either to relinquish children for adoption or to initiate formal adoption proceedings for the children they take in.

The number of truly unwanted children in the United States—those in foster homes who are legally free for adoption—is relatively small, at 36,000. These children, who used to be called "hard-to-place" children, now have the more euphemistic name of "special-needs" children. Virtually all are past the infant stage, belong to racial minorities, and/or suffer from physical or mental disabilities. Another 240,000 children, victims of abuse, neglect, or abandonment, also live in foster homes, often for years (only about half of foster children ever return to their original homes). Many probably could be adopted, but their parents refuse to consent to relinquishment, and social service agencies find it easier to leave the children as they are. (Some agencies even have a policy of removing children from foster parents who want to adopt them.)

High Costs as Impediment

High costs are one of the principal impediments to more widespread adoption. If you are a white couple working through a licensed adoption agency and would like a healthy Caucasian newborn, expect to spend about $5,000-$10,000 on fees and expenses. Here is how the expenses break down at Bethany Christian Services (affiliated with various branches of the Reformed Church and licensed in 29 states, Bethany places about 1,000 children a year, about half of them from abroad): $4,000 for the mother's medical care, $210 for the infant's medical care, $1,000 for a maternity-home stay for the mother, $500 for legal fees, and $500 in assorted administrative expenses. The mother might need another $500 or so for rent or counseling after the birth. Usually $800 or more goes for mandatory "home study" counseling for the adoptive parents.

Home study, a series of extensive interviews with social workers, is a source of some controversy among prospective adopters. Certainly it is wise to screen the adoptive parents' home for minimum standards of housekeeping and morals (no week-old garbage, no porn videos). But opinions are divided among parents about the need for in-depth home study on special questions associated with adoption: for instance, dealing with the lack of knowledge of the child's biological ancestry, anticipating the awkward reactions to adoption by friends and relatives, or addressing the child's questions about his identity. At some agencies home study can cost up to $2,000; perhaps some elements of it should be made voluntary to make adoption more affordable. Currently, 30 states require home studies before a court may finalize an adoption, and 11 require them before placement. Virtually all adoption agencies, public and private, require home studies as a matter of course.

Nonprofit agencies reduce fees or sometimes waive them for working-class couples. Couples willing to take



Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

Greg Louganis's 15-year-old mother saved his life by placing him with an adoptive family.

in an older child, a minority-race child, a handicapped child, or a group of siblings may spend as little as $1,700 for Bethany's services, says the organization's communications director John Knight. "We look mainly at the stability of the home, the religious commitment, the stability of the marriage, and the fact that there is some potential for income," says Knight. "We wouldn't place with a welfare family." Although most of the adoptive parents who use Bethany's services are members of the Protestant churches who support the agency, "more and more birth-mothers are having a say about the kind of home where their children are placed," says Knight. Bethany gladly places children in other Protestant-denomination, Catholic, or Jewish homes if the mother wishes, he says. Indeed, many nonprofit agencies provide first-rate services, especially for birth-mothers, who, because they operate in a seller's market, can be highly choosy in selecting parents for their babies.

Adoptions through public agencies, typically arms of local welfare departments, are far cheaper—about $500 to $1,000 in administrative costs—and the waiting period is typically less than a year. Public agencies screen adoptive parents as closely as private ones do, and those who adopt through public agencies can be assured that no legal ends will be left untied, but services for the birth-

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mother tend to be nonexistent. Indeed, her going on welfare is usually a prerequisite to her entry into the public agency system. Most of the children available through public agencies are black, older, handicapped, or a combination of all three. Public agencies are less picky about the marital status of prospective adopters—a few let homosexuals adopt—but under pressure from black social workers, they tend to be extremely picky about the racial status.

Even a few hundred dollars or a thousand dollars can be an impediment to a working-class family on a budget. Furthermore, blacks who work in adoption say that for many blacks, used to informal, family-based networks of child care, any fee for an adoption can be a psychological impediment. "They associate paying fees for children with slavery," says Mae Best, who directs the Washington, D.C., office of Homes for Black Children, a nationwide network of black agencies subsidized mostly by United Way that places several hundred black children a year for no charge. Homes for Black Children seems a kinder, gentler version of the public agency system, keeping expenses low by arranging to have the mother's medical fees picked up by Medicaid and sending her to public agencies or private charities for other services. Unlike public agencies, Homes offers small-group counseling for expectant mothers that is designed to nudge teenagers gently in the direction of relinquishment.

Twenty Thousand Dollars Per Baby

Outside the world of public and nonprofit private adoption agencies is the free-market world of adoption: lawyers, doctors, social workers, and even for-profit agencies (only 17 states bar or restrict fees in so-called independent adoptions). Costs escalate on the free market—expect to pay $15,000, $20,000, or more—but the waiting period for a Caucasian infant slides down to 18 months on average. As with free enterprise elsewhere, the free-market adoption market puts advertising to good use (newspaper ads targeting pregnant women are a common device). Independent adoptions offer much that private agencies cannot—the birth-mother can work out an arrangement that gives her maximum flexibility and control over the choice of who will raise her baby, choosing their religion, nationality, ages, and political beliefs if she likes. She can even meet the adoptive parents, and, if she wishes, arrange an "open" adoption and perhaps maintain contact with the child. Because she is a seller in a seller's market, she can require them to compensate her for blue-ribbon medical care, free housing, and other amenities.

It is now socially acceptable to be an unwed mother, but not to give up a baby for adoption.

I know of several private adoptions whose outcomes were happy children raised in loving homes. Some private adoptions can even be cheaper than agency adoptions. The pro-life movement, many of whose members operate crisis pregnancy centers, is a kind of informal low-cost adoption network. Some pro-life lawyers do the legal work on adoptions without charge. And many pro-lifers gladly cross racial lines to take in children. Independent adoptions now account for about one-third of all U.S. adoptions.

But there can be fraud in the independent system—children never delivered or lies told about the prospective home—and mothers can be pressured to relinquish their rights (most, but not all, states allow the mother to change her mind within a certain time after she signs, but none requires that she be provided with her own lawyer). The licensing process that agencies undergo requires audits and spot visits to ensure against fraud. Legal ends can be left untied in private adoptions, with the result that biological mothers, biological fathers, or, if the child is a Native American adopted off the reservation without the tribe's consent, complete strangers can reappear years later to claim rights to the child.

No matter how much or how little an adoptive couple spends, none of it is tax-deductible (compare this with a natural birth, where all medical expenses are potentially deductible). As part of the 1986 tax reform package, Congress repealed a $1,500 deduction enacted in 1981 for expenses in connection with adopting special-needs children, and most states followed suit in dropping tax breaks for adoption expenses.

A growing number of companies have started covering all or part of adoption expenses as an employee benefit, but there is a hitch here, too. The Internal Revenue Service views these benefits as taxable income to the employee, which means they are at most partial benefits unless the employer wants to add a cash subsidy for taxes. Adoption lobbyists have been trying to persuade Congress to change this policy—but with no luck, although federal regulations now require states to reimburse low-income families for adoption expenses. President Bush has proposed a $3,000 deduction for parents who adopt special-needs children. Some states currently forbid insurance companies to discriminate against adoption in reimbursing medical expenses.

Foster parents who fall in love with one of their charges and wish to adopt face another set of problems: They stand to lose their stipends and the reimbursement they receive for their charge's medical care and counseling. Many foster children have special problems that cost money, and many foster parents are in low-income brackets and need the social-services money. They are penalized if they try to make permanent the temporary home they have made for a child. Similarly, local social-service agencies lose their reimbursement funds from the state or federal government if a foster child is adopted. This provides a financial incentive for them not to push adoption.

Cultural Taboos

Most private adoption agencies refuse even to consider single people, couples in their 40s, or the handicapped as potential adoptive parents. Some require a stay-at-home mother; others require a separate bedroom

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for every child. Some agencies refuse to let parents who already have natural children add more. "They just don't have the energy," says the National Committee on Adoption's Pierce, of age 40-plus parents. "By the time the child reaches his teens, they could be in their 60s. When my kids were in their teens, I was in my 30s." In an era in which about 4,000 women in their 40s give birth for the first time every year, the age limits seem arbitrary. What happens? "Couples wait for years on the agency lists, and then they get too old," says Douglas Johnson, executive director of the National Right to Life Committee and father of three adopted children.

Singles have better luck with public agencies, but they may encounter what is likely the most common reason for the mismatch between parents waiting for children and children waiting for homes: a virtual ban on adoptions of black children by whites. Many black spokesmen regard such adoptions as cultural genocide, and since 1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers has worked to end interracial adoptions of minority children. They have been somewhat successful; in 1971, there were 2,540 interracial adoptions, and now there are only around 1,000 a year. About 35 states have policies almost entirely limiting adoption to parents of the same race as the child. Homes for Black Children does not even consider white homes for black children. "Children have a bad enough time in adolescence without being in a situation where even their own relatives shun them," says Robert Woodson, president of the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, a black self-help group. Woodson, like other black spokesmen, believes that there are enough black parents willing to adopt black children, if efforts are made to recruit them. But the public agencies in the social-work industry's thrall have few funds to spend on advertising for black adoptive parents, and they refuse to let whites adopt.

Homes for Black Children and the One Church, One Child program in Detroit have been making efforts to recruit black parents, with admirable success. But still 37 percent of all children awaiting adoptive placement are black, although blacks constitute only 14 percent of the nation's population of children and 12 percent of adults. Race-based adoption policies not only mean that black children can spend years in foster care awaiting permanent homes (some are never adopted); they subtly encourage black women to have abortions. "Black women go to agencies and they are told that the chances of finding an adoptive home for their children are almost nil," says Mary Sheila Gall, chief author of President Reagan's task force report on adoptions last year. Matching the races of adoptive parents and children is best, say Gall and others, but interracial adoption is far preferable to putting the child in an institution or foster home.



Douglas Johnson, executive director of the National Right to Life Committee, here with his wife and their three adopted children, protests cultural taboos against adoptive parents over 40.

The adoption process is also clouded by constantly shifting fads in sociological theory as to what size and configuration of family is best. One adoptive parent says he was nearly barred from adopting a second child through a Catholic Charities-affiliated agency because the boy was only two years younger than his adoptive brother. "The consensus in the social-work literature is that children should be spaced three years apart, so they almost didn't let the adoption go through. And this was a Catholic agency!" says the man, astonished that his religion's ban on artificial birth control could be superseded by a social worker's fancy. Another agency turned down a couple who already had a child but had only a two-bedroom house; it was considered poor child-rearing to put two siblings in a room together.

The adoption process is tilted toward those who like self-help groups. "Whenever someone asks me about adoption, I tell them first to join Resolve (an organization for the childless) and resolve their infertility," says the National Committee for Adoption's Pierce. "If they don't have 50 hours to put into that, they're not ready for adoption." Such attitudes screen out virtually all but white, college-educated, middle-class couples. The New York chapter of the American Council on Adoptable Children, which devotes itself to finding homes for the hard to place, conducts classes for blue-collar blacks and Puerto Ricans on how to sell themselves as parents to the adoption bureaucracy.

Few Maternity Homes

For poor women who carry their babies to term, there is no lack of medical or financial support from public welfare agencies. A low-income woman can start collect-

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

Rick Reinhard

In addition to her literacy work, Barbara Bush could lead a campaign to find adoptive homes for the 36,000 "special needs" children waiting to be placed.

ing cash benefits for herself and her child under the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program as soon as she reaches the third trimester of pregnancy. Eligibility for AFDC automatically qualifies one for Medicaid—payment of all medical expenses—and food stamps. Before last year's welfare reform law went into effect, teen-agers receiving AFDC benefits could immediately leave home to set up their own households; now they must wait until age 18 unless they can show parental abuse or neglect. Another more recent federal program in which most states participate, the Women, Infants, and Children program, provides free medical care throughout pregnancy and up until the child is five; the woman need not be so needy that she qualifies for welfare in order to receive these WIC benefits.

While unmarried pregnant women need not starve or go without medical care during their pregnancies, there is not much else in the way of support for them. The comprehensive maternity home, offering unwed mothers room and board, education, and counseling for after childbirth is a declining institution. In 1966, there were 201 maternity homes; by 1985, there were 141, the National Committee on Adoption has estimated. California is the only state that provides public funds for such homes, under a 1977 freedom-of-choice law. Any pregnant woman under age 21 can qualify, no matter what her income or her parents' income is. But the state funding level is fairly Spartan—an average of $43.07 per expectant mother per day, or about $1,300 a month—and the number of homes willing to operate on that amount has dwindled to seven, mostly under the aegis of religious organizations. "They tend to reopen as group homes for foster care, where they get up to $3,000 a month for the same services," says Jim Brown, the state's chief of adoptions. The problem: only 18- and 19-year-olds who have no other source of support can qualify under the new standards. The maternity homes are not popular with the public, Brown says, because they are perceived as welfare benefits for middle-income people.

Many more of the newer maternity homes and crisis pregnancy centers have religious affiliations, particularly to evangelical groups and denominations. A few years ago, evangelist Jerry Falwell announced an ambitious Save-a-Baby program to cut the abortion rate through Christian maternity homes. Operation Rescue founder Randall Terry's manual *To Rescue the Children* tells pregnancy counselors to "work with an evangelical Christian adoption agency" and says that "adopted children should be deliberately raised to know and serve the Lord." (Terry has three black adopted children himself.) While programs like Falwell's and Terry's may be ideal for an evangelical Christian girl who gets pregnant or for an unwed mother who wants to put her moral life in order, the religious overtones and strict rules may scare away some of the mothers whom the homes are supposed to help. There ought also to be a few no-questions-asked maternity homes for unrepentant Magdalenes who nonetheless choose life for their offspring.

Non-directive Counseling

Most state-sponsored pregnancy prevention programs and the federal government's $140 million Title X family planning programs specifically require "non-directive" counseling for teen-agers facing crisis pregnancies. That means presenting the options—abortion, adoption, and keeping the baby—without making any value judgments about them. Instead, the counselor is supposed to gently question the teen-ager to elicit from her what she wants to do. But in practice, Title X programs have tended to be little more than abortion-referral programs. "They'll mention adoption and tell the girls that very few choose it," says Bruce Chapman, a former Reagan official now at the Hudson Institute who has studied pregnancy counseling techniques.

Sandra Savarese, director of clinical services at Planned Parenthood's District of Columbia offices, says she would never steer a girl who rejects abortion toward adoption, even though she personally prefers adoption to keeping the baby. "I think it's very important to share the information and we talk about what's involved in single-parenting—teens are not very future-oriented—but a good counselor never directs anyone." In the five years that Savarese has been with Planned Parenthood, she says that no client of hers has ever chosen adoption.

A new set of Title X regulations issued last year bans counseling on abortion, but remains in abeyance since a federal appellate court in Boston ruled that the regulations interfere with constitutionally protected abortion and free-speech rights. The case is likely to end up in the Supreme Court. Pro-life organizations that engage in pregnancy counseling, such as Birthright or the Christian Action Council, have not been able to satisfy the "non-directive" requirement and thus have not been eligible for federal funds.

Under pressure from black social workers, about 35 states limit adoptions of black children by white parents.

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Non-directive counseling is also the approach of many doctors, who have reversed their opposition to abortion of the 19th and early 20th centuries. "The Physician's Guide to Adoption," a 1987 article in the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, warns doctors never to urge adoption over other options and never to become associated with pro-life crisis pregnancy centers that try to talk women out of abortion.

Pro-life pregnancy counselors who do try to present adoption in a positive light say it is difficult under the best of circumstances to persuade teen-agers to relinquish their babies. "Only a few girls are the least bit interested," says Janet Smith, a Notre Dame University professor who founded the Women's Care Center in South Bend, Indiana. "Most girls aged 14 to 17 want to keep their babies," she says. "They come from loveless households, and the baby is someone to love, and it's a link to their boyfriend." Indeed, teen-agers account for only one-fourth of U.S. abortions. Most women who choose abortion are in their early 20s and have high school diplomas.

The most successful pregnancy counseling program seems to be Birthright, which was founded in 1968 and now has 648 crisis pregnancy centers in the United States and Canada and a handful abroad. Nondenominational and supported entirely by private charity, Birthright offers free pregnancy tests, medical and legal referrals, maternity and baby clothes, and emotional support aimed at bolstering the decision against abortion. Although Birthright centers are quite candid about their anti-abortion stance, they get quite a few clients who are thinking about it. "Nowadays, a lot of the girls who come in are 12 to 14 years old; they're eighth graders," says Denise Coccioloni, director of Birthright's national office. "They don't know we're pro-life. They say they want abortions, but they really want someone to talk them out of it." Birthright counselors try to interest them in adoption by using positive language—expressions like "giving your baby away" are eschewed—and refer clients only to licensed adoption agencies.

There ought to be a few no-questions-asked maternity homes for unrepentant Magdalenes who choose life for their offspring.

Emotional Support

It is now socially acceptable to be an unwed mother—indeed, the very phrase "unwed mother" has fallen into disuse, replaced by the more value-neutral "single parent." But it is not socially acceptable to give up a baby for adoption. Such women are considered cruel and unfeeling. They get little support from their peers and relatives or direction from professionals in making an adoption decision.

Mary Cunningham Agee's Nurturing Network provides emotional and career support for professional women caught in a crisis pregnancy.

Although many urban high schools have adapted their programs to accommodate pregnant students—some even offer parenting classes—few colleges, even Christian colleges, have anything special for this group. At Notre Dame, says Smith, young women who get pregnant seem simply to disappear off campus. Indeed, middle-class women facing crisis pregnancies face a support vacuum; their peers and coworkers, and even parents typically expect them to choose abortion automatically.

One exception is Mary Cunningham Agee's four-year-old Nurturing Network, designed for the college and professional woman who would feel out of place in a maternity home but whose career and education prospects might be ruined if she became noticeably pregnant, showed up with a babe in arms, or had mysterious gaps in her resume. Agee is a one-time corporate fast-tracker herself (she worked for former Bendix Corporation chairman William Agee, quit under fire when reports surfaced of a romance between the two, and then married him). "It doesn't compute," is her way of describing how little societal support there is for the educated unmarried woman who gets pregnant; she believes many of them are forced into abortions by their families, their boyfriends, and their peers.

Her peach and lavender Nurturing Network brochure, crisply designed and written but subtly feminine, is a model of gentle salesmanship. "The profile client at an abortion clinic is not a teen-ager from an impoverished home, but someone who's from age 20 to 26, who's white, middle-class, and at least high-school educated," says Cunningham. Her 3,000-member network includes colleges willing to accept a transfer student on three weeks' notice, employers willing to extend responsible short-term jobs, and even corporate mentors. Other members are doctors, nurses, counselors, and social workers. More than 500 women have used her services, including lawyers, accountants, and medical

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residents whose age goes all the way up to 42 (she refers teen-agers elsewhere).

Pregnancy can be physically debilitating and an emotional roller coaster for a woman who plans to keep her child. It can be even more so for the woman who gives her baby up. Many more networks like Agee's are needed to give unwed mothers the strength to give birth, rather than take the much more convenient alternative of abortion.

Legal Barriers to Adoption Finality

Until the mid-1970s, state adoption records were strictly confidential, unavailable except on court order. The aim was to ensure the finality of the adoption, to assure adoptive parents that the biological mother would not suddenly appear to reclaim the child, and to assure the mother that she could put a problem pregnancy completely behind her and get on with her life. But under pressure from organizations such as the Adoptees Liberty Movement Association (which claims 700,000 registrants), this commonsense policy is being undermined.

Some "searchers" are merely curious about their genetic and cultural roots (state laws have become more obliging in this respect, allowing adoptive parents more access to their children's medical histories without naming names). Other adoptees are bitter about their adoptive homes and sometimes about adoption in general; they may hope that a reunion with their "real" parents will solve their problems. Florence Fisher, the founder of Adoptees Liberty, is still angry at her birthmother: "She had a right to give me up, but she had no right to hide her identity from me." At the behest of searchers, nine states over the past 15 years have either allowed adoptees access to their original birth certificates on reaching, say, the age of 18, or have set up procedures allowing intermediaries to search for biological parents and persuade them to consent to a meeting. Ten states, including California and New York, have established voluntary registries in which adoptees and birth parents who wish to meet can file.

With two million couples on adoption waiting lists, there is no excuse to take the life of an unwanted child.

Adoptive parents have not been enthusiastic about open-records laws; their natural fear is that the children they raised and nourished as their own might turn against them in favor of glamorous-seeming strangers. Fortunately, studies show that only about 1 percent of adoptees ever search for their biological parents.

A related problem can come from the fathers. Although biological fathers have no say whatsoever in a decision to abort their offspring, they can tie up adoption proceedings for years by claiming paternal rights. In a 1972 decision, *Stanley* v. *Illinois*, the Supreme Court ruled that, under the Constitution's equal protection clause, a father of illegitimate children has the same rights to block adoption or foster-care placement for them as a father who has actually married the mother. The *Stanley* ruling, coupled with state equal rights amendments that courts have interpreted as putting biological fathers on the same footing when it comes to adoption, have played havoc with adoption proceedings, raising the specter of a father, or even paternal grandparents, coming forward years later to nullify the placement. In Pennsylvania, one judge refused for five years to sign a decree finalizing an adoption because the biological mother refused to name the biological father, without whose written consent the adoption would not be valid, the judge said. Finally, the judge just gave up and signed. Obviously, clear legal definitions of when fathers can claim rights to children whose mothers they did not marry, and of when those rights end, are likely to make adoption much more attractive.

Little Help for the Hard to Place

No campaign to replace abortion by adoption will be plausible without special efforts to place the 36,000 hard-core "special-needs" children, who are the worst served by current adoption policies. The entrepreneurs of the adoption free market don't want them. There is no money for counseling and other post-adoption support services for these youngsters, many of whom are victims of child abuse. These children are often wards of social-service agencies that have few resources to hunt for suitable parents for them. Those parents are often out there: for every adoptive couple who return a child to the agency, there are generous people with room in their hearts. Some cities now have programs and photo files for hard-to-place children, with successful results. A national "bully pulpit" campaign to find a home for all these children could be very effective. Perhaps, as suggested by political strategist Grover Norquist, it should be led by Barbara Bush.

With two million couples on adoption waiting lists, there is no excuse to abort an unwanted child. To make adoption more attractive than abortion, however, will require changes in public policy, private-sector institutions, and cultural attitudes. The most important changes would include:

- tax relief for adoptive parents in the form of full deductibility for adoption expenses, including the birth-mother's medical bills, which would give adoption the same tax status as a natural birth;
- financial aid for those who adopt special-needs children, including reimbursement for counseling expenses and extra medical care, and special aid for foster parents who want to adopt;
- efforts in the private sector to encourage minority couples to adopt—more programs like Homes for Black Children and One Church, One Child;
- a suspension of the current taboo against interracial adoptions—same-race adoptions may be preferable but the needs of the child should come first;

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- advocacy programs like that run by the North American Council on Adoptable Children's New York chapter to show minority-group members how to deal with the adoption bureaucracy;
- greater flexibility in home study requirements, to make adoption more affordable;
- a relaxation of taboos against adoptions by older people, singles, and the handicapped, and more "cultural sensitivity" to lower-class people who would like to adopt;
- "directive" counseling for young pregnant women that in a non-coercive fashion gives them complete information and makes clear that adoption is an alternative that will let them give the gift of life without ruining their own lives;
- more maternity homes and support programs for pregnant women;
- stronger legal safeguards for adoption finality: clear cutoff dates for fathers to assert their rights and confidentiality safeguards for adoption documents to ensure that adult contacts between birthmothers and their children will remain strictly voluntary; and
- a national campaign to find adoptive homes for all 36,000 special-needs children.

The most important and difficult change of all is a change of attitude toward adoption—that people will come to see that, although emotionally hard on the birth-mother, it is the noble, right way for her to treat the small human being she carries in her body but does not have the resources to raise right now. It is not "abandonment"—it is the way society ought to care for its members, assuring each a home.

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—Thomas L. Pangle, University of Toronto

Liberal democratic thought in the twentieth century is composed of two strands: the classical (preserved in the term "liberal education"), which emphasizes human excellence, and the modern, which emphasizes individual freedom and social equality. Though these two intellectual tendencies may complement each other, they can—and do—also conflict with each other. In this collection of essays, originally published in 1968, Strauss examines the ambiguous relationship between these tendencies, seeking to illuminate the democratic discourse of that time. His results are as pertinent, insightful, and timely today as they were twenty years ago.

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Loose Cannons

Self-Inflicted Wounds at the National Rifle Association

Patrick B. McGuigan

After several years of political invulnerability, the National Rifle Association (NRA) is on the defensive in protecting the constitutional right of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms. Legislation to ban semiautomatic weapons, including some of the favorite rifles of hunters and sportsmen, is proliferating in states such as California that have historically opposed gun control. U.S. Representative Fortney (Pete) Stark of California has introduced national legislation that would impose a $200 tax on future purchases of certain semiautomatic weapons and require FBI background checks of these purchasers. Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio has proposed legislation that would require lengthy background checks of current owners. Media coverage emphasizes gun control as a solution to drug-related violence—as if making semiautomatics illegal would limit weapons for dealers already trafficking in illegal substances.

Many of the NRA's current difficulties are the result of self-inflicted wounds. During the past few years, the organization has refused to play coalition politics with its natural allies in the conservative movement, including, most especially, elements of organized law enforcement. A go-it-alone approach and a refusal to compromise on less than critical issues is jeopardizing the NRA's effectiveness in winning political support on those issues that it considers most important. Fortunately, there are now indications that the NRA is beginning to take the concerns of other potential coalition partners more seriously, helping shift the gun-control debate back to where it really belongs: the apprehension and punishment of those who misuse firearms.

Antagonizing the Police

At a press conference this March, NRA president Joseph Foss explained that there is no reason police officers and the NRA cannot cooperate on many issues. A decade ago, in fact, the average policeman considered the NRA an ally in the promotion of safe and responsible gun ownership. Today, policemen think of the NRA as an enemy of law enforcement—to the detriment of the conservative coalition, which ought to include both gun owners and cops.

In a battle lasting from 1981 to 1986, the NRA initially resisted legislation banning armor-piercing bullets. This issue was of minor concern for hunters or sportsmen, but of serious concern for law enforcement officers. Although the NRA eventually supported some restriction on access to these bullets, it needlessly antagonized the cops. The battle lines were drawn again last year, when the NRA fought tooth and nail against a push by policemen for a seven-day waiting period for gun purchases. The police were probably wrong to push this on the merits; waiting periods won't reduce crime. Even so, since a short waiting period doesn't prevent anyone from owning guns, the NRA was foolish to oppose something its natural allies on the beat consider so important.

Police officials bear part of the blame as well for the fragmentation of the coalition. For example, my good friend Dewey Stokes, national president of the Fraternal Order of Police, endorsed Howard Metzenbaum last year merely because of his restrictive gun control position, even though he has generally opposed legislation that would enhance law enforcement. But over the last decade, the NRA seems to have picked too many unnecessary fights with the cops. A more effective strategy would have been to make common cause with law enforcement on anti-crime issues in exchange for greater police support for the right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms.

Bennett Quick On the Draw

NRA political calculations too often have been based on temporary expediency rather than on the nurturing of coalitions that could be more effective over the longer term. In California last fall, the NRA authorized a late mailing on behalf of a liberal Democrat, Willard Murray, in his race against conservative Republican state assemblyman Paul Zeltner, even though Zeltner was a strong opponent of gun control. The district was Democratic-leaning, and the NRA apparently thought Murray, whom it considered acceptable on gun issues,

Patrick B. McGuigan *is editor of the Free Congress Foundation's* Family, Law and Democracy Report. *His memoir of the Bork battle,* The Ninth Justice, *will be published this fall.*

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would win. The NRA won the seat, but the tactic may have backfired. Its endorsement of Murray made California GOP assemblymen much less eager to support the NRA in the legislative battles over semiautomatics that it lost this spring.

Also this spring, in retaliation for drug chief Bill Bennett's quick-on-the-draw ban on semiautomatic imports, the NRA and other gun-owners' groups contributed significantly to the GOP's loss of the Indiana congressional seat once held by Dan Quayle and its near-loss of Dick Cheney's Wyoming seat. The NRA withheld a key mailing for the Indiana Republican, Dan Heath, and, then, having already made its point, sat out the Wyoming election, even though it had no objections to the Republican candidate Craig Thomas. (Gun Owners of America actually endorsed the Democrat, John Vinich.) This double punishment of the GOP probably served a useful purpose—encouraging the Bush administration to refocus its drug strategies more on crime control than on gun control. But it also weakened the party that has been most sympathetic to the NRA overall, and showed a spitefulness toward the Bush administration, with which it probably should be cooperating not fighting.

80 Percent Is Not Enough

The NRA also refused to cooperate with conservatives during one of the most important fights of the last decade: the Bork nomination. As one of the strategists who sought to secure Bork's confirmation, I know we badly needed the NRA's help and didn't get it.

When Richard Gardiner and Dave Connover, the NRA staffers who used to attend the 721 Group (an anti-crime/pro-judicial reform coalition that I chair), told me early in the battle that their leadership would not be supporting Bork, I researched the judge's record

Today, policemen think of the NRA as an enemy of law enforcement—to the detriment of the conservative coalition, which ought to include both gun owners and cops.

on Second Amendment questions. I found decisions in which Bork had ruled in favor of the rights of gun owners. In fact, in one case Judge Bork ruled in favor of the NRA itself, in a suit concerning the use of a gun stolen from the NRA's national headquarters in Washington. But, of course I did not find evidence of an overly broad reading of the Second Amendment on the part of the judge.

The NRA sat out the Bork battle because it feared he would modify the exclusionary rule.

Dan Casey of the American Conservative Union (my principal ally in organizing support for Bork among "outside" conservative groups) and I received multiple indications that the NRA opposed Bork because of his concerns about the excessive reach of the judicially created exclusionary rule. It was feared that Bork would be unwilling to suppress evidence gained during investigations and searches of, among others, the owners of firearms stores. (More recently, NRA political director Wayne LaPierre Jr. said that the Reagan White House pleaded with the NRA not to come out early for Bork.)

On September 8, 1987, after Casey and I determined that our own efforts to bring the NRA back into the judicial reform coalition had failed, my colleague Paul Weyrich at Coalitions for America asked Senator James McClure of Idaho, a favorite of the NRA, to intervene. McClure communicated with every member of the NRA board of directors, which was slated to meet in Washington during the Bork hearings. A major confrontation ensued, in which those who wanted the organization to stay out of the battle prevailed.

By contrast, both the National Right to Work Committee and the National Right to Life Committee immersed themselves in the pro-Bork fight, even though they had reasons to believe Bork might be an "80-per-center" and not a purist on their issues. But they understood the importance of the Bork battle to the coalition they are a part of, and devoted substantial resources to the confrontation.

ACLU-Style Absolutism

The Bork battle also brought out another source of strain in the conservative coalition: the NRA's insistence on an absolutist interpretation of the Second Amendment. Most conservatives who are fighting ACLU absolutism on issues like pornography, school discipline,

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U.S. Senate

Fraternal Order of Police president Dewey Stokes endorsing Howard Metzenbaum—a sign of hostility between the NRA and law enforcement.

and school prayer are troubled by assertions from the NRA that *any* new regulation of citizen access to firearms would violate a fundamental constitutional right.

Few conservatives would argue against a generous reading of the right to keep and bear arms. But surely

The NRA is helping to shift the gun-control debate back where it belongs: the apprehension and punishment of those who misuse firearms.

the Second Amendment does not require that courts strike down all regulations on gun use or ownership, any more than the First Amendment prevents reasonable regulations of speech. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, there is no constitutional right to stand up in a crowded theater and yell "Fire" when there are no flames. Similarly, gun registration seems no more an infringement on the right to bear arms than the need to get a parade permit is an infringement on free speech.

Ordinary citizens have no right to own machine guns, or bazookas, or surface-to-air missiles—indeed the National Rifle Association seems to have acquiesced in these restrictions. Why, then, is requiring a purchaser of firearms to undergo a background check, or to wait seven days to receive his weapon, or to go without certain bullets necessarily unconstitutional? By failing to admit the possibility of regulations that do not limit the basic right to bear arms, the NRA is cutting itself off from a broader movement of judicial reform.

Anti-Crime Coalition

There are now indications that the NRA may be moving away from its single-issue myopia, and even taking the initiative in supporting broader anti-crime legislation that would protect the rights of law-abiding gun owners. In a recent interview, Chuck Cunningham, central state liaison for the NRA's Institute for Legislative Action, said the NRA would be supporting efforts to strengthen punishment of juveniles, expand prison capacity, speed up trials, and reform sentencing procedures so as to reduce plea bargaining—all measures that could keep criminals off the streets.

The NRA also supported a Virginia bill signed into law this February requiring an "instant" criminal background check on purchasers of semiautomatic weapons that hold more than 20 rounds of ammunition and handguns with barrels less than five inches. Instantaneous checks of criminal records will soon be feasible, thanks to data at the National Crime Information Center. The technology, not completely in place yet, is roughly analogous to the credit and theft checks conducted when credit card users make purchases.

Similarly, in California, the NRA has endorsed a bill by state assemblymen Tom McClintock and Richard Mountjoy to establish a statewide system to check mental health and criminal records, and "prohibit possession, purchase, or transfer of weapons to all felons, all drug abusers convicted of violating health and safety codes, anyone convicted of a violent misdemeanor, and all people judged by a court to be a danger to themselves or others." Last year, the NRA supported congressional passage of the McCollum-Staggers amendment, calling on the Justice Department to study possible implementation of a national electronic system for checking criminal backgrounds.

America's voters will give strong support to a political coalition that can push through reform measures to keep dangerous offenders off the streets. The NRA can play a very important role in this coalition, and in so doing channel gun control into its proper direction—keeping weapons out of the hands of criminals by putting criminals behind bars.

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

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Stalin's Day of Infamy

The Soviet-Nazi Pact Was Responsible for World War II

Herbert Romerstein

"One swift blow to Poland, first by the German army and then by the Red army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty." This was how Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov characterized the most obvious result of the Soviet-Nazi Pact before the Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939.

August 23 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Soviet-Nazi Pact, the signal for Hitler to start World War II. The pact divided Poland between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and later allowed Stalin to annex Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The betrayal of Czechoslovakia by Britain and France in 1938 may have set the stage for World War II, but the Soviet-Nazi Pact set it in motion—permitting Hitler to carry out his *blitzkrieg* aggression against Poland, and then to concentrate all his resources against France and Britain without fear of an eastern front. The Soviet Union thus shares responsibility for the outbreak of a war that took the lives of tens of millions—including perhaps as many as 20 million Soviet citizens.

Molotov's Cocktail

The signing of the pact transformed the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement from a position of staunch anti-Nazism to what could only be called a pro-Nazi political position. The Soviet historian Vasiliy Kalish last year told the Soviet Young Communist League newspaper that during the signing of the pact Molotov proposed a toast: "Since the German people so loves its Führer, we will drink to the Führer's health."

Molotov announced the pact in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 31, 1939: "Only yesterday German Fascists were pursuing a foreign policy hostile to us. Yes, only yesterday we were enemies in the sphere of foreign relations. Today, however, the situation has changed and we are enemies no longer." He condemned those in the Soviet Union and abroad who were "carried away by an oversimplified anti-Fascist propaganda."

The next day Hitler said in the Reichstag, "I can only underline every word of Foreign Commissar Molotov's speech." He reported, "The nonaggression and consultation pact which became effective on the day it was signed was given its supreme ratification in Moscow and Berlin as well yesterday. This pact was greeted with exactly the same enthusiasm in Moscow as you are showing for it here."

Hitler falsely claimed that Poland had attacked Germany and he threatened, "From now on bomb will be repaid with bomb; poison gas will be fought with poison gas." At 5:00 A.M. on September 1 the Nazis attacked Polish forces and, despite heroic resistance, penetrated deeply into Polish territory. For three days Nazi bombers raided every Polish airport, destroying the Polish air force before it could get off the ground.

Accomplice to Blitzkrieg

On September 9, the German ambassador to the Soviet Union reported to Berlin that Molotov had phoned him with the message, "I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov."

Molotov was premature. The Nazis had only reached, not taken, Warsaw. Polish resistance continued. On September 16 the German ambassador in Moscow told the Soviet government that the Polish army was almost destroyed and that Warsaw would be occupied in the next few days. The Nazis called upon the Soviet government to "take a hand militarily" as this "relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary."

Molotov agreed that the time had come for the Soviet army to move. The ostensible justification for the Soviets' invasion of Poland was to protect their "Ukrainian and White Russian brothers" from the German advance. But this ruse was shattered when Hitler himself defended the Soviets in Danzig on September 19: "In the meanwhile Russia has on her part found it necessary to march into Poland to safeguard the interest of the White Russian and Ukrainian minorities there."

Soviet troops crossed the Polish border on a broad

Herbert Romerstein *recently retired from the United States government after serving six years at the United States Information Agency and 18 years as a professional staff member for congressional committees. He has written and lectured extensively on Soviet intelligence and disinformation.*

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

Map by Paul Woodward for *Policy Review*

front early on September 17 and Soviet planes began bombing Polish positions. In a speech in Danzig on October 24, Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop praised the Soviet army for occupying Polish territory "up to the demarcation line previously agreed upon between Germany and Russia," and declared that "German-Russian relations have now been finally established on a clear basis, and Germany and Soviet Russia are determined still further to strengthen their friendly and neighborly relations."

Oil and Agitprop for Hitler

The Soviet Union provided Nazi Germany with oil and other raw materials needed by Hitler's war machine. It also supplied Hitler with additional victims. German Communists, who had escaped to the Soviet Union when Hitler took power, and later were imprisoned in Stalin's purges, were turned over to the Gestapo. One of those who survived, Margarete Buber, described in her book *Under Two Dictators* the two years she spent in a Soviet slave labor camp and the five years in the Nazi death camp Ravensbruck. Buber, the widow of a prominent German Communist killed in the Soviet purges, Heinz Neumann, described how she and 29 others were handed by the GPU (a predecessor of the KGB) to an SS unit.

Meanwhile, Communists around the world stopped their criticism of the Nazis and concentrated their fire on their main enemy, the Western democracies. Stalin explained the party line to the editor of *Pravda* in November 1939:

> (a) It was not Germany that attacked France and England, but France and England that attacked Germany, thereby assuming responsibility for the present war; (b) After hostilities had broken out, Germany made overtures of peace to France and England, and the Soviet Union openly supported Germany's peace overtures, for it considered, and continues to consider, that the earliest possible termination of the war would radically improve the position of all countries and nations; (c) The ruling circles of England and France rudely rejected both Germany's peace overtures and the attempts of the Soviet Union to secure the earliest possible termination of the war. Such are the facts.

In his October 31, 1939, speech to the Supreme Soviet, Molotov said that the party had no quarrel with Nazism: "One may accept or reject the ideology of Hitlerism as well as any other ideological system that is a matter of political views."

During this period, Soviet propaganda continued to attack the British, blaming them for causing the Soviet-Finnish war actually started when Stalin tried to seize

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Finnish land near Leningrad. According to *Communist International* magazine in 1940, the British were "using every method to keep the Soviet Union 'preoccupied' in a military way; to organize a number of military ventures against it. Thereby, they hope to make it difficult for the Soviet Union to supply Germany with the necessary war materials."

Subversion Behind Allied Lines

Under instruction from Stalin, Communist Party members in the Allied nations undermined their countries' war efforts, in some cases contributing significantly to their defeat. William C. Bullitt, American ambassador to France, charged in 1940 that "Communist railway men stopped all traffic on the Belgian railways so that there was no transport by train for the French, British, and Belgian armies."

In Great Britain, Communist Party leader Harry Pollitt issued a pamphlet calling for the defeat of Hitler. Then came a communication from the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow: "In no country can the working class or the Communist Parties support the war....The international working class may under no conditions defend Fascist Poland....The division of states into fascist and democratic states has now lost its former sense....The Communist Parties which acted contrary to these tactics must now immediately correct their policy."

While Germany has been split in two as punishment for its aggressions, the Soviet Union still controls its territorial gains from its pact with Hitler.

Pollitt then wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain recanting his anti-fascism and pledging "to win the masses for support of the policy of the Communist Party of Great Britain and the Communist International." (When the British Communists held a conference in 1979 to reevaluate their history during the Soviet-Nazi Pact period the majority of the party concluded that they had made a tragic mistake in not supporting their own country's heroic resistance to Nazi aggression.)

According to the Soviet historian Z. P. Yakhimovich, similar instructions were given by the Comintern to the Communists in Scandinavian countries occupied by Germany, telling them that the British and French, not the Nazis, were their enemies.

The French Communist Party later played a valiant role in the Resistance against Nazi occupation. But initially it refused to participate in the defense of its country against Hitler. French Communists joined their leader, Maurice Thorez, in deserting the French Army. Communist members of Parliament refused to vote for war credits. Even after the fall of France, the Communist Party newspaper *L'Humanité* was published under Nazi auspices because it followed a line useful to Hitler.

Stalin, seeing no difference between the capitalist democracies and Nazi Germany, believed that the pact had broken the capitalist encirclement. Stalin's arch rival Leon Trotsky held much the same view. When the pact was signed, Trotsky accused Stalin of helping Hitler start his "bloody military operations." Nevertheless, Trotsky argued that the British and French were morally equivalent to the Nazis: "The present war has a reactionary character on both sides. Whichever camp is victorious, humanity will be thrown far behind."

Baltic Seizure

After decades of neglect and cover-up, the history of the Soviet-Nazi Pact and the early days of the war have recently become major subjects for research and study in the Soviet Union. One prominent Soviet historian, Yuri Afanasyev, reported in the newspaper *Sovetskaya Estoniya,* September 29, 1988, the widespread view that the pact was "a conspiracy between Hitler and Stalin." Afanasyev also vouched for the authenticity of three secret protocols of the pact showing that the Soviet takeover of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 1940 was conducted with Nazi support and cooperation.

The first of these protocols, signed on August 23, 1939, provided that Latvia and Estonia would be in the Soviet sphere of influence, while Lithuania would be in the German sphere. Another, signed September 28, 1939, put Lithuania in the Soviet sphere with some territory going to Germany. The third, signed on January 10, 1941, transferred to the Soviet Union the Lithuanian territory that had been given to Germany.

Although the U.S. State Department published these texts in 1948, some official Soviet historians such as Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, still deny their authenticity. Falin argues that these documents could not be found in Soviet files and that the Western texts were only copies. In fact, the original documents are in the hands of the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn. The Nazis had tried to burn them, but failed to destroy most of the pages. In addition, a complete microfilm of the papers that had been made by the Nazis and hidden was found and matches exactly the portions of the documents that survived. Molotov's signature, in the Cyrillic alphabet for the Russian text and the Latin alphabet for the German text, stands out clearly.

The secret protocols, which are of current political significance in the Baltic states, have been published by the Communist Party newspapers. On January 11, 1989, the official Soviet Lithuanian radio reported that between five and six thousand people in the capital city of Vilnius protested the anniversary of the third secret protocol, which had allowed the Soviet Union to take over their country. According to the official radio, "Rallies in condemnation of these plots have taken place in Lithuania since the autumn of 1987."

Soviet historians are also now examining the implica-

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tions of the pact that resulted in so much suffering for the Russian people. Because Stalin and his supporters could not conceive of a Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, they were disastrously unprepared for the German invasion of June 22, 1941. Soviet historian Vasiliy Kulish, writing in *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* August 24, 1988, revealed the Soviet view of the time:

> We would wage war on foreign territory, and with little bloodshed we would turn it into a civil war in which the world proletariat would fight the world bourgeoisie. Because we had prepared to fight on foreign territory, more than half of our stocks—weapons, ammunition, uniforms, equipment, and fuel—were stored close to the border. And in the first week of the war 25,000 freight cars (30 percent of all the stocks) of ammunition, 50 percent of all the stocks of fuel and food and animal feed had already been either destroyed or taken by the enemy. These were the vivid consequences of the shortsighted policy.

Lt. General M. M. Kiryan wrote in the June 1988 *Soviet Military History Journal* that at the time of the Nazi attack the main Soviet troops were not at the border and the remaining combat equipment was "in moth balls." He said, "The troops entered combat without proper artillery support and, as a rule, without an anti-aircraft artillery cover." The Nazi capture of fuel and supplies denied the Soviet units the necessities for combat. Soviet troops fought heroically, but "due to poor preparations, the lack of air support and the rushed, piecemeal commitment to battle, many counterstrikes ended unsuccessfully."

Mass Graves

Once taboo, the issue of the mass killings that took place in the territories acquired by the USSR as a result of the pact are now being publicly discussed in the Soviet Union. A. V. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium, pointed out in a January 13, 1988, speech that mass deportations from Latvia began on June 14, 1941. And he said, "Communists and members of the government were not spared."

A Soviet military historian writing in the army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* in May admitted that Estonia "lost approximately 15 percent of its population in the '40s. Many losses are directly or indirectly linked with the Stalinist terror." In Lithuania, similar persecutions took place. The chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers admitted during a Vienna press conference that 130,000 people had been deported from his country after the Soviet annexation in 1940. In recent years mass graves have been discovered in the Baltic states.

Mass graves in Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and other parts of the Soviet Union are also now being excavated. There is even some discussion of paying restitution to the survivors of the mass deportations and slave labor camps. The Soviets still refuse to admit responsibility for one group of victims, the 11,000 Polish officers murdered in Katyn Forest as part of a systematic effort to liquidate potential leaders in Poland who could challenge Soviet authority. A spokesman for the Polish government, however, has demanded that the Soviets admit that the NKVD committed the killings, and a joint Polish-Soviet commission is looking into the matter. As of now, there has been no such admission. But, under glasnost, even that may be forthcoming.

UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

London after 1940-41 blitz: The pact with the Soviets allowed Hitler to concentrate his resources against France and Britain without fear of an eastern front.

Soviet Suffering

Nazism has been banished from the face of the earth for 44 years, and Germany has been split in two as punishment for its aggressions. The Soviet Union, however, still controls its territorial gains from its pact with Hitler: the three Baltic states, and the western Ukraine and western Byelorussia, which were taken from Poland. Even the Communist officials in the Baltic states admit that the incorporation of their countries into the Soviet Union was illegitimate, while they insist it is too late to change.

World War II caused incredible human suffering. The Soviet people bore much of the grief. They were the victims of a war that probably would never have started if Stalin had not been an accomplice to Hitler's designs for conquest.

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So You Want To Start a Think Tank

A Battlefield Report from the States

JOHN K. ANDREWS JR.

State Senator Regis Groff, a liberal Democrat who works in the Denver public schools, was obviously frustrated during a January 1989 hearing on a bill to prod school districts toward school-based management and wider parental choice. He could feel the security of the educational status quo beginning to totter as the proposal was endorsed by a succession of witnesses including one of his fellow black leaders, Les Franklin, an IBM executive on leave for two years' service as director of the Governor's Job Training Office.

Not until a teachers' union spokesman stepped up to testify against the bill did the senator brighten. "I'm glad to hear from someone who shares my doubts about this bill," he told the committee. "All of these other witnesses sound as though they just stepped out of an Independence Institute briefing."

Independence Institute, a public policy think tank active since 1985 in promoting market solutions for Colorado issues, is not quite as influential as this legislator assumed. (In fact, the parental choice provisions the Institute favored were dropped from the education bill, although other important reforms will probably be enacted.) But staffers at the Institute are working to make the senator's appraisal more and more true.

That day, the witness from IBM did happen to be an Independence trustee. Several of the other witnesses as well as most of the committee members had been exposed to a series of Independence issue papers on education reform in the preceding months. Some had also attended the Institute's Western States Education Summit on School Choice in June 1988. The center, although still no heavyweight in state affairs, has become an influential voice in a short time.

Nor is this an isolated success story. The entrepreneurial growth of conservative and libertarian policy groups on the state and local scene has been one of the sleeper trends of American government in the 1980s. The Colorado experience has its counterparts in Pennsylvania and Illinois, Florida and Washington state, Michigan and Massachusetts, Connecticut and South Carolina and Arizona. Federal budget gridlock and the decentralizing spirit of the Reagan-Bush years have made the trend necessary. The proliferation of intellectual resources on the right and the revolution in information technology have made it possible.

Strike Quickly for Credibility

How do you start a state or local think tank? The core staff—one person or at most a handful—must be committed, risk-accepting, financially patient, and versatile. Find a front person who can lead, manage, network, politick, write, edit, research, speak, market, sell, fundraise, and generate lightning 60 hours a week indefinitely. Assemble a working board of recognizable names from the business and political community. Recruit academics whose itch to influence the policy debate will motivate them to contribute publishable analysis for a low fee or gratis.

While you wait for your incorporation and tax exempt status to go through, seek businessmen who can be angels for the fledgling center. Prospect for donated office space, furniture and equipment lent from someone's warehouse, health coverage with a friendly company that self-insures, free printing, and so forth. Locate strategically close to the seat of government, industrial centers, and major media markets.

Jump-start your program activities by copying what has succeeded elsewhere, even by recycling others' papers with a locally relevant cover sheet. But also look around, listen, and ask questions: What taxes and regulations most impede economic growth? What kinds of analysis do like-minded legislators need as cover for that risky vote they'd like to cast? What collectivist fallacies are dominating the media or the statehouse by default? Identify the fat targets, take aim, and commence firing.

During its first six months, Independence Institute's priority was to strike quickly for statewide credibility with key audiences. A candid, businesslike legislative workshop gave friendly lawmakers early proof of a listening attitude. A two-day conference on "Why Not an Economic Miracle for Colorado?" raised the supply-side banner and garnered news coverage. The first Independence issue paper caught the crest of publicity sur-

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rounding a bitter referendum over tax funds to enlarge Denver's convention center; the Institute pointed to private-sector alternatives.

Concentration of Power

State environments differ in some key ways—intensity of partisanship, variations in the structural organization of government, the degree of corruption, and the quality of people attracted to government employment and political participation. But David Kehler, president of the Public Affairs Research Institute of New Jersey, prefers to emphasize the commonalities. Addressing colleagues from some 15 states at a recent conference, Kehler (who has also done policy work in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington state) met little disagreement when he generalized that the typical state capital is a place where:

- power is closely concentrated in a face-to-face setting,
- the roles of participants are largely fixed and personal connections are often of long standing,
- the relative strength of interest groups tends to remain constant over time,
- ideas are less significant for their inherent merit than for who expresses them,
- the executive branch is often much stronger than the legislative branch (although a few states like North Carolina and Colorado have weak-governor systems),
- the spectrum of acceptable opinion on issues is narrow,
- the press tends to focus more on the politics of a situation than on the policy implications,
- the number of access points at which policy development can be influenced is far smaller than at the federal level,
- timing is important because major legislative action can occur quickly,
- legislators receive little valid information on most issues, and
- the principal source of statist ideas is from public employee organizations and from within government itself.

Overall, a state capital is a much more constricted policy environment than is Washington. Operating below the horizon of national glamor and away from the bicoastal power bases, state policy entrepreneurs learn what it means to farm in rocky soil and a severe climate. They face the difficult trade-off between breadth and focus. There is an incentive to keep diversifying issue priorities to broaden the donor base, but also a need to keep the program focused enough to demonstrate real impact in a few areas. Of course, national think tanks also confront this dilemma, but it pinches more when you don't have economies of scale.

The answer in Colorado has been to keep every publication, conference, or task force topically relevant to one of the Independence Institute's "big four" issue priorities: 1) economic growth, particularly the tax and regulatory factors, because the whole polity and society works better with a growing pie, 2) education reform, because two of every three state and local tax dollars are spent on education, 3) equal opportunity, because the Declaration of Independence rests on it, and 4) local government effectiveness, because decentralization is beneficial only to the extent that grass-roots institutions are really functional. A fifth issue priority, our wild card, we have called "the world and Colorado": this has let us nibble on topics as diverse as Pacific trade, Sandinista totalitarianism, and the fallacy of U.S.-Soviet moral equivalence.

Fiscal Watchdogs

Many issues are common to all or most states. The one that probably tops everybody's list is the need to reform state and local government fiscal affairs. According to Kehler, the new conservative and libertarian state policy organizations should focus on fiscal issues: "In particular, there is a great need to encourage state and local governments to formulate explicit program objectives, bases on which agencies and managers can be held accountable." Because state governments typically lack cost-effectiveness incentives, says Kehler, "the new state policy groups can improve the quality of government and make an important contribution by promoting efficiency and performance-focused budgeting."

Fiscal watchdogs also do well to keep one eye at all times on the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and other government unions. Kehler says, "The most important political change in state capitals in the past 15 years or so has been the rise of public employee organizations. They are, in many states, the dominant lobby, and...their bread-and-butter issues are high on the public agenda. To date, no strong countervailing force has developed, so balanced information—particularly on pensions, which represent long-term fixed costs—is needed."

The entrepreneurial growth of conservative and libertarian policy groups on the state and local scene has been one of the sleeper trends of American government.

This approach pays dividends. An Independence issue paper concluding that Colorado's state work force is 15 percent oversize and 15 percent overpaid by objective comparison with national norms provoked three cabinet departments into a flurry of defensive response. John Carlson of the Washington Institute for Policy Studies seized the initiative in Olympia with an itemized counter-budget booklet showing how the legislature could forestall a tax increase with a quarter-billion dollars in realistic spending cuts.

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

The real test is getting your message out. Here, an Independence Institute paper on reverse discrimination in Denver's public works contracting is released at a city hall press conference.

No two state policy centers are identical, of course. Independence Institute differs from most of its sister organizations in the degree of emphasis placed on policy implementation through task forces, especially the Colorado Opportunity Network. The network grew out of a 1986 conference on "Economic Growth That Leaves No One Behind," featuring neighborhood enterpriser Robert Woodson, author Richard Rodriguez, tenant organizer Kimi Gray, and scholar Glenn Loury. Upon adjourning, organizers felt the need for a structure to sustain the energy this event had generated in favor of self-help as an alternative to government dependency among the disadvantaged. Three follow-up groups meet every month or two to press policy initiatives and to look at private sector success stories and opportunities. One focuses on education in the inner city, another on minorities and the family, and a third on minority economic opportunity.

We now have a total of 10 Independence task forces pushing various aspects of our "big four" issue priorities. Open and lively, the task forces keep the program turning over between major publications and they also give hundreds of Coloradans a sense of ownership in the institute's goals. And not least important, the task forces are a great marketing point when a potential supporter asks what we do besides theorize. The trick is to keep the task forces active yet disentangled from busywork and overcommitment.

Kill Your Darlings

It's essential to aim high in your research and publications. There is little point in publishing anything that is not of outstanding quality, particularly for a new organization. Credibility is priceless, and hack work will destroy it fast. As you edit that draft, when the temptation comes to lard in the ideology and polemics, count to 10. Kill your darlings; delete the trigger words and let the facts carry the argument.

If possible, go on the offensive in raising issues, but do so with a realistic design for how you might connect to a political advocate willing to take the next step. Determine the most likely access points in the policy process at which an organization's research will be applicable. Where is your leverage? Whose self-interest can you engage? The policy community (including the media) in a state is relatively small, so it is not difficult to target your audience.

Remember that how an organization labels itself is a major factor in how its work will be received. As Emerson warned, "If I know your sect, I anticipate your argument." In the charged ideological atmosphere of Washington, D.C., some of the policy organizations may feel they gain morale and market advantage by openly describing themselves as the conservative voice or the libertarian idea people. But think tanks in the states probably do better to avoid such explicit self-labeling—although it is useless to argue when the media apply the label, which they often do.

State politicians like to be thought of as practical folks. Those who cluster around them take on the same utilitarian coloring, and highfalutin ideology doesn't go down well in the smaller, simpler circles where state decision-making takes place. By stating in a sentence what we are for, rather than in a word what we "are," the Independence Institute has managed to retain broad access to consensus building and coalition brokering on the political right and center without surrendering our principles. We work at involving a healthy mix of partisan Democrats, Republicans, and Libertarians, along with a sprinkling of political independents, in visible roles at the Institute.

Never Stop Marketing

Idea marketing should be the constant litany of any policy entrepreneur. You have to be driven by it, fanatical about it. Be anything less, and you and your associates will wind up talking mainly to yourselves, kidding yourselves about meaningful impact on the process, and watching your support base melt away.

The easy part is getting your message right. Let's assume you can do that. It is necessary but not sufficient. The real test is getting your message out. The forces working against a principled approach to state and local issues are great. Absent a relentless marketing onslaught, the information culture will kill you with yawns while the political/business establishment heedlessly steamrolls your proposals.

Everything you do, every day, must involve marketing in as many as six dimensions. Market your policy recommendations, market the principles and values behind them, market the tangible publications and events your organization is producing. Market the think-tank concept itself. Then market your specific organization. And never stop marketing yourself and the other key individuals who personify the organization.

Be careful not to aim over the audience's head. Remember that the very notion of public policy is completely foreign to most people outside the Washington Beltway. Most people's all-purpose name for the workings of government is simply politics—by which they

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mean partisan battles, campaigning, running and winning and enjoying the spoils, or running and losing and maneuvering to win next time. Getting your message out involves clearing up this confusion. Politics, you can tell people, concerns who gets elected, a decision made by the voters on one day out of every two years. Public policy, on the other hand, concerns everything that government officials do between elections. With those definitions established, you can clinch the argument by noting that citizens who, in their fixation on politics, ignore public policy abdicate much of the control they could be exercising over their government for 729 days of every 730.

Count on Fiascoes

Stumbles, fiascoes, crises? Count on them. There was the board invitation that had to be withdrawn after a particular individual, recommended to us as someone who could strengthen the Independence outreach to minority communities, spelled out his agenda for PUSH-style corporate extortion. There was the campaign season when several Independence trustees were dismayed to learn that stump speakers were quoting their names as having allegedly "endorsed" a tax-cutting ballot measure, merely on the basis of our having published an issue paper (replete with disclaimers) describing the negative effects of the existing tax burden.

An eagerly awaited column on the Independence Institute, our first notice in one of the Denver dailies, turned out to be a sarcastic piece under the headline "Policy Issues Appeal Like Boiled Tofu." Staffers gulped, elided the last three words, and circulated reprints anyway. Another time, the uncomplicated renewal of a major foundation grant was delayed 90 days when the proposal deadline was missed by one day; cash flow consequences were excruciating. The darkest hour was having to lay off staff after too many months of failing to meet payroll. What can be philosophized or laughed about years later may seem traumatic (if not terminal) as it is engulfing you. But somehow you survive.

Statist Activism

The state think tank movement has spawned an easygoing trade association called the Madison Group, which meets annually and publishes a bimonthly newsletter. It has 55 members in 22 states and will soon enter its fourth year. Additionally, for the past three years The Heritage Foundation and Free Congress Foundation have sponsored a July workshop on techniques for successful policy activities in the states, drawing participants from across the country. Since the mid-1980s both Heritage and Free Congress have sharply increased their attention to state issues. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a limited-government clearinghouse for state legislators that helped launch the Madison Group, is less lonely now than when it was getting started in the late 1970s.

Today, however, the Right not only must capitalize on past successes but also must develop new strategies and skills. In the '90s, even more than in the '80s, the battle for limited government and free markets must move aggressively to the state and local levels.

There are a couple of justifications for directing more effort to the grass roots. The Beltway perspective suggests we should do so because it is expedient, because there can be no victory at the national level without strength at the precinct level. That argument is valid, but it is not conclusive; most Madison Group members would not even say it is the main argument. The real reason for battling to reclaim constitutional government in the neighborhoods and statehouses is that it is right. It must be done for the states' own sakes, for the sakes of the people who call those places home, whose lives are touched most closely by those mundane, gray, still frighteningly powerful levels of authority. Indeed, if you believe columnist Neal Peirce or author David Osborne, the trend in many states is toward bigger and more activist government.

But in coming years the opponents of local statism will enjoy advantages that did not exist in earlier decades—the power of public choice theory, proven techniques of privatization, and the burgeoning worldwide entrepreneurial culture. Thus, we go into the next round much better armed, whether to defend against mandated benefits and eco-hysteria, or to press the offensive against socialized approaches to education, government services, and infrastructure. We are in a good position to keep winning if we can just remember to Keep It Simple. In Colorado that precept is kept fresh by the memory of one classic telephone conversation.

Find a front person who can lead, manage, network, politick, write, edit, research, speak, market, sell, fund-raise, and generate lightning 60 hours a week.

"Anyone who believes higher taxes cause economic growth must also think that Adam Smith and his brother teamed up to sell cough drops," a line from an opinion piece that the Independence Institute had offered to newspapers statewide, puzzled one rural editor. Who is this Adam Smith, he asked the Independence office manager by phone. The father of market economics, she told him. So, is he still alive? Died a long time ago, she explained patiently. Any of his followers still active? Milton Friedman for one, replied our office manager. Never heard of him either, grumbled the editor. But he did run the article.

Sophisticated they're not, most folks out here in the American hinterland. But you won't find them taking any wooden nickels either. Sound public policy matters to them, even if that's not the name they are inclined to call it. And the state policy movement will keep hustling to reach them where they live.

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Mitch Snyder's Phony Numbers

The Fiction of Three Million Homeless

Carl F. Horowitz

Back in the late '70s, homosexual college student organizations developed a novel method of estimating the number of gays on their respective campuses. Often with CETA funding, their members would fan out at strategic locations throughout campus and count the number of students wearing blue jeans. Before each of these "Blue Jean Days," homosexual students were encouraged to wear jeans as a "consciousness-raising" symbol. But prepublicity was limited, and whoever happened to be wearing jeans on the day of the count was considered homosexual whether he or she actually had any awareness of the "survey." Thus, for example, the homosexual population at Illinois-Urbana was estimated at 45 percent of the student body.

Such a survey was a variation on Senator Joe McCarthy's almost weekly juggling of the number of "known" Communists in the State Department. As the writer Richard Rovere recounted, McCarthy established his original figure of 205 in February 1950, and within months, had revised it in succession to 57, 81, 10, 116, 1, 121, and 106. Too many journalists reported these numbers without scrutinizing his very reputability. The resulting hysteria has undermined serious anti-Communism to this day.

In the 1980s, one of the numbers game's premier players has unquestionably been the homeless advocate. Prominent individuals and organizations acting on behalf of the homeless have argued that not simply hundreds of thousands, but millions of Americans on any given day are resigned to a life in shelters, institutions, or the streets. Beginning around 1983, the number three million—approximately 1.2 of every 100 Americans—has come to be reported as the benchmark figure. Politicians, celebrities, and corporations have found it a convenient rallying point to elicit sympathy and tax deductible donations for the homeless. The Washington, D.C., Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) routinely issues the figure in its literature and press releases. Then–House Speaker Jim Wright cited the number three million in February's Democratic counter-budget speech. Senator Ernest Hollings, in an article in the April 30, 1989, *Washington Post,* "Bush's Real Problem—The Ruins of Reaganism," referred to "upwards of three million" homeless (the title left little doubt as to where he assigns blame). Royal Crown Cola cites the number in conjunction with its campaign to donate part of its profits to homeless organizations. Clergymen lecture from their pulpits about their congregants' duty to help the three million homeless. Cher, Whoopie Goldberg, and Martin Sheen march in the streets for the three million homeless.

The understandable sympathy that Americans feel toward the homeless has effectively limited scrutiny of these estimates. The major media in particular have been guilty of slipshod reporting on this issue, as shown in a survey conducted by the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and cited in the April 19, 1989, *Washington Post.* Researchers monitored 103 CBS, NBC, and ABC evening news stories on the subject over a nearly 30-month period. Only 12 percent of the interviewed homeless adults were unemployed, and only 3 percent were drug or alcohol abusers. This contrasts with a recent U.S. Conference of Mayors survey indicating that 77 percent of all homeless are unemployed, and 34 percent are substance abusers. The networks quoted homeless advocacy groups more often than federal, state, and local officials combined. Were the networks actually doing their homework, their coverage of the issue would have been quite different.

Western Little Minds

In August 1988, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released *Homeless Mentally Ill: Problems and Options in Estimating Numbers and Trends,* a report that examined 83 national and local studies on the incidence and nature of homelessness, evaluating the soundness of their methods and their utility for future research. Of these studies, only one explicitly or even implicitly claimed a national homeless percentage anywhere near 1.2 percent. *Homelessness: A Forced March to Nowhere,* coauthored in 1982 by Mary Ellen Hombs and Mitch Snyder, and published by Snyder's Community for Creative Non-

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Ben Wildavsky

An inaccurate count of the homeless, high or low, diverts attention from the condition of the people who need help.

Violence, consisted of a phone survey of shelter operators across the country.

The report states: "...in 1980...approximately 1 percent of the population, or 2.2 million people, lacked shelter. We arrived at that conclusion on the basis of information received from more than 100 agencies and organizations in 25 cities and states. It is as accurate an estimate as anyone in the country could offer, yet it lacks absolute statistical certainty." Hombs and Snyder add, "We are convinced the number of homeless people in the United States could reach 3 million or more during 1983."

The monograph, which contained no descriptive methodology that would have shed light on the soundness of its national or local estimates (among other shortcomings), was not one of 27 of the 83 studies considered by the GAO to be "useful." As Anna Kondratas, now an official at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), noted, the report made no attempt to explain, reconcile, or verify national or local estimates. Some of the estimates were for whole metropolitan areas, others were for cities only; some were point-in-time counts; others were extended period counts. Snyder was refreshingly candid, to say the least, when given the opportunity to explain the figures to a Joint House Committee in May 1984. He admitted, "...these numbers are in fact meaningless. We have tried to satisfy your gnawing curiosity for a number because we are Americans with Western little minds that have to quantify everything in sight, whether we can or not."

Growing public outcry over the homelessness issue led HUD to conduct its own analysis. In May 1984 it released the results of a six-month study of homelessness in *A Report to the Secretary on the Homeless and Emergency Shelters.* HUD interviewed 500 local observers in 60 metropolitan areas, visited jails, shelters, and other forms of emergency housing in 10 cities, surveyed 184 shelter operators, and interviewed state officials in all 50 states. HUD also consulted with homeless advocacy groups. The report concluded that the national homeless population (those persons who at night reside in emergency shelters, or in private or public spaces not designated for shelter) ranged from 192,000 to 586,000, with the most reliable range being from 250,000 to 350,000.

HUD's "Nazi Propaganda"

Homeless militants immediately took up cudgels. The numbers were not only drastically low, they argued, they were manipulated to justify Reagan administration domestic budget cuts. *Washington Post* columnist Colman McCarthy accused HUD of "playing games," while Representative Henry Gonzalez, who chaired the Joint House Committee hearings at which Snyder had testified, compared the report to Nazi propaganda. Over four years later, Snyder, still fuming, referred to it on the December 19, 1988, edition of CNN's *Crossfire* as "that stupid study."

But HUD is not the only organization to take exception to Snyder's claim of three million homeless. The CCNV's assertions have been undercut by another homeless advocacy group, the National Alliance to End Home-

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lessness. Last year, that organization's Alliance Housing Council concluded that there are 735,000 homeless on any given night. And even that figure seems a bit "cooked." The Council reinterpreted and extrapolated from HUD's data, assuming a suburban homeless rate of one-third the city rate, and a 20 percent annual growth in homelessness overall since the HUD study.

Other recent studies also sharply conflict with CCNV estimates. A 1988 National Academy of Sciences book, *Homelessness, Health, and Human Needs*, voices a reasonable critique of the HUD study, but in no way suggests that the number of homeless would have been in the millions had HUD adjusted its sampling methods accordingly. While the book explicitly refrained from providing its own estimates, it implicitly demolished the CCNV report, noting that surveying shelter operators and other service providers (instead of counting the homeless themselves) produces inflated results. The authors elaborated, "The necessity of reliance on the advice of key informants whose perceptions of the size and nature of the homeless population are biased by their own particular set of experiences and who may be unaware of the extent of overlap in service utilization may also badly skew that population estimate."

William Tucker conducted a Manhattan Institute-funded study whose results are summarized in the September 25, 1987, *National Review* cover story, "Where Do the Homeless Come From?". Tucker, like the Alliance Housing Council, extrapolated from HUD's data. Using multiple regression techniques, he estimated the 1987 national homeless population to be 700,000, and found that the presence or absence of rent control, far more than even the rental vacancy rate, had the greatest influence on a city's homelessness rate.

In late 1988, the Urban Institute released a report, *Feeding the Homeless*, indicating the number of homeless to be between 567,000 and 600,000. Funded by the Agriculture Department's Food and Nutrition Service, the study drew upon more than 1,700 interviews with homeless users of soup kitchens and shelters. Yet although the study arrived at a figure roughly double that of HUD's, and interviewed the "right" people, homeless advocates denounced it. Maria Foscarinis, counsel for the Washington, D.C., National Coalition for the Homeless, responded that the Urban Institute had vastly miscalculated. "Our estimate is three million," she dryly noted. Mitch Snyder, lending a note of conciliation, remarked, "Just about everybody in America who is involved thinks the figure is two to three million."

Shooting the Messenger

Mary Ellen Hombs, the principal author of the CCNV report, is an intriguing figure in all of this. Currently, she is office coordinator for the National Coalition for the Homeless. She is knowledgeable about homeless shelters, having worked in them for over 10 years, and seems relatively free of Snyder's practiced abrasiveness. And she at least recognizes that the issue is not simply one of housing, but of job training, child care, and mental disorder treatment as well. When asked how she reconciles the discrepancies between the CCNV figures and those of the other studies, she responded, "I couldn't even begin to tell you how we got the numbers. It's not a productive exercise."

Hombs is unimpressed that the U.S. Census Bureau will include questions about homelessness in the 1990 Census. The Census will be "just as bad as the other studies." Then, with classic Movement intonation, she sent the numbers issue up in smoke:

> What's the difference, really, what the numbers are? Whether it's 300,000 or three million, the homeless are out there. They have to be turned away from shelters every night. If the federal government built the housing these people needed, the problem would practically be nonexistent. Instead of spending money on counting the homeless, we could be spending money on housing them.

That last sentence may have a nice rhetorical flourish, but it is patently misleading. HUD's study cost barely more than $100,000, including fees paid to outside contractors. That comes to less than 50 cents per homeless person, not enough to lay one brick, much less build a whole house. More importantly, by denigrating the importance of numbers as "statistics," a diversion from the real issues, Hombs can indict the "technocracy" of researchers who take the time to get realistic numbers and provide some supporting methodological discussion. One detects a double standard in operation: If the homeless militants' own messengers bring sufficiently bad news, their findings are valuable and deserve maximum publicity. If, however, rival messengers bring insufficiently bad news, their motives as well as their data are suspect.

The Street-to-Shelter Ratio

Of all factors that go into insuring the validity of a homelessness survey, perhaps none is as crucial as an accurate determination of the street-to-shelter ratio. The *street* population represents homeless people who, for whatever reason, are reported as living outside congregate housing at the time of enumeration. These are the people who establish nightly homes on sidewalks and roofs and in and around bus and airport terminals, alleys, construction sites, loading docks, garages, and other nooks and crannies. Homeless advocates argue that street people go to great lengths to hide themselves, and thus are inevitably (and grossly) undercounted. The *shelter* population consists of homeless people in shelters, welfare hotels, jails, mental institutions, and other group quarters.

In January 1984, HUD counted 111,000 shelter beds, only 70 percent occupied. Yet, even assuming full occupancy, and even defining all of the approximately 110,000 persons currently in public mental hospitals as "homeless," the street-to-shelter ratio would still have to be between 90 and 95 percent, or about 14-to-1, for there to be three million homeless.

The General Accounting Office's analysis would suggest that even a 1-to-1 ratio may be too high. Of the 27 studies the GAO deemed methodologically sound, nine attempted to develop a ratio. Eight indicated a ratio of

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

Although Mitch Snyder admits his numbers are meaningless, Ernest Hollings and Jim Wright cited them this year as fact.

less than 50 percent (less than 1-to-1), and six of these were less than 30 percent. The one study that found a ratio higher than 50 percent adds less fuel for the homeless advocates' fire than one might imagine. Over a six-month period during 1985-86, sociologist Peter Rossi of the University of Massachusetts' Social and Demographic Research Institute conducted a stratified random sample of street homeless on Census blocks in Chicago (a separate count had been conducted of the city's shelters). City authorities assisted Rossi in dividing blocks into those with a high probability of encountering a homeless person, and those with a low probability. Interviewers then searched all possible sites where the homeless might be found. During autumn months, the street-to-shelter ratio was 59 percent; during the colder winter months, the figure declined to 27 percent. Rossi, a pioneer in social research methods, estimated the total number of Chicago's homeless to be between only 3,700 and 6,000.

One local study that generously allowed for the possibility of not detecting the concealed homeless still counted many fewer homeless than the Community for Creative Non-Violence maintains. According to a full count of street and shelter people conducted by the University of the District of Columbia's Center for Applied Research and Public Policy, the maximum number of homeless in Washington, D.C., in July 1985 was 7,142. The author, Frederic Robinson, obtained this figure by weighting the actual street count upward by 2.5; without this inflation, the figure would have been 4,347. In either case, the total is well below the 1980 Hombs-Snyder Washington estimate of 15,000.

Why Numbers Matter

Advocates for the homeless have made an art form of deflecting questions about their inflated and often absurd estimates, either by denying the validity of lower estimates, questioning the competence or the sensitivity of researchers who obtain them, or denying altogether the importance of accurate measurement. As a result, the perception of millions of neglected homeless roaming the streets has gathered wide currency, abetted by a news media that has given advocates a nearly free ride, regularly indulging their grand gestures such as hunger strikes without subjecting their assertions to reasonable scrutiny. This situation is harmful not only to housing policymaking, but to all policymaking.

An inaccurate count of the homeless, high or low, diverts attention from the condition of the people who need help. To devise effective treatment programs for the mentally ill homeless, who account for about one-third of the homeless population, it is essential to know just how many of these tragic individuals there are. The problems of homeless alcoholics are far different from those of homeless mothers with young children, and "advocates" who disparage research about their numbers are doing a serious injustice to the people they ostensibly are trying to aid.

For better or worse, Mitch Snyder's aggressive contempt for facts has set the tenor for the homeless movement. His meteoric rise in stature has been an inspiration for heightened political involvement among an irrational social type for whom strident moral appeals, often tinged with religious symbolism, can and must substitute for good research. Such people reject more than "good data." They reject the very rational-positivist basis of science—that problem definition precedes solution; that facts precede values; and that means and ends are intimately linked. In this sense, Snyder's remark about Americans having "Western little minds" is more than a little self-revealing.

Snyder sounded the opening salvo of a national speaking tour in mid-April, announcing to a church group in Harrisonburg, Virginia, "they [Congress] know we're facing the worst domestic crisis the country has ever faced. And all that stands between that happening and not is money....Affordable housing disappears, because if the federal government doesn't build affordable housing, nobody does." Of course, one might respond that unsubsidized private enterprise has been responsible for most of the more than 12 million housing completions this decade, that the nonprofit sector has initiated successful, low-cost housing rehabilitation programs nationwide, that there were homeless people before HUD's budget cuts, and that a strong economy is still the best defense against a housing depression. Snyder would view making such points as foot-dragging, an excuse for continuing neglect, as the number of homeless climbs to four million, five million, and God-knows-what beyond. Ironically, this manipulation of issues and statistics into a giddy, evasive, and yes, McCarthyist game will do little for the people who most need help: the homeless.

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The Greenhouse Blues

Keep Cool About Global Warming

Dixy Lee Ray

The year 1988 ended on a high note of hysteria, one that was to continue well into 1989. The issue, fueled by an unusually hot, dry summer, was global warming. NASA's James Hansen testified at a Senate hearing that the high temperatures presaged the onset of the long-debated "greenhouse effect" and global warming due to buildup of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Forgotten were the harsh winters of 1978 (when barges carrying coal and heating oil froze in river ice and more than 200 people lost their lives in the cold weather) and 1982.

Memory is a capricious thing. Perhaps the early winter months of 1989 will remind prophets of global warming that nature can be fickle. Only days after *Time* magazine featured as its "Man" of the Year for 1988 a doomed Planet Earth, perishing from human mismanagement and greenhouse overheat, Alaska experienced the worst cold in its history. Twenty locations in our most northerly state recorded their lowest-ever temperatures, mainly in the range of -50 to -65 degrees Fahrenheit. The cold did not begin to move south until the first week in February, when it seeped down from Alaska on both sides of the Rocky Mountains, bringing near-record lows to the Pacific Northwest and throughout the Midwest, south to Texas, and eventually to the mid-Atlantic and New England states. Proponents of the "greenhouse-effect-is-here-global-warming-has-begun" theory were very quiet during these weeks.

Seeing Infrared

To be fair, even if there is a potential for increased temperatures due to enhancement of the greenhouse effect, no one would expect it to occur all at once or without intervening cold spells. So let us examine the situation more closely.

Earth, with its blanket of atmosphere, constitutes a "greenhouse." This fact has never been at issue. Indeed, were it not for the greenhouse function of air, the Earth's surface would be like the moon's, bitterly cold (-270 degrees Farenheit) at night and unbearably hot (+212 degrees) during the day. Although the amount of solar energy reaching the moon is similar to that reaching the Earth, the Earth's atmosphere permits incoming solar radiation to penetrate. When that warms the surface, infrared heat is radiated back. The "greenhouse gases"—carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane, hydrocarbons—all absorb longwave (infrared) radiation. This process moderates the surface temperature. Let us therefore rejoice and be glad that the Earth does indeed function as a greenhouse!

In addition, the greenhouse gases are all produced by nature as well as by human activity. For example, carbon dioxide comes from the respiration of all living things, and from forest fires, decaying vegetation, and volcanoes, as well as from humans burning fossil fuel. The total amount divides about 50/50 between what nature produces and what people can be blamed for. Hydrocarbons come from growing plants, especially evergreens such as the pines and firs that cause the "blue haze" of the Great Smoky Mountains and other areas where coniferous forests abound. Hydrocarbons also come from various industrial activities and incomplete combustion in automobiles. Both hydrocarbons and methane enter the atmosphere from the "burping" of cows and other ruminants. The contribution of hydrocarbons to our air is also about evenly divided between nature and human activities. Methane comes from swamps, termites, coal mines, and rice paddies. Approximately 90 percent of methane comes from nature and only about 10 percent from human activity.

Contrary Computer Models

These gases have always been present in the atmosphere, but in total they have been increasing during the last century. Carbon dioxide, the most carefully measured, has increased 25 percent since the Industrial Revolution. The current rate of increase in carbon dioxide plus the other greenhouse gases is about 1 percent a year. Assuming this rate continues, the amount of greenhouse gases will double in this century.

According to the leading computer models of climate

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scientists, the rise in carbon dioxide concentration since the middle of the 19th century should have caused measurable warming of 1 to 5 degrees centigrade (2 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit). But it hasn't! The temperature has oscillated and the overall rise is in the range of 0.3 to 0.7 degrees centigrade. (Nobody knows what has happened in the Southern Hemisphere, which is 90 percent ocean, because oceanic temperature measurements are so scarce.)

Recall that the public furor started June 1988, when NASA scientist James Hansen testified in the U.S. Senate that the greenhouse effect was here and changing the climate. He said he was 99 percent sure of it and that "1988 would be the warmest year on record...unless there is some remarkable, improbable cooling in the remainder of the year." Well, there was. (Ask them in Alaska!) While Hansen was testifying, the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean cooled drastically. The temperature dropped 7 degrees quite suddenly and is now at near-record lows. No one knows why. The phenomenon is called La Niña, to contrast it with the warmer El Niño current. Such cooling has occurred 19 times in the last 102 years. But Hansen didn't consider La Niña because his computer model didn't take sea temperatures into account even though sea water covers 73 percent of Earth's surface. When a NASA scientist talks "global" it's hard to imagine that he would ignore 73 percent of the globe's surface—but he did.

Another possible explanation for the absence of the warming predicted by the computer models: both carbon dioxide and water vapor have several absorption bands besides the infrared. While longwave (infrared) radiation may be kept *in*, some shorter waves of the incoming solar radiation may be kept *out* (by the combined effect of carbon dioxide and water) so that less heat becomes available to be trapped in the first place. Nature has many feedback and self-regulating mechanisms of which this is only one.

Eddy's Sun Spots

There also may be cosmic forces at work that influence Earth temperatures more than does the greenhouse effect. John Eddy of the National Center for Atmospheric Research has found an interesting correlation between decades of low sunspot activity and cold periods such as the "Little Ice Age" of the 17th century, when there was a virtual absence of sunspot activity between 1645 and 1715. (During the winter of 1683-84, recorded in the novel *Lorna Doone*, the trees of Somerset could be heard bursting in the cold.) Conversely, Eddy found that decades of high sunspot activity coincided with warm temperatures on Earth. If Eddy's theory holds up, the high solar activity of the mid-20th century accounts for the period's unusual warmth, and Earth may soon enter a slow return to colder temperatures. (Ice ages recur about every 10,000 to 12,000 years, and it is now 11,000 years since the last one.)

While most environmentalists blame deforestation and the burning of fossil fuel for the carbon dioxide increase, they generally fail to take into account the role of volcanoes in affecting the composition of the atmosphere. We are currently near the peak of a 500-to-600-

Washington State Tourism Division

Volcanoes such as Mount St. Helens are responsible for some of the increase in carbon dioxide.

year cycle of volcanic activity, which may have something to do with the carbon dioxide increase. The quantity of air-polluting materials produced by man during his entire existence on Earth does not begin to equal the quantities of toxic gases and particulates spewed forth into the atmosphere from just three volcanic eruptions: Krakatau in Indonesia in 1883, Mount Katmai in Alaska in 1912, and Hekla in Iceland in 1947. Mount St. Helens pumped out 910,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide during six months in 1982, not including the eruption.

Switch to Nuclear

Despite the uncertainty about whether we are now experiencing global warming, it is prudent to reduce the production of greenhouse gases through human activity. Because no one really knows what the ultimate consequences of the increases in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases might be, we should reduce man's contribution wherever possible. While there is no need to take draconian measures that would damage our standard of living, there are several things we can do.

For starters, we can phase out the use of fossil fuel for generating electricity and turn to technology with no known adverse impact on the atmosphere—nuclear power. We can shift to an essentially all-electric economy. We can turn, once again, to electric buses and trains and eventually to electric automobiles. For air travel we could

We should do what we can to reduce our own carbon dioxide contribution—proper stewardship of the Earth demands nothing less.

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Reforestation is far more effective in carbon dioxide reduction than preservation of existing forests.

replace fossil fuels with hydrogen. New ceramics materials and ceramics-metal compounds can overcome the former problem of embrittlement resulting from the absorption of hydrogen into metal. Recent advances in storage technology promise to ease the necessity for large, heavy, high-pressure, low-temperature hydrogen storage tanks.

Sapling Hopes

We can also take advantage of photosynthesis to absorb carbon dioxide and produce oxygen. Those who urge preservation of old growth, or "climax," forests on the basis of their contribution to the oxygen-carbon dioxide balance in the atmosphere overlook the fact that old trees metabolize far less rapidly than young ones (like humans and most living things). Indeed, old trees contribute little to removing carbon dioxide or producing oxygen, whereas a forest of young trees will remove carbon dioxide from the air at a rate of five or six tons per acre. Reforestation, therefore, is far more effective in carbon dioxide reduction than is preservation of existing forests. We should also vastly increase the use of plants in urban areas, where air pollution is usually worse than in rural regions.

In considering possible carbon dioxide mitigating actions, it is important to keep in mind that these steps are feasible for an advanced, highly technical industrialized society with plenty of electricity. Around the world, however, fossil fuel burning will inevitably continue for many years. In China, for example, 936 million metric tons of coal were burned in 1987-88. Who is going to tell them to stop or to change? What alternatives do they have? No matter what we do in the United States, or even throughout the Western world, the carbon dioxide from man-made sources is bound to rise. Should global warming occur, it is estimated that no nation, acting alone, could affect it by more than 10 percent. We should nevertheless do what we can to reduce our own carbon dioxide contribution—proper stewardship of the Earth demands nothing less.

To do so, we need not be panicked into precipitous and costly "corrective" actions that only reduce our standard of living. We can phase out fossil fuels—replacing them with nuclear power and other fuels such as hydrogen—in a deliberate, responsible way. We can also plant lots of trees.

Apocalypse No

A final note on the supposedly dire consequences of a global temperature rise of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees centigrade over the next 50 years: Such a climate change, should it occur, is not nearly so drastic a change for humans as a move by an Alaskan to Palm Springs. Elevated temperatures would have greater impact on agriculture and vegetation in general. But with plants, temperature is hardly the only determinant of growth. Perhaps as important are the duration and quality of light (latitude is significant here), soil moisture, and the amounts, timing, and duration of rainfall, and the possibilities for irrigation. A warmer Earth—and the changes in rainfall that might accompany it—would make some areas of farmland more fertile or less fertile than today. But that hardly constitutes global environmental doom.

Nor do the predictions of melting ice caps and possible inundation of low-lying areas. Most weather specialists predict that a global temperature rise of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees centigrade—enough to dislodge Antarctic ice submerged under the surface—would cause the sea level to rise by one and a half to four and a half feet. Should this happen, a number of cities would be vulnerable to flooding of the sort that Venice and Holland have coped with for centuries. Some beachfronts would be gradually moved back a few miles, and some people would have to move. The inconvenience of all this should not be minimized, but it is hardly apocalypse.

Is a global warming on the way? Maybe sometime, but it is not here now. Why do so many people believe in the dire forecasts? Perhaps the historian Hans Morgenthau was right when he wrote in 1946, "The intellectual and moral history of mankind is the story of insecurity, of the anticipation of impending doom, of metaphysical anxieties." John Maddox, editor of the British journal *Nature*, says, "But these days there also seems to be an underlying cataclysmic sense among people. Scientists don't seem to be immune to this."

High solar activity, not the greenhouse effect, may account for the unusual warmth of the mid-20th century.

Well, they ought to be. What the greenhouse debate needs most is a dose of healthy skepticism. ☎

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Reagan's Place in History



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HARRY BECK'S EARTHQUAKE

The Coming Dues-Payers' Revolt Against Organized Labor

REED LARSON

In June 1988, the Supreme Court handed down a far-reaching decision that clarifies the rights of employees and may sharply reduce the political power of organized labor. The Court ruled in *Beck* v. *Communications Workers of America (CWA)* that employees do not have to pay union dues for anything other than collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance procedures. Since most union dues now go for political rather than bargaining-related purposes, the 15.4 million Americans who currently work under compulsory union contracts now have the option of reducing their dues by as much as a half or more.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has so far failed to inform employees of their rights under the *Beck* decision. But once employees learn that they can save half or more of their union dues and fees (which average $330 a year), we can expect a dues-payers' revolt with serious political consequences. Last year, unions gave $35.5 million in cash to candidates for federal office—most of them left-of-center and most of them Democratic—plus unknown, but probably similar, amounts to state and local candidates. Another $100 million to $350 million was given in in-kind contributions such as free printing or voter registration drives. Since union members are increasingly conservative—with 45 percent voting for Reagan in 1984 and 33 percent for Bush in 1988—we can expect growing numbers to restrict their dues to bargaining-related activities. Other employees may opt out not for political reasons but simply to save some money.

The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation launched the *Beck* case more than 13 years ago when Harry Beck, a CWA member and former union shop steward from La Plata, Maryland, asked if we could help right what he and some of his coworkers perceived to be a terrible wrong: the expenditure of dues they were required to pay under the union's contract with AT&T and its then-subsidiary Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. to promote political candidates and causes they opposed.

The federal district court in Baltimore agreed with Beck, ruling in 1979 that the use of compulsory "agency fees" to finance union officials' political, ideological, and other nonbargaining activities violates the rights of objecting non-members. So did a three-member panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1985; the entire Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision on statutory grounds in 1986.

Then last year, in a 5-to-3 majority opinion by Justice William Brennan, the Supreme Court affirmed Beck's earlier victories. It ruled that workers covered by "union security" arrangements can be required to pay only a prorated amount of union dues equivalent to the amount of their money union officials spend on three activities—collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance proceedings. Collecting or spending compulsory dues money for anything else—politics, parties, picnics, participation in Labor Day parades, you name it—is prohibited.

79 Percent Refund

The *Beck* decision will not affect workers' rights in the 21 states that have right to work laws. In these states, you cannot be required to pay union dues as a condition of employment. In the District of Columbia and 29 states without right to work laws, employees can be required to pay union dues for collective bargaining.

Many union contracts go further, often with the help of misinformation from employers and the NLRB, and say that holding a job depends on union membership. But in fact, in 1963 the Supreme Court ruled in *NLRB* v. *General Motors Corp.* that employees can be required to pay only the equivalent of union dues and initiation fees; they don't have to join the union, participate in union activities, obey union by-laws, submit to union "discipline," or take part in strikes, picketing, slowdowns, or even the annual union picnic.

The *Beck* decision clarifies this earlier ruling, spelling out what fees and assessments can be required under the law from an employee who pays only dues without joining the union.

After exhaustive discovery proceedings and two lengthy trials, a "special master" appointed by the trial

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court in the *Beck* case found that CWA officials had been using just a fraction of the money collected from members and non-member dues-payers—21 cents out of every dollar—for bargaining-related activities. Beck and his coplaintiffs could therefore get 79 percent of their money back. Indeed, in both the *Beck* case and the more recently settled case of Steve Havas against CWA (a New York case practically identical in fact and law to the *Beck* case), the union agreed to refund employees 100 percent of all the fees they had paid, plus 10 percent interest, in order to avoid further litigation.

The 21 percent finding in *Beck* is not atypical. In another case still in litigation (after 11 years), *James P. Lehnert* v. *Ferris Faculty Association,* involving a National Education Association union affiliate, a Michigan judge found that only 10 percent of the union dues collected during the 1981-82 academic year could be shown to have been spent on legitimate collective bargaining and related activities. If this holds up, plaintiffs will be able to get 90 percent of their money back.

In a number of similar cases, slipshod union bookkeeping methods have made it impossible for courts to determine how union dues are allocated and spent. In these cases the courts have ordered a full refund because the burden of proof is on the union officials, not the employees.

Backbone of the Democratic Party

The political consequences of the *Beck* decision could be devastating to left-of-center candidates and causes. Only 17 percent of the working population belongs to unions today—down from 36 percent in 1945. But organized labor, still the most powerful political machine in America, remains the backbone of the Democratic Party. The unions spend $3.8 billion a year on payroll—more than $10 million a day. That's a lot of man- and woman-power when it's diverted—as much of it routinely is—to political campaigning, lobbying, organizing political protest marches and rallies, and similar activities, sometimes for weeks and even months at a time.

Unlike any other special interest involved in politics, unions provide unlimited in-kind contributions: thousands of union staffers who simultaneously serve as political campaign staffers, union-financed services that are made available to candidates, allegedly nonpartisan get-out-the-vote drives, union-staffed phone banks, printing, mailing, publicity. While it is impossible to put an exact dollar value on these in-kind contributions, election-year estimates range from $100 million to more than $350 million.

No steps have been taken by the National Labor Relations Board to inform employees of their full rights under the law.

The Supreme Court ruled that Harry Beck does not have to pay union dues for political causes he opposes.

Imagine, then, the political consequences of a dues-payers' revolt. Two to three million Americans working in union shops already have opted not to join their union and instead only to pay agency fees. If thousands, or tens of thousands, or a million working people insisted on not paying that portion of their fees being used for nonbargaining purposes, AFL-CIO and other union officials would have more than a rebellion on their hands; they would have a political catastrophe that would force them to sharply curtail political spending and lobbying.

Read Them Their Rights

Union officials, of course, have no particular incentive to broadcast news of the *Beck* decision. Nor do employers; they don't want to risk trouble with their unions.

No steps have been taken by the National Labor Relations Board to inform employees of their full rights under the law. The NLRB requires employers to post several kinds of notices on bulletin boards; it ought to do the same for the *Beck* decision. America today makes a fetish of reading criminals their rights. Why not require employers similarly to "read" employees their rights?

It is also essential that the NLRB correct its actively misleading statements. For example, a NLRB pamphlet on union representation elections, with the catchy title "Your Government Conducts an Election for You—On the Job," advises working men and women that the NLRB "is the agency of the United States Government which protects" their right to "form, join, or assist labor organizations." It also tells them, contrary to the Supreme

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Jacquelyn M. Crickey

Steve and Susan Havas each received refunds of $8,000 from the CWA in a lawsuit similar to Beck's.

Court ruling of 1963, that they have the right to "refuse" to do so, except "in a State where...agreements are permitted...requiring employees to join the union." Another NLRB brochure, "A Guide to Basic Law and Procedures under the National Labor Relations Act," similarly advises workers of their right to join or refrain from joining unions "except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment."

A Victory for Civil Liberties

More important than the political consequences of the *Beck* decision is its clarification of the civil liberties of working people. Why should a liberal Minnesota truck driver, because he is required to pay compulsory agency shop dues to the Teamsters union, be forced to help elect Republican presidential candidates? Similarly, why should a conservative California construction worker have his forced dues used to support liberal political candidates or causes?

Quoting from its 1961 decision in *International Association of Machinists* v. *Street,* the Supreme Court in Beck addressed the political liberties issue squarely: "Congress did not intend to provide the unions with a means for forcing employees, over their objection, to support political causes which they oppose." But the practice will continue as long as union officials are permitted to get away with it—until either an aroused public opinion or enough rank-and-file dues-payers demand a halt to the practice.

Many liberals who otherwise are thankful for and rely heavily on organized labor's political muscle are convinced on the more narrow question of individual rights that the use of compulsory dues for politics is indeed an injustice. Attorney Joseph Rauh, for example, one of the guiding forces behind Americans for Democratic Action in its heyday and a staunch political ally of union officials for many decades, argued during the internal mineworkers union struggles of the late 1970s that "The labor movement ought to have a program for giving back political expenditures to those members who don't want their money spent that way."

California Showdown

Many working men and women are willing union members and are quite happy with the way union officers are spending their money. I have no quarrel with them, and wish them well.

It's just as obvious, however, that thousands, perhaps millions, of men and women are union dues payers only because they will end up in the unemployment line—or think they will end up in the unemployment line—if they stop. It is their rights about which we are concerned. Nationally, the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation is already representing some 4,200 plaintiffs in 300 active political-spending cases. Several of these cases are class-action suits, with one Pennsylvania case affecting 18,000 employees.

As the *Miami Herald* wrote following the *Beck* decision: "The court's wise decision doesn't prevent unions from playing a vigorous role in politics, but it does institute some needed checks and balances. It will force the unions to be more accountable for their spending. Best of all, it will free workers of conscience such as Harry Beck from having to contribute indirectly to causes and candidates that they abhor."

That's right, of course, as a theoretical statement. The *Beck* decision does provide needed checks and balances and does "free workers" from having to support candidates and causes they personally oppose. But as a result of NLRB inaction, most rank-and-file workers aren't aware of their rights.

Later this summer we will begin a year-long public information campaign to inform working men and women of Harry Beck's hard-fought victory and what it means to them. We have chosen to test our strategy in California, a non-right-to-work state with approximately 2.2 million union members. Public records indicate that California locals had total revenues of $771 million last year. We don't know how many union members will join the dues-payers' revolt when they know more about the *Beck* decision. But, at the very least, rank-and-file workers deserve to know their legal rights.

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

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

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Jim Baker's "Folly"

The Seward Model for Relieving Mexico's Debt Crisis

Donald Grunewald

Ever since Peter Minuit bought the island of Manhattan for $24 from the Canarsie Indians in 1626, the history of America has been marked by successive land purchases. Even when such land-for-cash swaps were poorly received—as when critics derided the 1867 purchase of Alaska from the debt-ridden Russian czar, labeling it "Seward's Folly"—they often proved far-sighted, benefitting all parties involved. While the *New York World* lamented Secretary of State William H. Seward's successful completion of the Alaska purchase, saying "Russia has sold us a sucked orange," and another contemporary commentator called the deal "an egregious blunder, a bad bargain, palmed off on a silly administration by the shrewd Russians," few would later doubt the wisdom of an investment that paid for itself many times over in tax revenues, while shoring up U.S. security.

Baja California Dreamin'

Today, a prime candidate for this kind of bold initiative is Baja (Lower) California. Faced with an international debt of more than $100 billion, Mexico finds it extremely difficult even to service the interest on what it owes, despite periodic attempts by the holders of the debt—mostly U.S. banks—to ease the burden by stretching out the payment period and even lowering the interest rates. Neither the Baker nor the Brady plans have succeeded in this restructuring. What is really needed is a "Seward's Folly" for the 1990s. Perhaps Secretary of State James Baker should start negotiations with Mexico for the sale of Baja California to the U.S.; in return, the U.S. would assume some or all of Mexico's international debt. Although this move certainly would be attacked, "Baker's Folly" would come to be seen as a creative solution to Mexico's problems, with tangible benefits for the U.S.

Unlike most debt-relief proposals to date, this new Baker Plan involves no risk to American banks, currently under pressure to repudiate Mexican debts, and requires no unrequited sacrifices by U.S. taxpayers, who would ultimately foot the bill were the U.S. government to bail out Mexico. Instead, like earlier land purchases, establishment of this new American outpost would be a boon to us and to our southern neighbors.

Baja California, which is for the most part detached from "mainland" Mexico, is sparsely populated and contributes little to the Mexican economy under present government policies. Its sale would allow Mexico to redeploy resources now used to service its international debt to projects that would help meet the needs of its rapidly growing population.

The United States would benefit immensely from the debt equity swap by securing a more financially stable southern neighbor and deflecting the risk of possible collapse of major U.S. banks if Mexico were to default. Not only would a stable Mexico not have to export so many people to the U.S. to relieve its economic problems, but it would also be less likely to succumb to some extreme form of totalitarianism.

Under the advantages of American democracy and free enterprise, Baja California would blossom into another Florida or Southern California, and the purchase cost of Baja California would quickly be recouped through tax revenues resulting from the growth in the economy. Who knows—perhaps the example of the successful transformation of Baja California from desert to flourishing agricultural and tourist center would even lead to emulation of democracy and free enterprise by Mexico and other developing countries.

Historical Precedents

Such a debt equity swap would be just one of a series of purchases critical to American history:

• The first such swap occurred in 1803 with the Louisiana Purchase. President Thomas Jefferson, concerned that such a strong military power as France controlled the Mississippi River, the outlet for much of America's produce, and that the U.S. might be drawn into European wars, persuaded the Congress to appropriate $2 million to buy New Orleans and sent envoys Robert Livingston and James Monroe to approach Napoleon about purchasing the vital port. Unsure that France could defend New Orleans from a British naval attack and in dire need of money to buy armaments,

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Baja California has over a thousand miles of spectacular coastline.

Napoleon offered the entire Louisiana Territory to the U.S. for $15 million. Despite doubts about the constitutionality of such a purchase, Congress ratified the deal, doubling the size of U.S. territory.

- In 1819, Spain sold Florida and claims to Oregon to the United States for $5 million and the abandonment of U.S. claims to Texas under the Louisiana Purchase.
- In 1848, the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Mexico, which needed money after the secession of Texas and its defeat in the Mexican War, ceded Texas, California, and much of New Mexico and Arizona to the United States for $15 million and the payment of certain claims.
- In 1854, Jefferson Davis, who was Secretary of War under President Franklin Pierce, persuaded Congress to purchase the Gila River Valley of what is now southern Arizona from Mexico. The $10 million Gadsden Purchase made possible the economical construction of a transcontinental railroad to California along a southern route.
- In 1898, at the end of the Spanish-American War as part of the treaty of peace, the United States purchased Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines from Spain for $20 million.
- In 1917, the United States entered into its last debt equity swap to date with the purchase from Denmark of the Danish West Indies (Virgin Islands). Denmark, worried that either the Allied Powers or Germany would seize these islands during the war, preferred the $25 million payment to the risk of losing the islands without compensation. The U.S. desired the Virgin Islands ports to protect the Panama Canal.

Agricultural Eden

Debt equity swaps have generally benefited both the United States and the seller. All of the purchases except the Philippines (which was given self government before World War II and independence after the war) have been retained by the U.S., and all have flourished under democracy and free enterprise.

A similar debt equity swap with Mexico could prove of equal benefit to both the United States and Mexico. Baja California has over a thousand miles of spectacular coastline that could sustain a flourishing tourist trade, and, if water could be made available economically, it could become an agricultural paradise on the order of Upper California's Imperial Valley. Were Secretary of State James Baker to carry out the purchase of Baja California, perhaps "Baker's Folly," too, would go down in the history books as an act of far-sighted wisdom.

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A Guide to Media Newsletters

Reviewed by Tim W. Ferguson

For at least 20 years conservatives have loudly charged that the press is biased against them and acts as a tool of liberal legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups. Their accusations reached new decibel levels of stridency during the Reagan presidency. Liberals have countercharged that the media fawned over a popular president and have been intimidated by right-wing critics. What all sides might agree is that freedom of the press is a wonderful thing, and it includes the freedom to have at the press.

Within the print trade, at least, there's sentiment favoring self-policing. Media columns have been a mainstay of the "alternative" weeklies found in many cities. Several large newspapers and magazines have reporters specializing in the press, and television is examining its own coverage a bit more. And, of course, the *Columbia Journalism Review*, the *Washington Journalism Review*, and, to a lesser extent, *Editor & Publisher*, *Broadcasting*, *TV Guide*, *The Quill*, and *Presstime* act as established consciences of the press.

But consumers of news increasingly are getting into the act. Self-described "media gourmet" Jude Wanniski now publishes *The Media Guide*, an annual guide to bylines and publications, and Midge Decter's Committee for the Free World puts out a monthly newsletter, *Contentions*, that in assessing the popular culture dissects and excoriates articles in magazines and other publications. More focused are a handful of specialty letters, most desk-top published with a decidedly political intent, providing some spicy analyses of both print and broadcast media.

A cottage industry is at work, and conservatives are its best customers. The publishers rely on corporate, foundation, or individual donations, membership dues in the sponsoring organizations, or subscription revenue; none carries advertising.

AIM

The *AIM Report*, begun in 1972, is the oldest. Put out twice a month by Reed Irvine's Accuracy in Media group, the *AIM Report* usually gives a single topic (such as the mishandling of a particular story by the media in general or by a particular news organization) the full four-page treatment. Mr. Irvine also includes one or two additional pages of "Notes from the Editor's Cuff" in each issue, following up on earlier subjects or flagging some recent outrage.

The depth of the featured reports distinguishes the *AIM Report*. They usually cover a recent special program or news event (the troubles of Vietnam veterans, the vice presidential debate, or a made-for-TV movie or miniseries loaded with political content). Broadcasting is examined more often than the printed press. Essays may draw on Cold War history to set straight an alleged distortion of past or present events. An effort is usually made to gain explanations from journalists or their supervisors, and apparent contradictions, waffling, or stonewalling are exploited.

Foreign policy is usually the focus; economics, rarely. The *AIM Report* pays particular attention to news or entertainment shows that cast aspersions on the CIA, the FBI, or U.S. military operations. Anti-conservative bias or liberal blundering have been the targets of the *AIM Report* so far, although in January, Irvine's organization hired Joseph Goulden, a former journalist and unflattering biographer of a hero to many anti-Communists, the *New York Times*' A. M. Rosenthal.

AIM is an advocate—it has raised money for Oliver North and for Richard Secord's libel suit over a book by Leslie Cockburn—and is explicit about how members can put the information in each issue to use. The last section is traditionally headed "What You Can Do." Usually this involves writing to the heads of broadcast or print organizations, who are assumed at least to desire to quiet protests if not to have a genuine sense of fair play, or to their advertisers, generally depicted as politically naïve or worse but potentially responsive to customer complaints. Addresses often are included, and sometimes pre-written postcards are enclosed for the incensed but lazy.

Mr. Irvine claims some victories as a result of this pressure. In a row last year in which *AIM* played a role, CBS deleted from subsequent airings of a "Mighty Mouse" cartoon a scene in which the redoubtable rodent appeared to be snorting a cocaine-like substance. A network oversight official was out of a job in the wake of the affair, although CBS denied blame and said no implication of drug use was intended. Also, after extended bashing of both the Public Broadcasting Service and Ted Turner, an AIM documentary on press coverage of the Vietnam war was shown on some PBS outlets and on Turner's TBS Superstation.

After news department shakeups in recent years, both CBS and ABC have grown uncommunicative with him, Irvine said in an interview. But he's put one notch on his shotgun: the further decline of the documentary. "Some people say that's too bad, but seeing how bad they were in terms of being one-sided tracts, I can't mourn their demise too much," he said, adding that AIM's nudging of advertisers led some to steer their agencies away from such programs, which always hurt for backing.

TIM W. FERGUSON *is editorial features editor of the* Wall Street Journal.

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Irvine finds two different sources of media bias: the "missionary" journalists who are basically hostile to capitalism and American interests in foreign affairs, and the "fair-minded" camp of the basically liberal press, who are conscientious but are "naturally more interested in some things than in other things" and are more amenable to "facts which support their views than to those that conflict with their views." But it is not always clear into which groups AIM places the individuals singled out in its reports.

Sometimes Irvine beats a subject flat. Yet where he has been a guerrilla fighter, finding the weak spots and attacking with persistence, Irvine and his *AIM Report* have recorded more visible gains than when he has tried to make a scene, as with last year's crude "Impeach Dan Rather" petition drive.

MediaWatch

The monthly *MediaWatch* leans more toward short items ("Newsbites") that indicate a liberal bias, but develops them enough to not come across as cheap shots. The newsletter, established in 1987 by L. Brent Bozell III (a nephew of William F. Buckley Jr.), is mainly concerned with television. This lively read frequently compares a particular correspondent's or network's handling of a story with the competition's. *MediaWatch* showcases two longer items each issue, one of them the "Janet Cooke Award" (named after the *Washington Post* reporter whose Pulitzer Prize-winning story on an eight-year-old heroin addict turned out to be fabricated) for "the most outrageously distorted story of the month." Winners through early this year included broadcast journalists from all the major networks except CNN (although Ted Turner himself won for some Soviet syrup on TBS).

The editors also attempt some ambitious quantitative analyses, finding, for instance, that in coverage of the Democratic convention CBS showed more bias than the other three commercial networks. The most valuable contribution of *MediaWatch*, however, is its "Revolving Door" feature. This rundown of personalities moving between political and media jobs gives readers a feel for the increasing interchange between those two worlds. Although conservatives seem to be duly included when their times come, the point of "Revolving Door" is to show how strikingly frequent are the tie-ins with liberal Democrats. *MediaWatch* also highlights the often overlooked but powerful behind-the-camera posts, such as the producers.

While *MediaWatch* looks only for liberal bias or blunders, its sprightly writing and apparent conscientiousness (it, too, calls media figures and presses them for answers) can leave even a politically unsympathetic reader enriched. Lapses do occur, however, such as the wrongheaded reference in last September's issue to "usually liberal" *Newsweek* economics columnist Robert Samuelson.

Brent Bozell concedes a point often argued by his adversaries, that "some people confuse poor journalism with media bias." But he maintains the problem goes beyond shallow sound bites to "the liberal media's cultural misunderstanding of the American scene." He singles out CBS economics correspondent Ray Brady, who he says is "obsessed with bad news," and "culturally opposed to the free-market system as espoused by Ronald Reagan and culturally disposed in favor of big government." A *MediaWatch* staffer who conversed with Brady in conjunction with one attack on him says he suggested the broadcaster add conservative columnist Warren Brookes to his reading diet and that Brady replied, "Who's he?"

Contacted at CBS, Brady replied that his coverage was no more negative than that in the *Wall Street Journal*'s news section or the business press in general. "Several years ago I predicted there would be a recession [early in the Reagan presidency]. That's when all this started," Brady said. "My objection to these people is that they are very narrow, always looking for negative coverage. If you do a story that's positive—I did a series last year on America competing with the rest of the world that was very positive—they never mention it." As for Brookes, "I still don't know who he is." Brady asked, "I read George Will—is he not conservative? I read Safire—is he not conservative?"

Extra!

Extra! was started nearly two years ago. Its editor is Martin A. Lee, who's written a book on the CIA as well as investigative stories for *Mother Jones* and the *Village Voice.* The sponsoring organization FAIR, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, is headed by Jeff Cohen, a former ACLU attorney and interest-group publicist. Unlike the other newsletter publishers, FAIR highlights an advisory board of notables, including actors Ed Asner and Daryl Hannah, press guru Ben Bagdikian, Helen Caldicott, Noam Chomsky, radicalized dee-jay Casey Kasem, Maggie Kuhn of the Grey Panthers, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and Studs Terkel.

The founders evidently were tired of the Right enjoying an "exclusive dialectic" with the media. The mission of eight-times-yearly *Extra!* is to wield "a sharper edge," Cohen said in an interview, because the media were continuing to "suck up to power" despite years of critiques by liberal organs such as the *Columbia Journalism Review.* Cohen, Lee, and various free-lancers from the left press and the academy develop even-toned mini-essays, often on what they see to be a Cold War or jingoistic mindset in the press. Coverage of the KAL shootdown is compared with that of Iran Air. Nicaragua is found to get more critical attention than its neighbors. "We've driven the *New York Times* up the wall on Central America," Cohen boasted. An extraordinarily detailed "Editor's Note" in the *New York Times* last summer on an earlier, apparently bogus account of killings by Salvadoran guerrillas was greatly the result of pressure by FAIR and other critics on the left, Cohen maintained. FAIR also drew considerable notice with its criticism of a paucity of left-wing guests on ABC's "Nightline."

To its credit, the publication in July-August 1988 featured a barb at the lack of coverage of "the Jim Wright scandal" (it was rightly concerned that the hullabaloo over Wright's book deal was diverting attention from the savings-and-loan sleaze, although the implicit Left agenda here was the vagaries of financial deregulation). Whatever the motivation, it was unexpected to see Wright, a favorite of the Left for his opposition to Contra aid, used as evidence of journalistic neglect. (He was

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defended in the following issue, however, when criticized in the press for alleging that the CIA aided political opponents of the Sandinistas.) By contrast, right-wing media letters too often act as if they're out to protect the good name of all Republican politicians and appointees.

Of course, *Extra!* is disposed to focusing on the familiar overseas bugbears of the Left, those authoritarian regimes generally thought to be "pro-Western." While it often rightly decries an absence of coverage of some stories at home and abroad, its political agenda blinds it to other disparities, such as the pronounced over-coverage of South Africa (now only in the print press; television has been effectively censored) relative to the horrors elsewhere on the continent.

FAIR has decried what it sees as an overrepresentation of right-wing commentators in the media. But when it comes to news, "inquiring into the reporter's mind is beside the point," Cohen said. The product tells the story. Coverage is not distorted out of conscious bias; rather, journalists miss genuine news because they are prisoners of their white, prosperous, and too-often male perspectives of the world, regardless of their politics, or they tend to be too timid or slothful and accept the word of their primary sources—manipulative officers of the U.S. government.

Looking for conservatives slanting the news in most of the prestige press might not be fruitful because there aren't many, playing it straight or otherwise. But *Extra!* does catch some history being rewritten at the Left's expense, as when it correctly pointed out that the idealized, conventional memory of Martin Luther King Jr. that appears in the mainstream press each year on his birthday overlooks the radical stances King took in his final years.

Between the Lines

Between the Lines, a West Coast monthly that calls itself "The Conservative Watchdog of the Establishment Media," appeared at the start of 1988. One comes away wondering how editor Joseph Farah must have found his former news post at the trendy-secular-liberal Los Angeles *Herald-Examiner*. He is a New Right warrior from the "Second Thoughts" school of ex-radicals, and takes no prisoners in his 16-page assaults.

Cliff Kincaid has recently joined Farah from Accuracy in Media, and this likely heralds more national media analysis, which hasn't been an area of comparative advantage for this publication given the conservative competition out there. Where *Between the Lines* is gradually finding its niche is in examining the entertainment industry and its growing political pull and interplay. (The *MediaWatch* publishers have begun their own cheeky, fact-filled look at Hollywood, a bi-monthly called *TV etc.*) Farah's bird-dogging of Tom Hayden's career has managed to bring some fresh analysis to that oft-told story. With an eye to his old political comrades, Farah also has a regular feature on "The Left Press" that gives early warning on notions germinating in that resurgent sector that may soon work their way into mainstream media. The *L.A. Weekly*, an increasingly prominent outpost of the Left, is within easy sight. Perhaps a "Revolving Door"-type feature (actually more "Entry Way") would be appropriate here to call attention to the seemingly increasing transit from the Left press to the big time.

Between the Lines is more concerned than the other letters with what it sees as an unremitting media attack on religious values and practices, and this, too, could be a good niche. Otherwise the focus is mostly foreign policy, and the tendency is to associate the political Left with the interests and designs of Communists. This is likely to discomfit some readers—one wrote to say he liked the substance of the reports but not the style of presentation. Surely the hammer is used too often where the sickle might do, and *Between the Lines* could benefit from a better sense of humor and irony.

In a lead item in May 1988 headlined "Why the Media Hate America," Farah wrote: "Part of the answer is that the '60s generation is now firmly in control." His contemporaries, he continued, grew up with street and campus demonstrations, Watergate, and the general trashing of American institutions. At the same time, they were impressed by the growing power of the press to effect radical change. "In the '60s, there was a lot of talk about revolution. Today, because the activists have captured the media, the revolution they sought is practically a reality."

Unfortunately, *Between the Lines* offers only anecdotal and limited evidence to back up such sweeping pronouncements: reader agreement is assumed. Farah warms up his audience with a bundle of syndicated political cartoons—the desired humor component if one finds today's editorial cartoonists to be generally clever. The space instead could be devoted to keeping tabs on the *Los Angeles Times*, one of the nation's biggest, most liberal, and most influential papers, but one that barely draws notice on the East Coast and hence in Eastern media letters.

Media Monitor

Media Monitor is the product of Robert and Linda Lichter's Center for Media and Public Affairs in Washington, D.C. The two-year-old publication takes one issue each month, such as the fighting in the Persian Gulf or the "Quayle Hunt" that commenced at the GOP convention, and breaks it down into several sub-issues in the television coverage. Then, using the Lichters' methodology for classifying content and "spin" of broadcasts, it quantifies the preponderance of bias in coverage. Although this tells us little about the personalities and processes of journalism, it does give what the other evaluations do not: an overall measurement, the big picture. The result can be a good complement to all of the inside stories of neglect and distortion, but readers must trust the social scientists to distill the information appropriately. At least one instance raised concern that sufficient care wasn't being extended to anecdotal illustrations. Bill Blakemore's close on an ABC Labor Day report sympathetic to union positions was quoted incompletely, suggesting that he had voiced an overt opinion that "Congress needs to provide stronger penalties and enforcement to protect new immigrants," when in fact he had attributed it to a (convenient) General Accounting Office report. The gist of the *Media Monitor* barb was correct, but the sleight-of-hand undercut its credibility.

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The Journalist & Financial Reporting

The Journalist & Financial Reporting is a monthly scorecard of scandal and scuttlebutt in the business press. This very expensive ($549 for a year) publication is former *Wall Street Journal* reporter Dean Rotbart's vehicle for bashing ethical, judgmental, and competency lapses by the business press. But by establishing apolitical credibility, Mr. Rotbart may be in an excellent position to evaluate any underlying bias that might crop up—say, for instance, in the coverage of SEC or Justice Department actions against financial firms. (Are the sources on all sides treated with healthy skepticism regarding their potential self-interests?)

Occasionally something of a political note gets in, such as Rotbart's survey of a sample of financial journalists that found less than 10 percent were Republicans and a plurality at the time wanted to see Mario Cuomo as president, or two full-blown discussions of former *Wall Street Journal* and *Los Angeles Times* reporter Kent MacDougall, who revealed years of furtively promoting leftist causes while a mainstream journalist.

Mr. Rotbart also publishes a few "resumes" of leading lights in the business press in each issue, and this always provides a window on potential bias, although rarely do these folks show smoking guns.

AIM Report, Accuracy in Media, 1275 K Street, NW, Suite 1150, Washington, DC 20005. $30/yr.
MediaWatch, Media Research Center, 111 South Columbus Street, Alexandria, VA 22314. $29/yr.
Extra! Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, 130 West 25th Street, New York, NY 10001. $30/yr.
Between the Lines, P.O. Box 2870, Palos Verdes, CA 90274. $29/yr.
Media Monitor, Center for Media and Public Affairs, 2101 L Street, NW, Suite 505, Washington, DC 20037. $18/yr.
The Journalist & Financial Reporting, TJFR Publishing Co., 82 Wall Street, Suite 1105, New York, NY 10005. $549/yr.

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Ayatollah So

The Left's Infatuation with Khomeini

DAVID ROBERTS JR.

They don't like to talk about it now, but 10 years ago the American and European Left were infatuated with the late Ayatollah Khomeini. In the past two years we have seen the Reagan administration quite properly excoriated by its critics, including those on the liberal Left, for selling arms to a terrorist regime in the fatuous hope of winning a measure of good will from the nonexistent moderates within the Iranian government. More recently, we have been treated to the sight of scores of writers, most of them on the left, ardently protesting one of the less outrageous of the Ayatollah Khomeini's many outrages—the public solicitation of Salman Rushdie's assassination for allegedly defaming Islam, a threat that has put Mrs. Thatcher in the invidious position of having to provide police protection to a polemicist who has equated her government with that of Nazi Germany. These developments have tended to obscure the vastly more significant historical fact that the American Left, including some of the same intellectuals who rallied to the defense of Rushdie, was virtually unanimous in its embrace of the Khomeini Revolution during the crucial months of rioting, homicidal arson, and general mayhem that brought it to power.

Nowadays few can recall the reasons that our Progressive intelligentsia and some of our more Third Worldist political figures gave for testifying to the "progressive" character of Khomeini's Islamic theocrats, largely because we have come to accept the spurious notion that the Ayatollah and his followers are essentially "medieval-minded," and nothing else. We have tended to forget in just how many ways the Iranian Revolution was and is "progressive," in the leftist usage of the word, and just how much the worldview of Ali Khamenei has in common with that of Fidel Castro and Oliver Tambo.

Since the Islamic Revolution very rapidly proved itself an unmitigated disaster for both Iran and the civilized world, American progressives felt compelled to jettison this particular piece of political baggage rather more quickly than they discarded their enthusiasms for previous revolutions. The Left has been hoping that the rest of us would forget about its brief infatuation with the Khomeini Revolution, which is all the more reason for preserving bits and pieces of this curious ideological artifact. Here, then, are a few examples illustrating what the Left thought of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979:

Islam's Finest Hour

"What we have in Iran, thus far, is a remarkable revolutionary process with three distinctive features. First of all, it has been a great triumph for the tactic of militant nonviolence...against the organized power of a modern, ruthless state.

"A second feature of the Iranian revolutionary movement is its indigenous quality....We were often told by friends in Iran that this was Islam's 'finest hour.' The Shia tradition within Islam identifies the religious life directly with the struggle against oppression and for social justice. The earliest Shia heroes were martyrs willing to suffer and sacrifice their lives for the achievement of a just social order. In contrast to the dominant Sunni form of Islam,...Shia raises its own funds and considers the poor as its chief constituency.

"The third feature of the revolution is, of course, its religious character. For religion to assume a revolutionary posture is to challenge Western preconceptions that a religious outlook is irrelevant, or even hostile, to social change. The religious core of the Khomeini movement is a call for social justice, fairness in the distribution of wealth, a productive economy organized around national needs, and a simplicity of lifestyle and absence of corruption that minimizes differences between rich and poor, rulers and ruled.

"As Seyyed Javadi, an influential intellectual figure in the movement with a progressive political outlook and close political connections to Khomeini, recently emphasized: 'Our national revolution has a long way to go before achieving final victory.' He added, significantly, that 'Religious and political principles are not our goals, but they are a means of breaking away from despotic rule, corruption, oppression, and dependence on foreign influence.' Whether these goals will be achieved soon remains obscure. At this stage the main obstacle seems to be American interference."

Richard Falk, "Iran's Home-grown Revolution," *The Nation*, February 10, 1979.

DAVID ROBERTS JR. *is a free-lance writer based in Houston, Texas.*

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Thrill to Every Democrat's Heart

"It [The Iranian Revolution] was a victory to thrill a democrat's heart—and a warning to every tyranny in the world from Somoza's to the Kremlin's."

I.F. Stone, "The Lesson of Iran," *The Progressive*, April 1979.

To Establish Social Justice

"The Shah's religious opponents have been equally misrepresented. Dismissing them as Islamic reactionaries is a little like accusing liberal Catholic reformers in Latin America of wanting to bring back the Inquisition. Iran's religious authorities support the National Front's demands for constitutionalism and a neutralist foreign policy. They also want to establish social justice: Outside observers frequently forget that Islam, like Christianity, has a strong strain of social egalitarianism. By ruling through a small, rich, and largely corrupt elite, the Shah has offended the belief in fundamental human equality that many Moslems share. Far from wanting to return Iran to the Middle Ages, many of the Shah's religious opponents want to use tools of modernity to realize their philosophic ideals, which include distributing Iran's oil wealth more equitably, eliminating mass poverty, and taking action against corruption by the ruling elite."

Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crumbling Myth of the Good Shah," *The Progressive*, January 1979.

Manifestly Secular

"...[M]uch of the commentary abroad has focused on the presence in the opposition movement of the religious officials, the mullahs, headed by the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini. It has been commonly said that the opposition is 'reactionary' in character, or that the Shah has encountered opposition by 'going too quickly' in his industrialization programme. Closer study shows, however, that whilst there is a definite religious component in the opposition, its major causes, personnel, and demands are manifestly secular, and that the social opposition to the Shah's programme is based on the grossly unequal, corrupt, and inefficient character of what he has so grandiosely called his 'Shah-people revolution.'

"...Khomeini himself owes his reputation to moral example and not to any special religious promi—nence....Khomeini outside and the religious leaders inside do not themselves want to constitute a government: they see themselves, in a traditional Islamic way, as the moral guides of the community. In a post-shah regime there would no doubt be some mullahs in parliament as there have been in previous periods, but their main power would be an indirect one upon those secular politicians elected to the legislature.

"Without laying undue emphasis on this point, it must be remembered that in previous periods of Iranian history...mullahs gave voice to popular grievances and to nationalist sentiment. Under the last two decades of Pahlavi rule, moreover, the mosque has been the one place to which the population has been able to turn to hear an unofficial point of view and Khomeini's main demand is eminently secular—a restoration of the constitution."

Fred Halliday, "The Coalition Against the Shah," *The New Statesman and Nation*, January 5, 1979.

Some Kind of Saint

"Question: From his statements, it appears that Ayatollah Khomeini is not only anti-Christian, and anti-Jewish, but he is also anti-Baha'i. Does this kind of thing, especially being a minister, worry you?

"Young: Yes, that does worry me. But my own experience with the press leads me to be very sympathetic and understanding and forgiving of the way people are caricatured by the press. I would be willing to bet that in another year or so—it probably won't take that long—Khomeini will be some kind of saint when we finally get over the panic of what is happening there. He is not a man to be dismissed. I certainly cannot agree with what I hear people say he says. But I don't agree with what people say I say either."

Andrew Young, Interview before the National Forum, City University of New York, February 7, 1979.

The Mood in Iran Is Better

"The military expedition that President Carter ordered [to effect the rescue of the embassy hostages] violated international law and endangered the hope for peace. It was as 'humanitarian' as attempted murder....The expedition was apparently prepared to kill people in another nation, whoever got in the way. It is the rule of force and violence—terribly dangerous and absolutely lawless. It was dared only because Iran was weak."

• • • •

"The mood in Iran is much better now. I am optimistic. The people are pained by the continuing hostage crisis, which they know is wrong and which is said to cost them $50 million a day. The mood can be improved even more before the Majlis meets if America has the vision, the courage, and the compassion to act nobly under pressure. The stakes are enormous: 53 precious lives, the destabilization of an incredibly difficult revolution. (Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette as the French Revolution began that he must not expect to be carried from despotism to liberty on a feather pillow.)"

Ramsey Clark, "The Iranian Solution," *The Nation*, June 21, 1980. (Written upon his return from Iran, where Clark participated in the "Crimes of America" trial.)

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LETTERS

Judith A. Best, Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., Donald Devine, Douglas A. Jeffrey, Michael B. Wallace, Samuel T. Francis, Russell Nieli, Sidney Hook, Aaron Wildavsky, Glenn C. Loury, Linda Chavez, Henry J. Abraham, Robert R. Detlefsen, Fred Lee Smith Jr., Robert C. Whitten

Constitutional Winners and Losers

Dear Sir:

Representative Mickey Edwards confuses the winners with the losers at the Constitutional Convention ("Of Conservatives and Kings: The New Monarchism Is an Abdication of Our Principles," Spring 1989). The winners, the Founders properly so called, are those whose position prevailed in the Convention, and their view was that energy in the executive is "a leading character in the definition of good government," in large part because it is the antidote for legislative tyranny. They chose what is today called a presidential system. The losers were the old Whigs, like Mason and Randolph, who saw the "foetus of monarchy" in the energetic, independent executive. The old Whigs preferred a parliamentary system where the legislature is supreme, where it hires and can fire the executive, and where it also serves as the highest court in the land.

Yes, the Founders did fear concentration of powers, but it was fear of the concentration of powers in a republican legislature that produced our separation of powers, that led them to choose a presidential rather than a parliamentary system. Fear of legislative tyranny was the driving force behind the presidential veto, the method of selecting the president, bicam-eralism, the prohibition on legislators holding executive posts, and life tenure for judges.

Mr. Edwards must be reading the *Record of the Federal Convention* backwards, because to read it chronologically is to see that as the days and weeks passed the decisions of the delegates were in the direction of greater power and independence for the executive. Powers that in the early days of the Convention had been assigned to Congress or to one branch were taken away or modified to give the president the initiative.

The Convention took away the treaty-making power and the appointments power initially placed in the Senate and gave these powers to the president, leaving the Senate with merely the power of confirmation/rejection. It could say no, but it could not negotiate its own treaty nor appoint its own candidates to make and implement foreign policy. It could reject a foreign policy but not substitute one of its own, nor was it to direct and manage a foreign policy.

One of the more formidable powers, the power of commander-in-chief, was granted to the president with relatively little discussion because the delegates knew from their own experience that unity of command is the condition of victory. Madison reports in his *Journal of the Federal Convention* that initially Congress had been given the power "to make war" but this was soon diminished to the power "to declare war." On the vote, only two states opposed this change, New Hampshire and Connecticut, but after Rufus King pointed out that "make" war might be interpreted to mean "conduct" war, Ellsworth of Connecticut changed his position and supported this major reduction in the congressional power over war.

It is precisely those wishing to preserve the separation of powers who must disagree with Mr. Edwards, for it is Congress that is intent on destroying it with attacks on the president's constitutional powers such as the omnibus appropriations bill, which vitiates the veto, or the War Powers Act, or its defiance of the Supreme Court's ruling on the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto.

The Most Dangerous Branch

Mr. Edwards' error arises from a failure to understand the difference between two forms of government—monarchy and republic. Tyranny is, as Madison said, the concentration of all power in the same hands, but he went on to say the hands can be those of many, of a collective like Congress, as well as those of one man. In monarchies the king's power is the source of danger, but in republics the legislature is the most dangerous branch. The separation of powers in a republic is designed to control the legislature, which otherwise would hold all power, and so said our Founders: "It is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions."

Judith A. Best
Distinguished Teaching Professor
SUNY—Cortland
Cortland, NY

The Founders' Audacity

Dear Sir:

I would query Representative Edwards' statement that "The Founders...wanted an executive...neither superior to—nor even equal to—the national legislature." To understand the intent of the

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Founders, we need to go back to the 18th century and to the republican tradition the Founders worked with and transformed. The American president was given greater constitutional powers than any republican ruler in history—greater than the Doge of Venice, greater than the Grand Pensionary of the United Provinces (Netherlands), or even the Stadtholder (who turned into a king), greater than the Roman consuls in ancient times or the King of Sparta. In *Federalist* 70 the president

In monarchies the king's power is the source of danger, but in republics the legislature is the most dangerous branch.

—Judith A. Best

is compared to a Roman dictator, that is, an executive during a period of deep crisis, not in ordinary times. Part of the audacity of the Founders' political project was giving a leader powers that earlier had been seized only by men like Julius Caesar during the collapse of republican institutions.

In applying the Founders' rather ambiguous intent to our circumstances, it is important to distinguish between *executive* power and *presidential* power. When the Founders allocated certain powers to the executive branch and some to the legislative, there was no civil service. In the Washington administration, the State Department consisted of Thomas Jefferson, an Assistant Secretary, and two clerks. The growth of vast bureaucracies through which the president carries out his duties has had the effect of recreating within the executive branch one of the problems the Founders saw in the legislative branch: the difficulty of creating a sense of ultimate personal *responsibility* for what we do as a nation and for what happens to us. (I believe the Founders were aware that creating this sense of responsibility in officials is an even greater problem in a political community united not by ethnic and religious identity, but by shared aspirations for individual freedom and opportunity.) Whatever the Founders may have intended in the distribution of powers, they did not intend to withhold powers from the Congress in order to give them to the bureaucracy.

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.
Research Professor of
International Relations
Johns Hopkins Foreign
Policy Institute
Washington, DC

Striking a Balance

Dear Sir:

Representative Edwards thinks conservatives are opportunists: when Congress was conservative in the 1960s, we supported congressional power; now that presidents are more conservative, we support increased executive power, including a line-item veto.

Unfortunately, the congressman must be given a C minus on constitutional history. For Mr. Edwards believes that Article I gives all legislative powers to Congress, whereas the remainder of the document actually distributes power in a manner that makes exceptions to that statement. Otherwise, the rest of the Constitution need never have been written. The Founders were just as concerned about Cromwell's runaway parliament as George III's tyrannical executive.

Congress, indeed, was created the dominant power by the Constitution, and that is precisely why it had to be balanced by executive, judicial, and states' powers. Preeminently, the president was given the power of a legislative veto, the power to say "no" to less than two-thirds of Congress. For the Founders acknowledged that the failure of all previous republics was the inability of their legislatures to refuse special interests. The Founders created a constitution of separated powers which were to balance one another, not a legislative tyranny.

When the bills came due from the Great Society—measured in both funds and riots—Congress reasserted the power systematically taken from it since the New Deal. As the heady optimism of the '60s turned to a nasty pessimism, politics became ruled by a passion to make the other side pay, even to the point of deposing a president—for the first time in history. The executive branch became cautious, even paralyzed, shrinking in fear of John Dingell-like investigations. Few appointees would do much of anything except bow to Congress and its agents in the bureaucracy and the media.

America's Founders were worried about this, too. They tried to create a president with enough "energy" to act, to balance Congress; otherwise, they believed, the system would not work. Their worst fears would be confirmed by the current scene, which finds Congress led by a party that has despaired of electing a president, but intends to rule through its own more powerful branch.

The Power To Say "No"

Today, conservatives look to the line-item veto not to create a monarchical executive, but to recreate the constitutional balance: to give back to the president his power to say "no." For clever men in Congress have found means to evade it, especially by forcing the president to shut down the government if he is to veto the massive continuing resolutions of the present, which include every single appropriation for each agency and program for the whole national government.

But the Founders may have been more clever. The president's Clause 3 power to veto all acts of Congress—not just legislation—may already give the president a line-item veto. Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole, for one, says the president has the power and should use it.

Whatever the Founders may have intended in the distribution of powers, they did not intend to withhold powers from the Congress in order to give them to the bureaucracy.

—Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.

The presidency is by no means the only problem. In a vain attempt to administer the government rather than legislate, Congress has drastically expanded its staff, and presumably will not stop until there are as many staff in the Congress as there are members of the executive.

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If Mr. Edwards needs a separation of powers task to keep his associates busy, how about trying to get congressmen to become legislators rather than pseudo-executives attempting to manage the bureaucracy through intimidation?

Conservatives today do not want more executive power. They simply want an executive who can execute and say "no" and a legislature that represents the citizenry, each branch performing its legitimate constitutional functions.

Donald Devine
Chairman
Citizens for America
Washington, DC

Dear Sir:

While the executive power represented the main threat to liberty in "olde England," in a democracy like ours—where law is king and the executive is, after all, elected—it is the legislative. If Representative Edwards disagrees, he must disagree as well with Hamilton and Madison and Jefferson. I invite him to read *Federalist* 48 and 71, and Query XIII of Jefferson's *Notes on the State of Virginia.*

Mr. Edwards cites Thach's *Creation of the Presidency* in observing that seven of eight state constitutions drafted in 1776-78 subordinated the executive to the legislature. He might go on to finish the book, however, which shows clearly that this subordination proved disastrous, and that having seen this, the Framers in Philadelphia avoided following suit.

Thus, the opposite of what Mr. Edwards writes about Articles I and II of the Constitution is true. Congress's legislative powers in the former, qualified by the words "herein granted," are "well-defined." It's the plenary grant of executive power to the president of which one can say there are "no exceptions."

But more to the point (and more puzzling) than these and other errors of scholarship is Mr. Edwards' obfuscation of the American political scene today. His identification of centralized government, overbearing government, and presidential power on the one hand, and "diffuse" government, limited government, and congressional power on the other, is wrongheaded at first glance and ludicrous at second.

Like many conservatives, Mr. Edwards confuses limited with decentralized government. Tocqueville, one of his authorities, in fact followed the Framers in explicitly favoring strong, centralized government. What Tocqueville feared and abhorred was centralized *administration,* or bureaucracy, which in effect weakens and diffuses government. Thus, today Washington increasingly meddles in the details of our day-to-day lives but can't enforce the Monroe Doctrine or pass an annual budget.

This confusion underlies the *reductio ad absurdum* at the heart of Mr. Edwards' argument. The increasing power of Congress vis-a-vis the president, especially since Watergate—a trend Mr. Edwards regards as happy for limited government—has coincided precisely with the bureaucratization of America.

As *The Imperial Congress* (Pharos Books, 1988) demonstrates at great length, restoring independence and energy to the presidential office is neither an institutional nor a simply partisan concern, as Mr. Edwards suggests. Rather it is the *sine qua non* of a healthy separation of powers, which is itself the key to constitutional, limited government.

It is also the *sine qua non* of Congress itself functioning once again as the Constitution intended, deliberating on the common good and passing general laws rather than feeding and overseeing the federal bureaucracy as part of the corrupt, cynical game of interest-group liberal politics.

Fretting and fuming over "strongmen" at a time when our government is perfectly suited for the sort of tedious hearings covered by C-SPAN but perfectly incapable of controlling America's borders, Mr. Edwards fiddles while Rome burns.

Douglas A. Jeffrey
The Claremont Institute
Claremont, CA

Use It Or Lose It

Dear Sir:

Representative Edwards notes that President Reagan's argument for the line-item veto was undermined by his failure to use the veto that the Constitution already conferred upon him. He might equally well have noted that the executive branch has voluntarily surrendered its constitutional power over the last several years by acquiescing in the exercise of a congressional veto power that the Constitution itself does not recognize.

During the first of President Reagan's administrations, the Justice Department worked very hard to eliminate the legislative veto, whereby all members of one or both houses of Congress would have the opportunity to vote for or against the decisions otherwise delegated to the executive branch. The campaign culminated in the *Chadha* decision of 1983, in which the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could override an executive decision only by passing a new law through both houses and presenting it to the president for his signature. On its face, the decision gave tremendous authority to the executive branch, certainly raising reasonable fears of the sort of centralized authority against which Mr. Edwards warns.

Mickey Edwards must be given a C minus on constitutional history.
—Donald Devine

Veto By Committee

In practice, however, Congress has replaced the legislative veto, in which all members of Congress could participate, with reprogramming, in which only the members of the appropriations committees have a voice. The appropriations bills for many federal bodies, including the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), of which I have served as director for the last four and a half years, provide that all new regulations must be submitted to the appropriations committees of both houses for 15 days before being put into effect as law. *Chadha* makes clear that the executive branch may thereafter proceed to promulgate its regulations, notwithstanding expressions of committee disapproval. Nevertheless, I was informed by members of the Senate appropriations subcommittee

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having jurisdiction over LSC at this year's hearing that every federal agency except LSC refrains from publishing regulations unless they have been affirmatively approved by the two committees. If this is true, and I have no reason to doubt it, then the executive branch has permitted two congressional committees to exercise power that the Supreme Court has denied to the entire Congress itself.

I supported the legislative veto, in its original form, because I share Mr. Edwards' fears of centralized authority, especially in an era where great discretion has been delegated by statute to the executive branch. The one-house or two-house veto was an important democratic tool because it inhibited executive overreaching, while requiring all members of Congress to vote their convictions on the record. Reprogramming certainly restrains the executive, but it is much less open and democratic, permitting no direct participation by most members of Congress while not even requiring affirmative votes by the appropriations committees themselves.

Mr. Edwards is to be commended for reminding us that conservatives must work to maintain a balance between executive and legislative authority. When the executive branch uses the constitutional authority available to it there will be time enough to determine whether it needs more.

Michael B. Wallace
Legal Services Corporation
Washington, DC

In Defense of Congressional Management

Dear Sir:

Although I question whether "separation of powers" is a significant part of the English constitution and whether Thomas Hobbes can accurately be described as one of the "champions of individual liberty," I substantially agree with Representative Edwards' argument that conservatives in the 1980s have attributed too much authority to the presidency and not enough to the Congress in foreign policy.

Mr. Edwards' main argument is a constitutional one, based on conservative commitment to the separation of powers; but while this is a sound and sufficient argument, there are good reasons for defending a strong congressional role in foreign policy on pragmatic grounds as well.

As an aide to a conservative U.S. senator from 1981 to 1986, I spent much of my time engaged in "micromanagement" of executive branch actions contrary to conservative principles, the stated commitments of President Reagan, and the national interest. Among those that I and other conservatives in the Senate opposed were efforts to weaken or circumvent the Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. adherence to the unratified SALT II agreement, official reluctance to expose Soviet violations of arms control and other treaties, ratification of the unamended U.N. Genocide Convention, U.S. appeasement of international terrorism, and abandonment of or merely token support for anti-Communist insurgencies. Congressional conservatives in the early 1980s also often opposed or blocked objectionable appointments and nominations and worked with supportive executive branch officials for a foreign policy that protected and advanced American national interests. Even under a conservative presidency, conservatives in Congress found it necessary to keep close watch on executive branch foreign policy and a firm grip on the foreign policy rudder.

Unaccountable Bureaucracies

To acknowledge virtually unrestricted presidential authority in foreign policy, as many conservatives now do, is not only to risk delivering this power to future liberal Democratic presidents but also to deliver it now to the bureaucracies of the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, and other agencies that continuously pursue their own agendas without regard for elections and administrations.

Despite the corruption of Congress through its involvement in executive branch policy-making since the 1960s, Congress and only Congress still retains sufficient political independence of the executive branch to exert effective oversight of, and effective influence on, the formulation and conduct of foreign policy and thus to check and balance the permanent national security bureaucracy and its agenda. Congress is able to do so because its own dependence on local constituencies separates it from bureaucratic elites in the government and their allies in academic, journalistic, and corporate institutions. Granted that this separation has diminished in recent years, the cure for this kind of corruption and imbalance is not further enhancement of the imperial presidency (about which conservatives such as James Burnham and Willmoore Kendall were the first to warn) but the restoration of a real separation of powers among the branches and the genuine integrity of legislature and executive alike.

Samuel T. Francis
Deputy Editorial Page Editor
The Washington Times
Washington, DC

Mickey Edwards responds:

Mrs. Best is quite correct in asserting that the Founders feared a legislative branch unchecked by competing powers. While she does not quote Jefferson, she might well have added his warnings about "the tyranny" of the legislature. She is also correct in stating that the Founders deliberately chose a form of government that placed considerable power in the hands of a chief executive. I am not sure, however, why she goes to such great lengths to make that point, since I made it rather forcefully myself ("The Founding Fathers," I wrote, "clearly did not intend a weak and ineffective presidency....Clearly the drafting of the new Constitution was a move toward a stronger chief executive.")

When the executive branch uses the constitutional authority available to it there will be time enough to determine whether it needs more.

Michael B. Wallace

For some reason, Mr. Fairbanks, Mr. Devine, and Mr. Jeffrey all labor to make the same point. And we all agree on it: the Founders feared a concentration of power in either the

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Congress or the executive branch, and they all wanted to strengthen the office of the presidency.

The problem is in conclusions otherwise asserted. For example, Mrs. Best refers to the decision to give to the president the title—and role—of commander-in-chief. But, she makes more of that than is justified. In my article I agreed that the president is commander-in-chief. But that has only to do with the conduct of war. As she points out, it was well recognized that at such times, unity of command is essential. Once again, her point is correct but irrelevant.

Even under a conservative presidency, conservatives in Congress found it necessary to keep close watch on executive branch foreign policy.

—Samuel T. Francis

The same is true of Mr. Jeffrey's point about subordination of the executive to the legislatures prior to adoption of the Constitution. He is correct, of course, in asserting that the Founders concluded they should not follow suit, and that they chose, as I have already pointed out, to give more power to the executive. But it is equally true that they carried into their deliberations a continuing distrust of concentrated executive power, and that was the reason they concerned themselves so greatly with a system of checks and balances. Unlike Mr. Jeffrey, the Founders chose not to go to either extreme.

Mr. Jeffrey is likewise incorrect in dating the increasing "bureaucratization of America," as he puts it, from the time of Watergate. In fact, that unhappy state of events, which I deplore as much as he does, long pre-dated Watergate and is unrelated to the issue at hand, although I would point out that the growth of the departments and agencies of government has stemmed more from executive than congressional initiative.

My point is not that the presidency should be weak and ineffective, but that it now seeks powers wisely denied it. The Congress was meant to be strong and assertive. So was the presidency. But it would be wrong if, out of frustration with liberal domination of Congress, we were to attempt to place within the executive branch powers we would greatly fear if entrusted to a Michael Dukakis.

LBJ's Original Intent

Dear Sir:

Gary McDowell's article "Affirmative Inaction: The Brock-Meese Standoff on Federal Racial Quotas" (Spring 1989) adds many significant details to our knowledge of the clash within the Reagan administration over race- and gender-based employment policy. At the same time, Mr. McDowell's article helps to perpetuate a myth—one originally concocted by supporters of preferential treatment in employment—that would view the current federal policy of pressuring government contractors to hire on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender criteria as somehow the result of ambiguity ("inherent vagueness") in Lyndon Johnson's Executive Order No. 11246. The fact is that the policy of encouraging preferential treatment for women and members of certain ethnic groups—at the expense of men and the members of all the remaining non-stipulated ethnic groups—was exclusively the product of bureaucratic fiats issued in 1970 and 1971 by the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance. The "goals and timetables" policy with which we have become all too familiar has absolutely nothing to do with any official act Johnson ever undertook as president. Indeed, the two executive orders LBJ issued to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (No. 11246 and No. 11375) were explicitly intended to ensure the most scrupulous adherence to the principle of racial and ethnic *neutrality* in all employment decisions. Their color-blind intent was as clear and unambiguous as that of Title VII itself.

The relevant section of Executive Order No. 11246, issued by Johnson on September 24, 1965, reads: "The contractor will not discriminate against *any* employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take *affirmative action* to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, *without* regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: Employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruit advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training including apprenticeship....The contractor will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed by or on behalf of the contractor, state that *all* qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment *without* regard to race, creed, color, or national origin." (Emphasis added).

The term "affirmative action," which appears only once in the executive order, refers to positive steps to be taken by an employer to guarantee that race, ethnicity, and religion shall *not* be used as criteria in the making of employment decisions. "Affirmative action" in the sense LBJ used the term thus meant "active non-discrimination." Executive Order No. 11246 remained true to both the letter and the spirit of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which had declared it an unlawful employment practice for any employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

Heady Goals at Howard

Mr. McDowell quotes (with slight inaccuracy) from an important speech LBJ gave at Howard University in June 1965: "We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal equity but human ability. Not just equality as a right and a theory but equality as a fact and equality as a result." It is true that many supporters of preferential treatment in employment would later seize upon this quotation and claim that LBJ had shifted ground by 1965 and come out in support of racial and ethnic hiring quotas. This

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interpretation, however, is not only belied by the two "affirmative action" executive orders Johnson subsequently issued, with their aim of the strictest of color blindness in employment, but by the remainder of the Howard University speech itself. "For the task is to give 20 million Negroes," Johnson said immediately following the above quotation, "the same chance as every other American to learn and grow, to work and share in society, to develop their abilities." "To this end," he went on, "equal opportunity is essential but not enough." It was not enough, Johnson explained, because many black Americans are prevented from developing their innate talents and abilities due to the effects of inadequate schooling, poverty, poor health care, social isolation, the legacy of past discrimination and brutalization, and most seriously of all, the effects of family disintegration. What LBJ was trying to do in the Howard speech was to consolidate support for the myriad Great Society anti-poverty programs his administration was developing, and to draw special attention to the plight of the black family. By speaking of "equality as a result" Johnson was envisioning a situation whereby blacks would not only enjoy the benefits of racially neutral employment policies ("equality of opportunity"), but would have the social, familial, and educational resources needed to succeed under such policies in matching the achievements of whites. He sought not to change the rules of the racially neutral hiring game, but to develop policies and ideas whereby the current low scorers in that game could come up to a par with others.

Russell Nieli
Lecturer
Department of Politics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ

Meese's Major Failure

Dear Sir:

If Gary McDowell's article is accurate, Ed Meese made a terrible decision when he decided not to press Ronald Reagan to modify the executive order forbidding invidious discrimination in order to prevent the perversion that authorized numerical goals and timetables, which in effect open the way to racial and sexual quotas. If he was trying to prevent the Reagan administration from being unfairly accused of racism, then he clearly failed, since it was harshly criticized anyway.

I can't believe Meese chickened out on political grounds. Other Reagan priorities such as tax reform were *not* more important than returning to the principle of non-discrimination. Of all the accusations that have often unfairly been heaped on Meese, when the future history of this country is written, the worst thing that will be laid at his feet is his failure to help reverse the policy that nullified the principle of non-discrimination and violated the specific provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Sidney Hook
Hoover Institution
Stanford, CA

Just Say No

Dear Sir:

Although a reasonable case can be made that it was not worthwhile for the Reagan administration to abolish federal regulations requiring those doing business with the government to use racial quotas, the arguments given cannot withstand closer scrutiny. It is certainly true that abolition of racial quotas would have set off large-scale negative commentary, including charges of racism. But the alternative—letting the matter slide—has not stopped the charge of racism from being spread widely within liberal and minority communities. Refusal to face the issue allowed the Reagan administration to be blindsided by a series of *Bob Jones*-type incidents. Instead, formal abolition of racial quota regulation would have given the administration the opportunity to state its opposition to using racial means to secure non-racial ends.

While it would have been possible in theory for the uproar following abolition of racial quota regulation to have hampered other matters of importance to the Reagan administration, a review of the actual sequence of events suggests otherwise. The across-the-board tax cuts and spending reductions of 1981 set the tone for President Reagan's first term. Had abolition of racial quota regulation been done in 1982 or 1983 it would not have interfered with any other important matter. Nor could it have affected either the congressional or presidential election because all those likely to be affected by such an issue were already anti-Reagan and anti-Republican. The great policies of Reagan's second term, from tax reform to the INF treaty and the START negotiations, involved the president imposing sanctions on his own supporters, whether this be business accepting the loss of important tax preferences or conservatives accepting arms control before regime change in the Soviet Union. Egalitarians, whatever their color, were attracted to these policies because these liberals saw important values being served, from taking several million poor people off the tax rolls to the beginnings of nuclear arms reduction. Several years after the event, they would not likely have gone back on their own preferences to further belabor the president about an executive order. Had Congress voted to reinstate that order over a presidential veto, the president and the Republican Party would have had another opportunity to get across its message about personal responsibility without suffering more opprobrium than it already had. And the most likely hostage to abolition, the defense buildup, had in fact halted by 1984, after which defense budget authority was reduced every year.

"Affirmative action" in the sense LBJ used the term meant "active non-discrimination."

—Russell Nieli

A Great Moral Issue

Whether defending other Reagan administration policies was more important depends in significant part on what those concerned thought racial quota regulation was about. If it was about helping racial minorities overcome discrimination, it would have been wrong for Reagan to do anything but

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strengthen these regulations. Indeed, had not some members of the administration felt that this was what the regulations were about, the administration as a whole would have been united. But if President Reagan was trying to lead the nation out of dependence on government and toward an enhanced sense of self-worth, away from government regulation and toward self-regulation, mandatory racial quotas went to the heart of his effort to change the relationship between the citizen and the state. That people inside the administration accepted the transparent notion that racial quota regulation could be fixed up by altering its application at the margins suggests that they did not see it as the great moral issue it was and is.

This was not, in my opinion, a low-level issue from whose divisive consequences the president should have been shielded but a question of whether equality of opportunity or equality of condition would become the major value of American life. While I think well of the Reagan administration's efforts to change the course of public policy, its refusal to follow its own advice when faced with wrong behavior ("Just say no!") was unfortunate. It could be, of course, that President Reagan knew more about convincing people than I ever will. Perhaps it is not an easy matter to persuade the public that affirmative action is undesirable. In any event, the polls are on my side. Had Reagan always counted on unanimity within his administration, I would point out, he would have no accomplishment to his credit.

Aaron Wildavsky
Professor of Political Science and Public Policy
University of California—Berkeley
Berkeley, CA

Affirmative Action and Public Perception

Dear Sir:

I read with interest Gary McDowell's account of the struggle within President Reagan's cabinet that resulted in the decision not to repeal Executive Order No. 11246.

I am saddened but not surprised by yet another example of what David Stockman has called "the triumph of politics." Yet, despite the fact that I strongly support the principled position against quotas taken by Brad Reynolds and others, I must reluctantly conclude that the decision not to repeal the executive order was a correct political judgment, saving the administration endless grief, avoiding a firestorm of negative congressional and press reaction, and averting the likelihood of even more offensive programs enacted by legislative mandate as a counterweight to the perceived "retreat" from "rights" that the repeal would have been taken to represent.

Racial quota regulation was not a low-level issue but a question of whether equality of opportunity or equality of condition would become the major value of American life.

—Aaron Wildavsky

I cannot agree with those critics of the failure to repeal who assert that "the vast majority of Americans—black and white—are offended by preferential treatment." True, there is ample survey evidence to suggest that most Americans believe in a concept of equal opportunity that does not include the numerical quotas characteristic of affirmative action as administered under the executive order. However, the public meaning of these dubious efforts to advance the interests of minorities and women extends well beyond the concrete policies undertaken. The significance of affirmative action is largely symbolic; it is seen as representing a commitment to "right history's wrongs." Opposition to it is perceived as representing an inadequate acknowledgement of "society's role" in the current poor condition of many blacks, and a "lack of concern" for the rights of "women, minorities, and the poor." Legalistic and philosophic arguments concerning the violence done by this practice to the fundamental ideal of equality pale in comparison to the emotive force of symbolic arguments concerning the importance of placing *oneself* "on the right side of history." It takes an intellectual to grasp the nuances of the Court's reasoning in a case like *Wygant*, but anyone can see that blacks lag far behind other Americans in economic standing, that ours is a country with a history of discrimination, and that "reasonable efforts" to redress the wrongs of history should be tolerated. Those who insist otherwise bear a heavy burden of showing that they are not motivated by mean-spiritedness.

Evidence for my position is painfully easy to come by. Reynolds paid a not inconsiderable personal price for his crusade against quotas—witness his rejection by the Senate for promotion to the post of associate attorney general. Judge Bork, of course, paid an even higher price; and while his "offenses" lay mostly outside the arena of affirmative action, his public lynching was undertaken by the same forces who could have been expected to mobilize in reaction to a repeal of Executive Order No. 11246, and for much the same reasons—he showed "insensitivity" to the "rights" of "women, minorities, and the poor." Consider the congressional reaction to the reconstitution of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission; consider the sorry history of that body since its reconstitution. Note the harassment and ridicule that Clarence Thomas and the late Clarence Pendleton endured for publicly supporting the anti-quota position as black Reagan appointees with responsibilities in the area of civil rights. Recall the reaction to Reynolds' "infamous" letter to local governments in the wake of *Stotts*, in which he suggested that their "voluntary" programs had been rendered legally suspect by the Court's decision, and for which he was pilloried by Republican as well as Democratic mayors around the country. Indianapolis mayor William Hudnut became a national figure as he appeared on network news programs to denounce the "pernicious" effect of the assistant attorney general's "meddling."

Uphill Battle

What is sad, indeed tragic, in all of this is that those most exercised by any criticism of affirmative action, those prepared to organize, mobi-

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lize, and march to prevent "racists" from "turning back the clock," those ever-vigilant monitors of our public life, prepared at a moment's notice to assess the "commitment" or "sensitivity" of a nominee to the problems of "women, minorities, and the poor"—in short, the civil-rights establishment—have become essentially irrelevant to the real life circumstances of their ostensible constituents. They live and work in a world of symbols, not of substance. They demand obeisance to an idol, and consider their job done when they have secured a public affirmation that theirs is the one true god. Despite the manifest failure of their vision to deliver an improved standard of living to those on behalf of whom they protest, they continue to claim the moral high ground as the only true supporters of the interest of the disadvantaged. They are morally smug, intellectually soft and self-satisfied, but they are in control of the civil-rights agenda in this country. And they are likely to remain that way until they are challenged, not by conservative Republicans, who must fight an uphill battle for credibility when addressing these issues, but rather by women, and by black and Hispanic and poor white Americans who decide they have had enough.

Glenn C. Loury
Professor of Political Economy
John F. Kennedy
School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

Ignoblesse Oblige

Dear Sir:

As a member of the working group to revise Executive Order No. 11246, I read Gary McDowell's excellent article with great interest. As Mr. McDowell points out, inertia clearly won the day. It was simply easier—not to mention politically expedient—to do nothing to change the status quo on federally mandated affirmative action programs.

The failure to act means that race-conscious employment decisions will continue to define affirmative action. What a tragedy. And who will be hurt the most? Not white males. Sure, some individual white males will fail to be hired or promoted because of an employer's affirmative action plan—but more than likely these actions will be a temporary setback to the individual. Ironically, minorities themselves will suffer the longer-lasting and more pernicious effects of race-conscious affirmative action.

Racial quotas send a very clear signal to blacks, Hispanics, and others who are affirmative action's intended beneficiaries. They say that different standards must apply to minorities because minorities don't and can't measure up. Racial quotas may fill those on the dispensing end with feelings of *noblesse oblige,* but they patronize those on the receiving end in a demeaning and destructive manner.

Racial quotas may fill those on the dispensing end with a feeling of *noblesse oblige,* but they patronize those on the receiving end in a demeaning and destructive manner.

—Linda Chavez

The Reagan administration missed an opportunity to strike out against the inherently racist attitudes that drive many affirmative action programs.

Linda Chavez
Chairman
Equal Opportunity Foundation
Washington, DC

A Little Bit Pregnant?

Dear Sir:

Not only does Gary McDowell's splendid article record a fascinating behind-the-scenes account by a *bona fide* insider, it illuminates the fundamental injustices of a policy that has permitted arguably supportable affirmative action to be transformed into non-arguably proscribed reverse discrimination. Racial quotas are simply insupportable both on legal and constitutional grounds, and critics of quotas were, and are, correct in contending that "to play politics with so central a principle as equality was [and is] itself politically unacceptable." Just as one cannot be "a little bit pregnant," there is no such thing as condoning policies on the ground that they are only "a little bit unconstitutional."

Henry J. Abraham
James Hart Professor of
Government and Foreign Affairs
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA

Dear Sir:

Mr. McDowell tells us that Labor Secretary William Brock "was joined [in opposition to revising Executive Order No. 11246] by Treasury Secretary James Baker, who feared the effect revision might have on George Bush's presidential chances; by Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, whose husband had presidential ambitions of his own." Later we learn that Brock finally persuaded Edwin Meese that "had the order been revised, it would have undoubtedly become the focus of attacks on the administration and the Republican Party during the 1988 campaign, causing promises to be made all around that, if elected, this candidate or that would revise the order once again to include the clear authority to use goals, timetables, and so forth." Would this have been so bad? Instead of serving up vacuous bromides about "a kinder, gentler nation" and "good jobs at good wages," the candidates might have had a real issue to contend over.

Missed Opportunities

Bearing in mind that there is a big difference between how the issue of preferential treatment plays in the federal courts and the Democratic Congress and how it plays among the American people (just check any public opinion poll), I think there is every reason to believe that such a debate would have redounded to the benefit of the Republican Party. Everyone knew before the 1988 campaign even started that the Democrats' chances of capturing the White House depended upon their ability to win back the legions of so-called Reagan Democrats. These were largely Southern white males and working-class ethnic whites in the industrial North. Does anyone sincerely believe that these constituencies would have responded favorably to

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Democratic promises to restore racial goals and timetables? Yet this is precisely what Democratic candidates would have been compelled to do if Reagan had revised the executive order; Michael Dukakis could never have effected his celebrated reconciliation with Jesse Jackson at the Democratic convention without vowing to push hard on

I must reluctantly conclude that the decision not to repeal the executive order was a correct political judgment.

—Glenn C. Loury

the issue of restoring quotas. (As it happened, Dukakis was highly circumspect about such things. He seemed to realize that as far as the electorate was concerned, the words "affirmative action" were at least as odious as the dread word "liberal." Hence, throughout the campaign he avoided any discussion of affirmative action except when speaking before groups like the NAACP, where he enthusiastically endorsed it. Had the executive order been on the campaign's front burner, Dukakis would have been forced to bring his support for group preference out of the closet.) And because the executive order offered such a compelling example of the evils of government-coerced race- and gender-based hiring, it was a particularly prepossessing vehicle for carrying forward the public debate over the true meaning of "civil rights." The same cannot be said of the *Bob Jones University* case or even for the so-called Civil Rights Restoration Act. In short, I think the Reagan administration missed a marvelous opportunity to provoke a public discussion about affirmative action on its own terms, while at the same time enhancing Republican electoral prospects, not just at the presidential level, but at the congressional level as well.

A New Racial Demagoguery?

The Reagan administration's "affirmative inaction" with respect to the executive order, followed by the Bush administration's full-scale retreat (surrender?) on the issue of preferential treatment, does not mean that public opposition to it will go away. By withdrawing from this volatile moral and legal controversy, the Republican Party has created a void in the national political discourse that will eventually be filled by politicians from outside the political mainstream. Some of them will be unsavory persons with hidden agendas—the recent election of David Duke in Louisiana may be a case in point. It would be supremely ironic if the Reagan administration's failure to restore the non-discrimination principle to civil-rights policy led ultimately to the rise of a new kind of racial demagoguery, fueled by popular impatience and frustration over the unwillingness of "prudent" politicians to confront one of the most vexatious issues of our time.

Robert R. Detlefsen
Postdoctoral Fellow
Program for Constitutional Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA

Gary McDowell responds:

It is gratifying to read the responses to my recent article because each reader seems committed to the proposition that preferential discrimination is never to be desired as a matter of public policy.

Even the emotive power of affirmative action as a symbol to be reckoned with does not, as Mr. Loury points out, legitimate the sort of discriminatory policies that have come to be embedded by a heavy bureaucratic thumb in the loose rhetorical soil of LBJ's original executive order. (Despite Mr. Nieli's defense of LBJ's original intention, the policy line from there to here has been a direct one; to say the least, Mr. Nieli's account is a strong argument for intentionalism as the most dependable interpretive device.)

What is generally troubling about the responses, however, is the readiness with which so many are willing to dismiss as cowardly or deride as niggardly Edwin Meese's decision on the revision of the executive order. The simple fact is that Meese, like the president he so ably served, is firmly committed to the principle of non-discrimination. As he has often said, it is a policy wrong in principle and disastrous in practice. But from his broad view from the top of President Reagan's administration, it was clear to him that the remedy being pushed would very likely be worse than the disease. As I strove to point out, unintended consequences of a policy change in so volatile an area could have been—probably would have been—truly disastrous for the future of the principle of non-discrimination.

"Let's Pretend" Markets

Dear Sir:

Robert N. Stavins' article ("Clean Profits: Using Economic Incentives To Protect the Environment," Spring 1989) illustrates how little progress has occurred in the environmental debate. Mr. Stavins' economic rhetoric is refreshing; unfortunately, his message remains the same "only the Feds can save us" reality. Project 88, the report summarized in the article, is a hodgepodge of dated economic gimmicks uneasily linked to the standard environmental ideology. The message is unchanged: markets "fail" to protect environmental values; hence, government must intervene. The "new breeze" is to use pollution taxes, emission fees, and other politically engineered economic carrots and sticks to "perfect" our messy capitalist economy. When these ideas were first discussed in the early 1970s, they seemed plausible. At that time, economic planning was held in high regard, while markets were seen as archaic, incapable of addressing the complexities of a modern economy.

The world has grown wiser. Post-World War II experiences with economic planning here and abroad have shown that while markets aren't perfect, they consistently outperform political bureaucracies. Moreover, public choice researchers such as James Buchanan have demonstrated that the "public interest" model of "good government," by ignoring the role that self-interest plays in the political world, often leads to disastrous results. Mr. Stavins also seems unaware of the environmental benefits that would be made possible by the

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expansion of private property and the resulting greater reliance on private stewardship arrangements. The "let's pretend" markets that Mr. Stavins promotes would lack such property rights and, as Warren Nutter pointed out long ago, markets without property rights are a "Grand Illusion."

Mr. Stavins is unwilling to challenge the absurdity of current environmental laws, which impose uniform constraints on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis across the nation. He would simply place economic penalties on all economic activities and raise them until pollution goes away. Moreover, Project 88 goes far beyond its purported "efficiency" perspective of merely determining effective means of achieving environmental goals. Disguised in Mr. Stavins' article (explicit in Project 88) is a call for sharply increased corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. Had Mr. Stavins read the paper by his fellow Harvard professor John Graham, "The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety" (*The Journal of Law and Economics*), he would have found that higher CAFE standards dramatically increase highway fatalities. That, however, may well not have changed his recommendations; Mr Stavins, like his fellow environmental planners, seems to prefer increased regulatory control even when public health suffers.

Does anyone seriously believe that if Reagan had revised the executive order, the so-called Reagan Democrats would have responded favorably to Democratic election promises to restore racial goals and timetables?

—Robert R. Detlefsen

Diversity of Tastes

Less pollution is a good thing, but in the real world it is far better to have less of some pollutants than others, less in some regions than others. Moreover, there are many different ways of measuring pollution (cumulative, peak, peak cumulated over some specified time period); which statistic is most relevant may well vary depending upon local conditions. People may differ considerably in their willingness to accept varying air quality. Not every individual purchases bottled water, nor does every individual air condition his home.

The essence of this criticism is that centralized efforts at pollution control cannot take into account the variability in tastes and control possibilities critical to a modern complex economy. All economic activities entail some environmental consequence—efforts to address environmental problems from Washington thus amount to an indirect way of controlling all aspects of our economy. Theory and practice argue that all such efforts are doomed to failure and must give way to an approach based on an expansion of property rights to those environmental resources now at risk. That task is not easy—nor is the task of the reform of the centralized economies of Eastern Europe—but it is essential. As Pogo noted: "We have met the enemy and he is us!" Only extending stewardship responsibilities to individuals via expanded private property can make Pogo's injunction real to the citizenry.

Hayek vs. Hungary

Imagine Mr. Stavins were to publish a similar report aimed at improving the overall economy. He might piously note that it was not the purpose of markets to decide what is to be done. "Need," not individual choice, would determine production levels. His plan would then establish targets for wheat, toilet paper, cars, housing, and so forth, and detail an elaborate set of economic means to ensure this output is "efficiently" produced and distributed. That, after all, is pretty much what the Hungarian central planners have sought to do over the past two decades. They now know what F. A. Hayek and other free-market economists have sought to explain to their planner colleagues—that the problem solved by markets is far less how to produce than what to produce. Trade-offs are the essence of markets and trade-offs require private control over property.

Environmental values are critical. We should not waste time and energy in a foolish delusion that centralized planning will be any better at producing environmental quality than wheat. Creating property rights and enforcing the Polluter Pays Principle—the critical steps toward integrating environmental values into a free economy—will take much work and much creative thinking. But that effort—not another "good government" diversion—should be the priority of conservatives and all people valuing both economic freedom and environmental quality. The Road to Serfdom leads nowhere, even when green rather than red bricks pave its course.

Fred Lee Smith Jr.
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Washington, DC

Robert Stavins responds:

Fred Smith states that my article illustrates "how little progress has yet occurred in the environmental debate." On the contrary, current developments in Washington indicate how dramatically the substance and the tone of the debate have changed, even over the past 12 months. For the first time, serious consideration is being given to market-based approaches to environmental protection by the major players in national policy—the administration, the Congress, private industry, and the environmental community.

For nearly 30 years, economists have recommended market-based reforms of environmental policy and for just as long such recommendations have been ignored by policymakers. What has changed? Mr. Smith claims that Project 88, upon which my article was based, contains the same "dated economic gimmicks," but the truth is that it is Project 88's *departure* from previous recommendations by economists that helps to explain the very positive reception these ideas are receiving. Whereas economists have traditionally argued for the use of economic criteria to establish environmental goals and standards, Project 88 advocates a more moderate course—namely, that the environmental goals set by the body politic be achieved by least-cost means.

It is true that Project 88 does *not*

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recommend market-based solutions for *all* environmental problems, but this is because such approaches are *not always* appropriate. Whereas a properly designed marketable-permit approach to acid rain control has the potential of being productive and cost-effective, other environmental problems, characterized by localized, threshold effects, are not good candidates for control by such market mechanisms, since a result is likely to be the creation of significant pollution hotspots. Examples of the latter category include the case of highly toxic chemicals being emitted into small streams and emissions of dioxin from solid waste incinerators.

The "let's pretend" markets that Stavins promotes would lack property rights and therefore won't work.

—Fred Lee Smith Jr.

Inexplicably, Mr. Smith states that I am unwilling to challenge "current environmental laws, which impose uniform constraints on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis across the nation." But such a challenge is repeated throughout my article and the Project 88 report. Mr. Smith says the essence of his criticism is that "centralized efforts at pollution control cannot take into account the variability in tastes and control possibilities critical to a modern complex economy." But this is precisely why economic-incentive approaches to environmental protection are needed. The 36 recommendations in the Project 88 report are based upon greater reliance on individual initiative, made possible by policies that make it profitable for individuals and firms to clean up and costly for them to fail to do so. From our recommendation of a system of marketable permits for acid rain control to our recommendation of establishing markets for the allocation of western water supplies, the focus is repeatedly on using the powerful forces of the decentralized market and the ingenuity of individual entrepreneurs to solve environmental problems at lowest possible cost to society at large. Although the particular perspective and attendant rhetoric that Mr. Smith favors may well be absent from Project 88, the underlying approach he calls for actually permeates my article and the full report.

Mr. Smith's call for exclusive reliance on the expansion of private property rights as a pure and simple solution for environmental problems is based upon ideas first developed by Ronald Coase 30 years ago. Unfortunately, the Coasian solution of bilateral negotiation is as infeasible as it is simple, because of the large numbers of interested parties involved in most environmental disputes and because of the public-good nature of the resources of concern. Does anyone really believe that acid rain can be efficiently controlled by assigning private property rights for the U.S. airshed and then effecting negotiations among all affected parties? Economic-incentive mechanisms, on the other hand, avoid the impracticalities of the pure, private-property approach, while retaining the *merits of* decentralized, market-driven policies. There is clearly a place for greater reliance on market forces in our approaches to environmental problems, but an idealized, unreal image of the market only obscures possibilities for real policy improvements to deal with actual environmental problems.

Compulsory Servitude

It was with great surprise that I read James Strock's "Citizen Service: What You Can Do for Your Entitlements" (Spring 1989) in the pages of *Policy Review*. Proposals for national service, which will, if enacted, unquestionably lead to compulsory or quasi-compulsory servitude, are completely consistent with the collectivism of the "Dukakis liberals." But they are *not* consistent with the principles of freedom.

Mr. Strock says "Domestic or military service, while voluntary, should become an expected rite of passage for American youth." The modifier "voluntary" should be viewed in the light of the assurance to us a generation ago that "school busing" was prohibited by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Mr. Strock's "national service," under which objectors would become second-class citizens for the rest of their lives, flies squarely in the face of the Thirteenth Amendment. Moreover, it would unquestionably have a severely adverse affect on the very successful All-Volunteer Force.

Robert C. Whitten
Cupertino, CA

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